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Abstract
Decision-related activities, such as bottom-up and top-down policy development,
analysis, and planning, stand to benefit from the development and application of
computer-based models that are capable of representing spatiotemporal social human
behavior in local contexts. This is especially the case with our efforts to understand and
search for ways to mitigate the context-specific effects of climate change, in which case
such models need to include interacting social and ecological components. The
development and application of such models has been significantly hindered by the
challenges in designing artificial agents whose behavior is grounded in both empirical
evidence and theory and in testing the ability of artificial agents to represent the behavior
of real-world decision-makers. This dissertation advances our ability to develop such
models by overcoming these challenges through the creation of: (a) three new
frameworks, (b) two new methods, and (c) two new open-source modeling tools. The
three new frameworks include: (a) the SOSIEL framework, which provides a theoreticallygrounded blueprint for the development of a new generation of cognitive, multi-agent,
and knowledge-based models that consist of agents empowered with cognitive
architectures; (b) a new framework for analyzing the bounded rationality of decisionmakers, which offers insight into and facilitates the analysis of the relationship between
a decision situation and a decision-maker’s decision; and (c) a new framework for
analyzing the doubly-bounded rationality (DBR) of artificial agents, which does the same
i

for the relationship between a decision situation and an artificial agent’s decision. The
two new methods include: (a) the SOSIEL method for acquiring and operationalizing
decision-making knowledge, which advances our ability to acquire, process, and
represent decision-making knowledge for cognitive, multi-agent, and knowledge-based
models; and (b) the DBR method for testing the ability of artificial agents to represent
human decision-making. The two open-source modeling tools include: (a) the SOSIEL
platform, which is a cognitive, multi-agent, and knowledge-based platform for simulating
human decision-making; and (b) an application of the platform as the SOSIEL Human
Extension (SHE) to an existing forest-climate change model, called LANDIS-II, allowing for
the analysis of co-evolutionary human-forest-climate interactions. To provide a context
for examples and also guidelines for knowledge acquisition, the dissertation includes a
case study of social-ecological interactions in an area of the Ukrainian Carpathians where
LANDIS-II with SHE are currently being applied. As a result, this dissertation advances
science by: (a) providing a theoretical foundation for and demonstrating the
implementation of a next generation of models that are cognitive, multi-agent, and
knowledge-based; and (b) providing a new perspective for understanding, analyzing, and
testing the ability of artificial agents to represent human decision-making that is rooted
in psychology.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 1 describes the current challenges in modeling social human behavior that this
dissertation aims to overcome, presents the dissertation’s thesis statements, and
provides summaries of subsequent chapters.

1.1 Current challenges and criteria
Decision-related activities, such as bottom-up and top-down policy development,
analysis, and planning, stand to benefit from the development and application of
cognitive, multi-agent, and knowledge-based models that are capable of representing
spatiotemporal human behavior in local contexts. This is especially the case with our
efforts to understand and search for ways to mitigate the context-specific effects of
climate change, in which case such models need to include interacting social and
ecological components. The development of such models would significantly improve our
understanding of the context-specific relationships among various possible decisions and
their potential outcomes, while their application would support bottom-up and top-down
scenario analysis and planning.
Such decision support systems are already being used in many fields (Power 2002, 2008),
where they have shown to be capable of improving both decision-making processes and
related outcomes (Klein & Methlie 1995, Holsapple & Whinston 1996, Holsapple & Sena
2005). Models that simulate social human behavior or that include a component that
1

simulates it need to be capable of capturing the complex1 and adaptive2 nature
characterizing social contexts (Arthur et al. 1997, Miller & Page 2007). Complexity in social
contexts arises through the interactions among decision-makers (e.g., Arthur et al. 1997,
Miller & Page 2007), which are heterogeneous in both their attributes and behavior.
Heterogeneity is of special interest because interactions among autonomous agents have
the potential of producing emergent properties, such as collective actions, which are
essential for resolving many social problems (Ostrom et al. 1994).
The multi-agent approach to modeling (e.g., Wooldridge 1997, Jennings 2000, Shoham &
Leyton-Brown 2009) has been repeatedly recognized (e.g., Arthur et al. 1997, Tesfatsion
2006, Miller & Page 2007) for its ability to produce complex and adaptive behavior and
there is already in existence a large number of multi-agent models designed to study
social-ecological interactions that have been shown to be capable of producing at least

1

Sterman (2000) defined social complexity as having two dimensions, combinatorial, which results

from a large number of possible combinations of relevant factors, and feedback, which results from
the presence of direct and indirect feedback loops.
2

Adaptation is any change in individual or collective behavior aimed at fulfilling a need and that is

in response to change(s) in personal, social, and/or ecological conditions. In terms of adaptation in
social contexts, it sometimes arises from decision-makers switching from one known (individual or
collective) decision option to another and sometimes from switching to a new decision option that
they either invented themselves or learned from another decision-maker.

2

some of the complex and adaptive behavior of interest (e.g., Parker et al. 2003, Bousquet
& Le Page 2004).
However, a number of major challenges have been recognized in developing such multiagent models of human behavior (Parker et al. 2003, Filatova et al. 2013). For example,
according to a literature review conducted by Filatova and colleagues (2013) of multiagent models in the fields of land use and environmental sciences, it remains a major
challenge to design agents whose behavior is grounded in both empirical evidence and
theory, as opposed to just one or the other.
In terms of empirical evidence, these models need to go beyond capturing local
demographics and practices and capture more of the relevant knowledge that is used in
decision-making. This is not only because local knowledge evolves within the context of
interest and, therefore, likely holds valuable insight into the intricacies of the context and
the ways to manage it (Berkes 1999, Berkes et al. 2000), but also because the success of
any policy affecting the local population depends on its compatibility and ability to coevolve with the particularities of the local knowledge.
In terms of theory, these models need to start incorporating the cognitive foundations of
decision-making (Meyfroidt 2012) and ground agent behavior in a comprehensive
framework of human individual and social decision-making (Filatova et al. 2013). It is
important for agents to respond meaningfully to qualitative change (Meyfroidt 2012), to
be capable of all relevant types of adaptation, including individual and social, and to be
3

capable of producing potential, in addition to past, behavior. These obstacles are further
complicated by the need for the behavior of these agents to be useful for practical policy
implementation and therefore be first and foremost humanly possible (as opposed to
optimal), suggesting that the agent behavior needs to be inspired by psychological and
sociological processes, as opposed to machine learning.
An additional challenge has been to test the ability of artificial agents in multi-agent
models to represent the behavior of real-world decision-makers (Filatova et al. 2013). This
is partially due to: (a) the general difficulties of testing models of open, complex, and
adaptive systems; (b) the fact that individual and social human behaviors permit both
multifinality, which is when the same initial conditions can lead to varying outcomes, and
equifinality, which is when varying initial conditions can lead to the same outcome; and
(c) the limitations in our ability to understand, capture, and represent the knowledge and
cognition of real-world decision makers. There is a need for a new method to test the
ability of artificial agents to represent real-world decision-makers that can overcome the
above challenges and provide insight into how agent representation of human decisionmaking can be improved.

1.2 Thesis statements
Overcoming the above-listed challenges requires introducing levels of cognition that are
currently not implemented in multi-agent models of decision-making (e.g., An 2012). They

4

are, however, implemented in the field of cognitive architectures (e.g., Newell 1990, Sun
2007, Langley et al. 2009, Goertzel et al. 2010). This leads us to the first thesis statement:
Thesis statement 1: The challenge of designing multi-agent models with
agents whose behavior is grounded in both empirical evidence and theory
can be overcome by empowering each agent with their own cognitive
architecture that consists of theoretically-grounded cognitive processes
and agent-specific and empirically-grounded knowledge.
Empowering agents with cognitive architectures also helps to overcome the challenge of
testing the ability of artificial agents to represent human behavior by creating the
opportunity to apply methods of analysis from psychology. This brings us to the second
thesis statement:
Thesis statement 2: The ability of artificial agents to represent human
decision-making can be improved with a method of analysis that is rooted
in psychology.
In this dissertation, Chapters 2-5 address the first thesis statement and Chapters 6 and 7
address the second. Chapter 8 discusses the contributions, the conclusions, and the next
steps. A brief introduction to each chapter is provided below.

5

1.3 Chapter summaries
The chapters may be separated into two groups. The first group consists of Chapters 2
through 5, and focuses on knowledge acquisition for and design, theoretical foundations,
and operationalization of the SOSIEL framework. The second group consists of Chapters
6 and 7 and focuses on analyzing, testing, and improving models of artificial agents.
Chapter 2 describes the research conducted thus far in an ongoing effort to apply LANDISII with the SOSIEL Human Extension (Ch. 5) in an area of the Ukrainian Carpathians, called
Bohdanska Dolyna. LANDIS-II is an existing forest-climate change model, while the SOSIEL
Human Extension (SHE) is its new extension that was developed as part of this dissertation
and that simulates human behavior, allowing for human-forest-climate interactions. The
research involved using the new SOSIEL method that was developed as part of this
dissertation to acquire and operationalize local decision-making knowledge for
parameterizing and initializing SHE. In this regard, the research serves as a proof of
concept of the new method and more generally our ability to acquire and operationalize
local decision-making knowledge for cognitive, multi-agent, and knowledge-based
models. As a positive side-effect, the chapter describes a real-world context in which
there is a need for a cognitive, multi-agent, and knowledge-based model and provides a
backdrop for the examples used in other parts of the dissertation.
Section 2.1 introduces the chapter with a brief contextualization of Bohdanska Dolyna.
Section 2.2 discusses some of the key differences between cognitive, multi-agent, and
6

knowledge-based model and traditional knowledge-based systems and how these
differences imply a need for a new method for acquiring knowledge. Section 2.3 describes
the new SOSIEL method for acquiring and operationalizing local knowledge for
parameterizing and initializing SHE and more generally cognitive, multi-agent, and
knowledge-based models. Section 2.4 describes the results from implementing the new
method, which include a description of Bohdanska Dolyna’s socio-economic context and
the relationships among its forest landscape, forest managers, and local forestdependent residents. The results are useful in assessing the current state of Bohdanska
Dolyna’s local capacity to adapt to climate change and also serves as a proof of concept
for the new method. Lastly, Section 2.5 concludes with a brief description of this chapter’s
contributions. The next steps of the research effort applying LANDIS-II with SHE in
Bohdanska Dolyna are described in Section 8.2.
Chapter 3 describes and provides theoretical support for SOSIEL, a novel cross-disciplinary
framework for designing a new generation of multi-agent models in which each agent is
empowered with their own cognitive architecture that consists of theoretically-grounded
cognitive processes and agent-specific and empirically-grounded knowledge. Section 3.1
provides a summary of the SOSIEL framework. Section 3.2 describes the SOSIEL agents
and their social structure and population dynamics. Section 3.3 describes the cognitive
architecture of SOSIEL agents, which consists of a learning processes component, a
memory structures component, and a decision-making processes component. Lastly,

7

Section 3.4 describes the ways in which the cognitive architecture of SOSIEL agents and
more generally the SOSIEL framework uniquely qualify for guiding the design of cognitive,
multi-agent, and knowledge-based models.
Chapter 4 describes characteristics of the SOSIEL platform, which is an open-source
modeling tool that is the first operationalization of the SOSIEL framework (Ch. 3). Section
4.1 briefly introduces the platform, Section 4.2 describes the information needed for
parameterization and initialization of the platform, Section 4.3 describes the four
cognitive levels to which the cognition of agents can be set, Section 4.4 provides the main
call directive of the platform’s algorithm, Section 4.5 provides the pseudo-code that
served as the template for programming the three decision-making and five learning
modules of the SOSIEL platform, and Section 4.6 lists the differences between some parts
of the platform’s design and the corresponding parts in the SOSIEL framework.
Chapter 5 describes LANDIS-II’s SOSIEL Human Extension (SHE), which is the result of
coupling the SOSIEL platform (Ch. 4) with an open-source forest-climate change model,
called LANDIS-II. Together, LANDIS-II with SHE can simulate context-specific, co-evolving
human-forest-climate interactions, which is exemplified in the chapter with two
hypothetical examples. Chapter 5 begins with a discussion in Section 5.1 of the need for
SHE and describes other platforms that simulate human-forest interactions, while Section
5.2 briefly describes LANDIS-II, SHE, and the two of them coupled together. The chapter
also describes a part of the effort to implement LANDIS-II with SHE in the Ukrainian
8

Carpathians, which involved simulating the model with simplified variations of the locally
acquired knowledge that was discussed and presented in Chapter 2. To this end, Section
5.3 describes two hypothetical examples, one involving innovation in forest management
and the other involving social learning and collective action in a forest-dependent
community. Lastly, Section 5.4 discusses how LANDIS-II with SHE can be used in more
complicated examples, how applying formulation from evolutionary game theory can
introduce rigor into the analysis of decision-outcome relationships, and how SHE
contributes overall to our ability to analyze human-forest-climate interactions.
Chapter 6 first describes a new framework for analyzing the bounded rationality in
decision-makers that is rooted in competing schools of thought and consolidates a variety
of related concepts to establish a comprehensive relationship between a decision
situation and a decision. The chapter then describes the new framework for analyzing the
doubly-bounded rationality of artificial agents that expands on the framework for
analyzing bounded rationality and advances our understanding of the relationships
among: (a) a decision situation, (b) a decision-maker making a decision within that
decision situation, (c) a modeler modeling the decision-maker, and (d) an artificial agent
designed by the modeler to represent the decision-maker.
Chapter 7 presents and demonstrates the application of the doubly-bounded rationality
method for testing the ability of artificial agents to represent human decision-making,
building on the new frameworks described in Chapter 6. The chapter demonstrates the
9

new method by testing and comparing the ability of SOSIEL and two other types of
artificial agents to represent the decision-making that takes place in a popular psychology
experiment, called the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism. Section 7.1 describes the
general challenges in testing the ability of artificial agents to represent the behavior of
decision-makers. Section 7.2 describes the doubly-bounded rationality method, its four
steps, its relation to the Turing Test, and the respective decision situations within which
boundedly-rational decision-makers and unboundedly rational and double-boundedlyrational artificial agents are analyzed. Section 7.3 describes the application of the method
in attempting to invalidate the ability of SOSIEL and IEL agents to represent BR decisionmaking within the context of the common-pool resource problem. Lastly, Section 7.4
discusses the conclusion that can be drawn from the results, while Section 7.5 describes
how the doubly-bounded rationality method advances our ability to test artificial agents.
Chapter 8 ends with this dissertation’s contributions and conclusions, as well as a
discussion about the next steps in terms of: (a) implementing SHE in Bohdanska Dolyna,
(b) using evolutionary game theory to introduce rigor into the analysis of the decisionoutcome relationship, and (c) improving the SOSIEL framework.

10

Chapter 2: Acquiring and operationalizing local knowledge
Chapter 2 describes the research conducted thus far in an ongoing effort to apply LANDISII with the SOSIEL Human Extension (Ch. 5) in an area of the Ukrainian Carpathians, called
Bohdanska Dolyna. LANDIS-II is an existing forest-climate change model, while the SOSIEL
Human Extension (SHE) is its new extension that was developed as part of this dissertation
and that simulates human behavior, allowing for human-forest-climate interactions. The
research involved using the new SOSIEL method that was developed as part of this
dissertation to acquire and operationalize local decision-making knowledge for
parameterizing and initializing SHE. In this regard, the research serves as a proof of
concept of the new method and more generally our ability to acquire and operationalize
local decision-making knowledge for cognitive, multi-agent, and knowledge-based
models. As a positive side-effect, the chapter describes a real-world context in which
there is a need for a cognitive, multi-agent, and knowledge-based model and provides a
backdrop for the examples used in other parts of the dissertation.
Section 2.1 introduces the chapter with a brief contextualization of Bohdanska Dolyna.
Section 2.2 discusses some of the key differences between cognitive, multi-agent, and
knowledge-based models and traditional knowledge-based systems and how these
differences imply a need for a new method for acquiring knowledge. Section 2.3 describes
the new SOSIEL method for acquiring and operationalizing local knowledge for
parameterizing and initializing SHE and more generally cognitive, multi-agent, and
11

knowledge-based models. Section 2.4 describes the results from implementing the new
method, which include a description of Bohdanska Dolyna’s socio-economic context and
the relationships among its forest landscape, forest managers, and local forestdependent residents. The results are useful in assessing the current state of Bohdanska
Dolyna’s local capacity to adapt to climate change and also serves as a proof of concept
for the new method. Lastly, Section 2.5 concludes with a brief description of this chapter’s
contributions. The next steps of the research effort applying LANDIS-II with SHE in
Bohdanska Dolyna are described in Section 8.2.

2.1 Contextualization
One Summer morning in Luhy, I found myself walking alongside an elderly woman on my
way to the bus stop. Luhy is one of four villages in a secluded valley, called Bohdanska
Dolyna, in the Rakhiv region of the Ukrainian Carpathians, where I was conducting
research into human adaptation to climate change in 2016.
After briefly chatting about the sunny weather, the woman shared with me how all her
family had moved away and how difficult it was to manage on her own. After listening to
her story, I asked her, “Will things ever change here?” by here meaning Luhy. “Never,”
she replied, with determined certainty. “Never.” “How do you know?” I asked her. “I feel
it,” she replied, this time getting a little emotional.
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I remember reflecting on her reply after we parted ways and wondering: was she right?
Indeed, Luhy, the village where the woman lived her entire life, seems in some ways like
it hasn’t changed for decades, if not longer. Many of the houses around were built out of
wood, mud, and hay, with no gas or sewage infrastructure. The models of most cars date
back well into the Soviet era. The Bila Tysa River, along which Luhy stretches, is endlessly
running, or at least it seems. The surrounding evergreen-covered mountain slopes seem
like they have been there forever. Even the seemingly constant buzz of the wood mills,
where timber is prepared for mostly shipment abroad, and the trucks regularly passing
along the main road that transport (at times illegal) timber out of the valley, add to the
feeling of an endless state of normalcy and lack of change.
And yet Bohdanska Dolyna in many ways is a place that has seen major change. Just within
the last century, the political regimes governing its region transitioned from the AustroHungarian rule before WWII, to the Soviet rule afterwards, and to Ukrainian self-rule after
Ukraine’s independence in 1991. Reflecting on this recurrent change in political regimes,
another elderly resident of Luhy in an interview joked how he never needed to travel
outside of the valley because he could just as well be in different countries just by
remaining put.
Despite each political regime bringing its unique and significantly different set of
institutions, the residents of Bohdanska Dolyna and more broadly of the Ukrainian
Carpathians managed to simultaneously preserve many of their traditions and adapt to
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the change. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which led to all local factories
shutting down and, as a result, most local jobs disappearing, the residents of Bohdanska
Dolyna managed to adapt by finding seasonal work abroad.
One of the major constants that allowed them to preserve their local life has been the
forested mountains, within which they live and upon which they depend for building
material, food, heating, water, inspiration, leisure, and many other ecosystem functions
that are less obvious to the eye.
And yet, another regime change is coming, not a political regime this time, but a climate
one. Climate change is expected to have adverse effects on many mountain populations
throughout the world, such as the one in Bohdanska Dolyna. Climate change affects
mountain forests in a number of ways, including through flooding, droughts, landslides,
change in species composition, and insect infestation. While the well-being of the
residents in Bohdanska Dolyna is intricately intertwined with the state of the surrounding
forest landscape, there are no currently known (formal or informal) climate change
adaptation efforts under way or even planned.
In summary, the residents of Bohdanska Dolyna have endured many changes that have
affected their political, social, and economic ways of life. Yet they managed to
simultaneously preserve many of their traditions and adapt to the changes. One of the
major constants that allowed them to preserve their local way of life has been the
forested mountains, within which they live and upon which they depend. However, as a
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result of changes in the climate, the forested mountains may soon become the source of
new and potentially unprecedented change.

2.2 A need for a new method for acquiring knowledge
This section discusses some of the key differences between cognitive, multi-agent, and
knowledge-based models and traditional knowledge-based systems and how these
differences imply a need for a new method for acquiring knowledge. Although
knowledge-based decision support systems (Klein & Methlie 1995, Holsapple & Whinston
1996, Negnevitsky 2011) already exist and can be used as examples, most of the popular
knowledge-based systems are expert systems (McGraw & Harbison-Briggs 1989,
Negnevitsky 2011), which are developed to mimic the decision-making processes of
human experts with the aim of supporting or replacing them in certain decision situations
(Jackson 1986). A good amount of guidance exists in the literature on how to acquire
knowledge for operationalizing expert systems. However, there are fundamental
differences between expert systems and cognitive, multi-agent, and knowledge-based
models representing the knowledge of heterogeneous populations.
For one, in the case of an expert system, the goal is to acquire and represent the
knowledge that is needed to imitate an expert’s decision-making process within a specific
context that is sufficiently understood. From the perspective of the developer(s), the
expert(s), and the future user(s) of an expert system, there are right decisions and wrong
decisions, and it is essential that the expert system is capable of producing right decisions.
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The knowledge that is incorporated into an expert system may come from a variety of
experts. However, it must be consistent (McGraw & Harbison-Briggs 1989), as in noncontradictory, and accurate.
By contrast, in the case of a cognitive, multi-agent, and knowledge-based model, the goal
is to imitate the decision-making of multiple decision-makers, who may have different
and at times contradictory perspectives about a context that is often poorly understood.
With respect to the fact that the knowledge need not be consistent, not only can
inconsistence be tolerated in such models on the level of the population of agents, it also
need not be consistent at the level of an agent, since confusion in human understanding
and decision-making, which the agent is designed to represent, is anything but rare.
With regards to accuracy, and in the case of an expert system, the aim is to capture the
successful decision-making of an expert, or a set of experts, and to use it to either support
a skilled user or to replace an expert altogether. There is no sense in capturing
unsuccessful decision-making, since there is little demand for an expert system that
produces unsuccessful decision support. As a result, testing the quality of knowledge
gathered for an expert system is relatively easy; it is assessed by the success rate of the
decisions made by the expert system.
Accuracy, as it relates to the knowledge in a cognitive, multi-agent, and knowledge-based
model, takes on a different meaning. The aim is to capture the true decision-making
processes of decision-makers, regardless of their success. Furthermore, most decision16

makers being simulated by such models are likely to vary in degrees of their expertise.
And the level of expertise would not only depend on the length and type of a decisionmaker’s experience in dealing with a context in question, but also with the level of
uncertainty inherent to the context. This makes the quality of acquired knowledge
difficult to test, as even a decision-maker whose knowledge is being used may not
understand their own decision-making processes enough to assess the quality of its
artificial representation.
The above-mentioned characteristics of cognitive, multi-agent, and knowledge-based
models that differentiate them from expert systems suggest that they would benefit from
methods in the social sciences that are used for collecting data about heterogeneous
populations. Specifically, surveys and interviews are typically used for collecting
information on demographics, motivations (e.g., Nielsen-Pincus et al. 2015), preferences
(e.g., Gundersen & Frivold 2008), and even individual and group conceptualizations of
contexts (e.g., Morgan et al. 1992, Morgan et al. 2002, Etienne et al. 2011, Mathevet et
al. 2011. Stone-Jovicich et al. 2011, Lynam et al. 2012, Hoffman et al. 2014, Jones et al.
2014, Smythe & Thompson 2015).
This type of information is necessary for parameterizing cognitive, multi-agent, and
knowledge-based models. To be simulatable and adaptive, however, in addition to this
type of information, such models also require information about relevant decisions and
decision-making processes that adapt these decisions (and potentially motivations,
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preferences, and conceptualizations) to personal, social, and (in the case of socialecological contexts) ecological changes. For example, a profit maximizing forest manager
who also wants to maintain a forest’s biomass above a certain level may switch from
intensive to mild harvesting practices after noticing the forest’s biomass nearing or
dropping below a specific given level (with the aim of allowing the forest to recover).
Simulating such adaptation in a cognitive, multi-agent, and knowledge-based model
requires information about the forest manager’s motives, practices, and the decisionmaking processes that use the motives, the practices, and the forest conditions to
produce a switch in behavior.
In summary, there are significant differences between some of the characteristics of the
knowledge needed for operationalizing a cognitive, multi-agent, and knowledge-based
model and those of the knowledge needed for operationalizing traditional knowledgebased systems. These differences stem from the fact that the purpose of cognitive, multiagent, and knowledge-based models is to simulate the behavior of a population of
decision-makers, as opposed to one expert (as is the case with expert systems). These
differences require a new method that is capable of both, capturing information relevant
for decision-making and reflecting the variety in decision-making of a heterogeneous
population of decision-makers.
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2.3 The new SOSIEL method
This section describes the new SOSIEL method for acquiring and operationalizing
knowledge for parameterizing and initializing a cognitive, multi-agent, and knowledgebased model. Knowledge acquisition is a term from the field of knowledge-based systems
(e.g., Negnevitsky 2011) that represents the process of obtaining knowledge from one or
more sources using one or more approaches. Knowledge operationalization involves both
processing the acquired knowledge and representing it in a form that is consistent with
the knowledge requirements of a knowledge-based system. The method is unique in its
ability to acquire both the breadth in knowledge that is characteristic of heterogeneous
populations and the depth in knowledge that is characteristic of expert systems.
The new method was developed for acquiring and operationalizing knowledge for models
developed in line with the SOSIEL framework (Ch. 3), such as SHE (Ch. 5) and more
generally the SOSIEL platform (Ch. 4), and was implemented in Bohdanska Dolyna. The
method consists of the following five main steps: (a) preparation, (b) acquisition, (c)
processing, (d) representation, and (e) definition of the resulting social or social-ecological
system.

2.3.1 Preparing for knowledge acquisition
Proper preparation is critical for knowledge acquisition, partly because it is important to
know which questions should be asked and which questions respondents are willing to
answer, partly to be able to prepare the proper tools to document the knowledge
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collected, and partly, in case there is a team, to have all team members ready and on the
same page. The perpetration for knowledge acquisition may involve: (a) forming and
preparing a team and (b) choosing the location.

2.3.1.1 Preparing the team
It is critical that the team is well-prepared and includes members who work well together
and can contribute one or more of the necessary skills, including emotional and social
intelligence, critical thinking, knowledge of the local culture, and interviewing,
transcribing and/or translating experience. In order to identify fitting team members, a
seven-week training course for knowledge acquisition and operationalization was
conducted as part of this dissertation at the Ukrainian National Forestry University (Lviv,
Ukraine) and attended by faculty and graduate students from the ecological economics,
psychology, and sociology departments of local universities, including the Ukrainian
National Forestry University and the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv.
Training began with a review of relevant documents (prepared as part of the background
research and upon which a significant portion of this method section is based) and
transitioned to extensive practice in using a unique style of interviewing (Sec. 2.3.2.2.1).
As suggested by McGraw and Harbison-Briggs (1989), mock interviews were conducted
with experts, which helped to tailor the questionnaire (App. A1) to the local context.
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2.3.1.2 Choosing a location
A meeting was set up to identify a specific area in the Ukrainian Carpathians to focus on,
which included representatives from academia and an NGO (World Wildlife Fund).3 The
participants of the meeting were presented with the following criteria:
1. The location should include significant bidirectional social-ecological interactions,
which means that human activity must currently or in the relevant future have
significant influence on forest dynamics and that changes in the forest must
currently or in the relevant future significantly influence human well-being;
2. The location should be transferable, which means that any lessons learned from
studying the location should be relevant to other locations in the Carpathian
Mountains and beyond;
3. The location should have a complex landscape, which means that forest
management challenges should be significant;

3

The Ukrainian Carpathians were chosen as a place of study for a number of reasons, but primarily out of

personal interest to me, as Ukraine is my country of birth. Approximately a year before this effort, parts of
Ukrainian East and Southeast were invaded by pro-Russian forces, which threw Ukraine into turmoil and
inspired me to pursue a Fulbright Research Award in order to conduct research in Ukraine. With the
Ukrainian Carpathians including the largest percentage of the Ukrainian forests, they were the first-choice
in my search for an area in Ukraine where I could conduct forest-related research.
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4. The location should have a sufficient amount of forest cover, which is a criterion
included for meeting LANDIS-II requirements; and
5. The location should be underdeveloped, which implies reducing the number of
exogenous socio-economic factors influencing local social-ecological interactions.

After a discussion, a consensus emerged that a valley in the Rakhiv region called
Bohdanska Dolyna (the word dolyna means valley in the Ukrainian language), best met
the above criteria. Bohdanska Dolyna (Fig. 1) is part of the Bila Tysa watershed, which
stretches across 486 square kilometers. Although the entrance into Bohdanska Dolyna
borders the Rakhiv Region’s administrative center, Rakhiv, its topography has left it as
one of the most isolated areas in the Ukrainian Carpathians.
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Figure 1: Bohdanska Dolyna on the map of Ukraine.

It is convenient to divide Bohdanska Dolyna into three main components: (a) its forest
landscape, (b) the human component that manages the forest landscape, and (c) the
human component that lives in and relies on, but does not manage, the forest landscape.

2.3.1.2.1 The forest landscape
The Bila Tysa watershed is a medium mountainous mostly spruce-dominated area with
elevations ranging from 445 meters to slightly over 2000 meters. In such mid-latitude
forests, a warming climate is likely, on one hand, to lengthen the growing season and
increase the rates of tree growth and, on the other, to increase the frequency and
magnitude of biotic disturbances (IUFRO 2009).
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The forests in the Bila Tysa watershed, which cover 367 square kilometers, are owned by
the Ukrainian government and are divided among five local forestry enterprises and the
Carpathian Biosphere Reserve. The forestry enterprises manage more than 60% of the
watershed’s forested area through harvesting, maintenance, and planting. The remaining
144 square kilometers of the forests are managed by the Carpathian Biosphere Reserve
(Ukrderzhlisproekt 2014), which is tasked with protecting the forests, limiting
management to sanitation cutting. Individuals are not allowed to harvest in any of the
government-owned forests. Illegal logging is recognized as a major problem in Ukraine
and, according to Pavelko and Skrylnikov (2010), is a result of socio-economic pressures,
as well as shortcomings in policy, legislature, and forest management practices.

2.3.1.2.2 The human component that manages the forest landscape
The Kyiv-based Ukrainian State Forest Management Planning Association provides a
nation-wide ten-year harvesting plan that specifies by year where, what, and how much
to harvest. The plan is based on forecasted inventory statistics, is annually updated, and
as of the Summer of 2017 did not take climate change, species competition, or common
disturbances into consideration.
The respective portions of the plan are distributed to the regional forestry enterprise
headquarters, where the sequence of harvesting for the year is decided. In turn, the
respective portions of the plan are distributed to the corresponding township-level
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forestry enterprises, which are in charge of the day-to-day forest management. As
mentioned above, Bohdanska Dolyna is home to five such forestry enterprises.

2.3.1.2.3 The human component that lives in the forest landscape
Bohdanska Dolyna includes four villages (Bohdan, Luhy, Roztoky, and Vydrychka), which
are home to approximately 7,000 to 10,000 residents and are densely populated around
the main road that runs for approximately 17 kilometers along the Bila Tysa river.
Culturally, the residents of Bohdanska Dolyna are known to consider themselves as
Hutsuls, who are a people who for centuries inhabited Ukrainian and most-northern parts
of Romanian Carpathians.
In preparation for this research, extensive searches were conducted online and in
Ukrainian university libraries for any demographic or socio-economic data on or analysis
of Bohdanska Dolyna or any one of the villages. These searches did not bear any fruit,
suggesting that in addition to acquiring knowledge for SHE the research documented in
Section 2.4 also offers novel insight into the socio-economic state of Bohdanska Dolyna.

2.3.2 Acquiring knowledge
This subsection describes the unique knowledge that is necessary for parameterizing and
initializing models designed in line with the SOSEIL framework (Ch. 3), such as SHE (Ch. 5),
and a novel technique used to acquire it.
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2.3.2.1 Knowledge
Knowledge is situation-specific information decision-makers use in making decisions in
respective decision situations. Decision situations are decision-specific contexts
observable to decision-makers through potentially-unique to them sets of conditions. The
knowledge required for parameterizing and initializing models designed in line with the
SOIEL framework is unique because it must meet the requirements of a cognitive, multiagent, and knowledge-based model.
The now widespread practice of systematic collection of information about socialecological systems was initiated by Elinor Ostrom and colleagues in the 1980s as a part of
the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, which was
initially called the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework. The data-collection
approach developed by Ostrom and colleagues and the set of variables characterizing
social-ecological systems (Tab. 1) are now widely referred to as the Social-Ecological
System framework.
Table 1: Variables characterizing social-ecological systems.
Social, economic, and political settings
Economic development
Demographic trends
Political stability
Other governance systems
Markets
Media organizations
Technology

Governance systems
Government organizations

Resource systems
Sector (water, forests, pasture, fish)
Clarity of system boundaries
Size of resource system
Human-constructed facilities
Productivity of system
Equilibrium properties
Predictability of system dynamics
Storage characteristics
Location
Resource units
Resource unit mobility
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Nongovernment organizations
Network structure
Property rights systems
Operational-choice rules
Collective-choice rules
Constitutional-choice rules
Monitoring and sanctioning rules
Actors
Number of relevant actors
Socio-economic attributes
History of past experiences
Location
Leadership/Entrepreneurship
Norms (trust-reciprocity)
Knowledge of system (mental models)
Importance of resource (dependence)
Technologies available
Interactions
Harvesting
Information sharing
Deliberation processes
Conflicts
Investment activities
Lobbying activities
Self-organizing activities
Networking activities
Monitoring activities
Evaluative activities

Growth or replacement rate
Interaction among resource units
Economic value
Number of units
Distinctive characteristics
Spatial and temporal distribution
Related ecosystems
Climate patterns
Pollution patterns
Flows into and out of focal system

Outcomes
Social performance measures (efficiency,
equity, accountability, sustainability)
Ecological performance measures
(overharvested, resilience, biodiversity,
sustainability)
Externalities to other systems

Source: Simplified from McGinnis and Ostrom (2014).

Table 1 contains categories and sub-categories of information about a social-ecological
system. The definition of a decision situation that was provided at the beginning of this
subsection is in line with Ostrom and colleagues’ definition of an action situation (Ostrom
2005, Janssen & Ostrom 2006), which is where the “interactions” listed in Table 1 take
place. The sub-category “Knowledge of system (mental models)” that can be found under
the category “Actors” is where the knowledge being acquired as part of this research
effort fits within Ostrom’s Social-Ecological System framework.
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2.3.2.1.1 Knowledge for parameterizing and initializing SOSIEL models
SOSIEL models require a unique set of context-specific information about the decisionmakers, the factors that influence their decision-making, and the decisions they take. In
a SOSIEL model, this information is organized into the following five categories: (a)
context-specific factors and related meta-data, (b) knowledge heuristics and related
meta-data, (c) mental models and related meta-data, (d) social networks, and (e) profiles
of decision-makers and related meta-data. Below is a brief description of each category
and related meta-data.

a. Context-specific factors influence decision-making and can be common to all
decision-makers (e.g., price, tree species) or specific to a decision-maker (e.g., goal,
age, sex). In the SOSIEL framework, these factors are referred to as variables.
Related meta-data for each factor includes its limits, states, and initial condition. In
the case of goals, meta-data also includes the reference factor, its current and prior
state, and goal characteristics, such as whether the goal is to increase the reference
factor, manage it above a value, or so on.
b. Knowledge heuristics are shortcuts that decision-makers use to link specific
contextual conditions (i.e., states of factors) with a specific decision and with the
influences the decision is expected to have on relevant goals. Knowledge heuristics
consist of unique combinations of factors. Related meta-data for each knowledge
heuristic includes
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c. Mental models are representations of decision situations that consist of knowledge
heuristics.
d. Social networks are relevant social groups that decision-makers belong to.
e. Profiles of decision-makers consist of unique sets of decision-maker-specific factors,
knowledge heuristics, anticipated influences, mental models, and social networks.

The unique structure in which this information is organized in the SOSIEL framework is
discussed in detail in Chapter 3’s Subsection 3.3.1, where the memory structures of
SOSIEL agents are described. The exact steps involved in parameterizing and initializing a
SOSIEL model are described in detail in Chapter 4’s Subsection 4.2.

2.3.2.1.2 Knowledge for design
Knowledge can also be used in design. For example, this chapter also describes the results
of an effort to acquire knowledge related to the adaptation of collective action in
Bohdanska Dolyna, insight from which influenced the design of the SOSIEL framework’s
cognitive process of innovation (Ch. 3’s Subsec. 3.3.2.2.1.4). Collective action is any
planned action involving coordination among two or more individuals. Adaptation is any
change in individual or collective behavior aimed at fulfilling a need and that is in response
to change(s) in personal, social, and/or ecological conditions.
Collective action is believed to be essential for adaptation to climate change (Adger 2003).
Collective action is not always present in every decision situation. It may arise, may persist
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over time, and may collapse. Its formation and persistence are often a result of a need
and may involve adaptation, as conditions change while the need persists. Its collapse is
often due to the disappearance either of the need or of favorable conditions.
The idea of engaging in or adapting a specific form of collective action does not appear
out of nowhere. It is often introduced into a group by one or more agents who have either
learned about it or have implemented it in a different part of their life, i.e., within a
different social network (Padgett & Powell 2012). A people’s historical relationship with
collective action and adaptation offers insight into their capacity to act collectively in
adapting to climate change.

2.3.2.2 Acquisition
Numerous approaches for acquiring decision-making-related knowledge for expert
systems have been developed (Shaw & Woodward 1990), including: (a) domain
ontologies, (b) empirical induction entity-attribute grids, (c) implicit knowledge
structures, (d) interviewing, (e) problem-solving ontologies, and (f) protocol analysis.
Similarly, numerous approaches have been developed for acquiring the knowledge of and
the information about populations of individuals, including: (a) interviewing, (b) focus
groups, and (c) surveying.
Interviewing was selected as the main approach for acquiring knowledge both in
Bohdanska Dolyna and in Kyiv for its ability to explore both the breadth and the depth of
the topics at hand.
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2.3.2.2.1 Interviewing
Semi-structured interviewing (involving a set of predefined guiding questions that may be
followed up by more specific ones) was chosen over structured interviewing or surveying
due to the flexibility it allows an interviewer in guiding the interview. Additionally, the
following two frameworks were implemented in guiding the semi-structured interview
process: SWOT analysis and the Five W’s. SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities,
and Threats) analysis was used to gain a better understanding of the various factors
shaping the socio-economic development path of Bohdanska Dolyna, while the Five W’s
(what? when? where? why? and who?) were used to identify and define the relevant
decision situations and related decisions.
Acquiring knowledge for a cognitive, multi-agent, and knowledge-based model built in
line with the SOSIEL framework (Ch. 3) is specific in both the type of information that
needs to be acquired and the process of acquiring it. What makes the interview process
especially challenging is the fact that the interviewer must work with two different
representations of the knowledge during the interview process, and analyze both in realtime (Fig. 2).
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Figure 2: What makes the interviewing process challenging.

One representation of knowledge is provided by the respondent in their terms, based on
their personal images, practices, plans, and memories. The other representation exists in
the interviewer’s mind and, while based on the respondent’s representation, consists of
a set of variables and the relations among them. The goal of the interviewer is to ask
questions in the respondent’s terms that elicit the relevant variable- and relation-related
knowledge.
Below is a set of suggested steps to be followed by the interviewer that captures the
interplay between the two representations:
1. Ask the respondent a question in the respondent’s terms;
2. Listen to the respondent’s answer, which is in their terms;
3. Identify the relevant variables and relations in the respondent’s answer;
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4. Determine what additional knowledge is needed about the relevant variables and
relations in order to sufficiently describe them; and
5. Follow-up with a question about the variables and their relations in the respondent’s
terms.

The phrasing of the questions is important. McGraw and Harbison-Briggs (1989) provided
three characteristics to pay attention to about the way questions are phrased. They
include (a) terminology, (b) level, and (c) complexity. In terms of terminology, the
interviewer should use the language of the respondent and be both familiar with the
respondent’s terminology and avoid using terminology that is unfamiliar to the
respondent. In regards to level, it is important to phrase the questions at a level of
knowledge that the respondent is likely to possess. Lastly, in relation to complexity, it is
important to keep the structure of the questions as simple as possible.
Figure 3 depicts a hypothetical flow of variables throughout an interview. For
convenience, variables may be organized into those that fall into the personal (e.g., age,
goal, sex), social (e.g., social connections, prices), or ecological (e.g., tree species)
dimension of a decision situation. The hypothetical s-shaped curve in the above figure
captures the likely initial increase and then decrease in the total number of variables, and
demonstrates knowledge saturation during an interview.
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Figure 3: A hypothetical flow of variables during an interview.

In prior studies conducted by Özesmi and Özesmi (2004), it took respondents on average
40-90 minutes to complete their cognitive models, which contained on average 23
variables (with ±2 standard deviation) with 37 relations (with ±3 standard deviation).
Carley and Palmquist (1992) shared that the lists were typically between 200 and 250
variables long in their studies, whereas in a study conducted by Papageorgiou and
Kontogianni (2012), cognitive maps included on average 8 variables (with ±2 standard
deviation) and 11 relations (with ±7 standard deviation).
It is worth noting that the above-described approach to interviewing is significantly
different from the way in which knowledge is usually acquired in the process of, for
example, cognitive mapping. Typically, at the beginning of a cognitive mapping study,
respondents are explained how to create a cognitive map and are either provided with a
list of variables and asked to establish relations among them or are allowed to come up
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with their own list of variables, among which they are then asked to establish relations
(Özesmi & Özesmi 2004; Papageorgiou & Kontogianni 2012).
However, I believe that putting a respondent in a position in which they need to think in
an unfamiliar way creates an unnecessary interference. Instead, the approach proposed
here is to have an interviewer take on the burden of having to work with both the
respondent’s representation and the variable-relation-based representation and to allow
the respondent to engage with the interviewer during the interview in a way that they
are much more familiar with.
The drawback of this approach is that it removes the opportunity for a respondent to
immediately review and provide feedback on the cognitive map that is constructed from
their responses and is intended to represent their view of a decision situation, as was
done in Özesmi and Özesmi (2004) and Papageorgiou and Kontogianni (2012), for
example.
In general, there are a number of assumptions that are made when acquiring knowledge,
related to a respondent’s ability to clearly and fully understand and articulate their view
and an interviewer’s ability to understand their articulation and represent it. These
assumptions and the challenges they pose to modeling human behavior are explored in
detail in Chapter 6.
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2.3.2.2.2 Other approaches to knowledge acquisition
In addition to interviewing, knowledge related to forest management was acquired
through the analysis of regional forest management guidelines. Additionally,
demographic data was acquired through the analysis of village records. Other approaches
may be useful and should be utilized on a per need basis.

2.3.3 Processing knowledge
The method of knowledge processing described in this section builds on the work of
extracting relevant data from interview transcriptions (Carley & Palmquist 1992) and
therefore takes place after all the acquired knowledge had been transcribed. The purpose
of knowledge processing is to take the transcribed knowledge and extract from it only
that which is relevant. The process involves: (a) identifying relevant variables, relations,
and meta-data; (b) representing and naming variables; (c) analyzing variables; and (d)
filtering out irrelevant ones.

2.3.3.1 Identifying variables, relations, and meta-data
The aim of knowledge processing is to select the right set of variables, relations, and
meta-data that represent the respondent’s mental models of their decision-making
within relevant decision situations. The word “right” is italicized because no criteria
currently exist for determining which variables are the right variables and how many of
them there should be.
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Ackermann and colleagues (1990) recommend reading through the entire text before
starting to process the knowledge in order to gain an overall understanding of a
respondent’s perspective and which variables and relations to document. Therefore, the
first step in processing knowledge was to read through the transcriptions and identify the
decision situations within which decision-makers make relevant decisions. Keeping the
decision situations in mind, the next step was to go through the text sentence by sentence
and extract variables, relations, and meta-data that are relevant to the decision
situations.
Variables can be numeric or categorical. In the case of being numeric, a variable can be
cumulative or not. Numeric variables can require the following meta-data:
1. A current value, which can be a number, ratio, or a percentage;
2. A desired value, which can be a number, ratio, or a percentage; and
3. A range, within which the variable fluctuates.

As important as the variables are the relations between them, which may be causal or
conditional. Relations can require the following meta-data:
1. Existence, which denotes which variables are linked with which others;
2. Direction, which denotes whether a relationship represents causal influences from
one variable to another; and
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3. Polarity, which denotes whether two variables are positively or negatively
correlated.

In some cases, it was possible to extract entire knowledge heuristics from the text, which,
as mentioned briefly above and discussed in detail in Chapter 3’s Subsection 3.3.1.4, are
conditional IF-THEN statements. As in Berkan and Trubatch (1997), in some cases one
sentence contained more than one knowledge heuristic, while in other cases several
sentences were necessary to construct one. Also, as in Berkan and Trubatch (1997), in
some cases it was necessary to introduce new variables that were not explicitly
mentioned in the text, but instead were implied by the context. For example, a sentence
that describes a tree as being old implies the need for introducing the variable “age.”
Additionally, in some instances the use frequencies of variables were used to decide
which variables to include and to determine which variables were potentially the most
important for the respondents. Variable frequency should be calculated selectively,
however, leaving out redundant cases that repeat or denote similar concepts.

2.3.3.2 Representing and naming variables
Once variables were identified, the next step was to represent synonyms with one
representative term. Another form of representation involved aggregating variables in an
effort to reduce unnecessary complexity. However, it is important to keep in mind that
aggregating variables changes the scales, which may result in losing some necessary
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flexibility. In some cases, when more detail/flexibility is required, variables were
decomposed into other variables.
Also, acquiring knowledge from different respondents implies that some of the terms will
carry different meanings and some different terms will carry the same. This introduces
an unnecessary level of complexity into the model. For this reason, shared definitions of
variables need to be created. This is permitted by the view that knowledge is significantly
influenced through learning from others and is rooted in a local context (Berger &
Luckmann 1966, Romney et al. 1986, Romney & Batchelder 1999). This, however, should
not be confused with the idea that respondents sharing locality also share an identical
perspective (Richards 2001). It also does not interfere with our goal to allow for
inconsistency in the model, which is still captured through the variety in and potential
inconsistency among knowledge heuristics.
Berkan and Trubatch’s (1997) naming conventions that are provided below were used to
name representing variables:
1. Use an uppercase first letter to denote variables (Tree) and predicates (Young).
2. Use underscores between the names to denote variables consisting of combined
names (Very_young).
3. Use all uppercase letters to denote linguistic connectors (IF, AND, OR, THEN).
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2.3.3.3 Analyze
Sometimes it is useful to construct conceptual models with the resulting collection of
variables in order to make sure that the collection makes sense (Norman 1983, Nersessian
1992). A convenient technique for creating a conceptual model is causal loop
diagramming, even though not all relationships are causal. Causal loop diagrams that
were created based on the knowledge acquired are provided and discussed in Subsection
2.4.1.

2.3.3.4 Filter
Filtering involves removing from the list variables that seem irrelevant (although these
should not be removed permanently from the initial list, as their usefulness may become
apparent at a later time). As mentioned previously, in studies conducted by Özesmi and
Özesmi (2004), transcripts on average contained 23 variables (with ±2 standard
deviation). Carley and Palmquist (1992) shared that in their studies lists of variables were
typically between 200 and 250 long. Jones and colleagues reported their number of
variables averaging between 43 (with ±16 standard deviation) and 58 (with ±19 standard
deviation). According to Özesmi and Özesmi (2004), processing a conceptual map that has
more than 20 or 30 variables becomes unwieldy.
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2.3.4 Representing knowledge
Knowledge is stored in the artificial memory component of a SOSIEL agent’s cognitive
architecture (Ch. 3’s Subsec. 3.3.1). This artificial memory component consists of a set of
artificial mental models, each of which represents a relevant situation in which a realworld decision-maker makes decisions. Some decision situations that cannot be solved
with just one decision require a sequence of artificial mental sub-models.
Each artificial mental (sub-)model consists of a set of decisions, which are the knowledge
heuristics that have been already briefly mentioned above and that will be explained in
detail in Chapter 3’s Subsection 3.3.1.4. The process of knowledge representation
involves using established relations among variables to construct these knowledge
heuristics from the variables and any related meta-data.
The variables and associated meta-data making up a knowledge heuristic may be
organized into: (a) a set of antecedents, which represent the current states of the
variables defining a decision situation for a decision-maker; (b) a consequent, which
represents a specific decision; and (c) the anticipated influences of the decision on
relevant goals, which, depending on the goal in focus preferences one knowledge
heuristic over another.
Following the guidance of Berkan and Trubatch (1997), the antecedents of the knowledge
heuristics were identified by searching through the text for descriptions of reasons, while
the consequents of the knowledge heuristics were identified by searching for descriptions
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of actions. Following the guidance of Buchanan and colleagues (1983), if a heuristic
appeared too ‘big,’ attempts were made to break it down into several, while if it appeared
too ‘small,’ attempts were made to synthesize it with another.
Throughout the processes of knowledge processing and representation, significant gaps
are likely to be identified. For example, relationships between some potential
antecedents and some potential consequents may be vague (Negnevitsky 2011). A list of
such gaps was made and discussed during follow-up interviews with respondents. In some
cases, the advice of experts had to be sought.

2.3.5 Defining the social-ecological system
Identifying the relevant variables allows for formally defining the social-ecological system
under study, which can be done by following the next three steps:
1. Identify first the social, ecological, and social-ecological processes that significantly
influence and are significantly influenced by the social-ecological problem under
study and then identify the interacting variables that generate these processes;
2. Identify first the social, ecological, and social-ecological processes that significantly
influence the social-ecological problem, but that are not significantly influenced in
return, and then identify those variables through which these processes influence
the social-ecological problem; and
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3. Identify first the social, ecological, and social-ecological processes that are
significantly influenced by the social-ecological problem, but that do not significantly
influence it in return, and then identify those variables through which these
processes are influenced by the social-ecological problem.

The above steps determine the boundaries of the social-ecological system and, in turn,
define it. In the case of our application of LANDIS-II with SHE in Bohdanska Dolyna, these
social-ecological boundaries were used in determining the relevant area of the forested
landscape being represented by LANDIS-II.

2.4 Results of knowledge acquisition
This section presents the results of applying the above-described method to acquiring
knowledge about Bohdanska Dolyna. Specifically, the section presents the knowledge
gained about: (a) the local social-ecological context, (b) the residents and related
decision-making, and (c) the forest management and related decision-making.

2.4.1 The local social-ecological context and interactions
Insight into the local social-ecological context and interactions was gained by applying the
SWOT analysis approach in conducting interviews with three out of the four village heads,
namely Stepan A. Mylchevych from Bohdan, Maryna V. Shemota from Luhy, and Mykola
M. Shemota from Vydrychka.
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The village heads considered the valley’s greatest strengths to be its forest resources and
the lumber processing skills of local residents. To them, forest resources included
primarily timber and edibles, such as mushrooms and berries. The village heads felt that
these strengths were not being fully utilized due to a number of challenges, the main one
being a lack of infrastructure, which included very bad roads and no central food
processing.
The qualifier “very bad” in relation to the roads in Bohdanska Dolyna deserves a further
description. The main road that runs through Bohdanska Dolyna and crosses the four
villages has so many and relatively deep potholes that it would take me approximately
forty-five minutes to drive 17 kilometers from one end of Bohdanska Dolyna to the other.
The village heads also felt the residents were easily taken advantage of by outside
business persons due to them having in comparison a significant lack of bargaining power.
Being isolated and lacking access to markets was also a weakness, leading to a lack of local
job opportunities. In the words of the head of Vydrychka, Mykola M. Shemota: “Before
there was enough work for those who didn’t even want to work, while now there isn’t
enough even for those who want to.”
In regards to opportunities, the village heads saw processing and the export of natural
resources (berries, mushrooms, timber) as having the greatest potential. However,
uncertainty resulting from price instability and more generally economic fluctuation
continuously threatened Bohdanska Dolyna’s ability to develop. The other main threat
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were natural catastrophes (flooding, landslides), which damaged both private assets, such
as homes, and public infrastructure (roads, bridges). The ongoing uncertainty possibly
explained the primary focus of village heads on short-term projects with barely any
medium- to long-term planning.
In summary, bidirectional social-ecological interactions are significant in Bohdanska
Dolyna and are seen by the interviewed village heads as being essential for the valley’s
development. To explore these social-ecological interactions from a macro-level
perspective, the results of the SWOT analysis in combination with information gained
from the interviews of residents that are described below (Subsec. 2.4.2) were depicted
in a causal loop diagram (Fig. 4).
Figure 4: Influences on the well-being of residents.
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The causal loop diagram represents at a very high level Bohdanska Dolyna’s social and
ecological components and centers on the well-being of the local residents. The diagram
depicts the causal relationships among: (a) the local forest landscape, which is
represented by the biomass element; (b) the forest management by local forestry
enterprises, which is represented by the harvesting by forestry enterprises element; and
(c) the local population, which is represented by the well-being of residents element.
Biomass influences the well-being of residents directly through flooding and through the
forestry enterprises, which provide residents with heating and building materials and in
some cases employment. The well-being of the residents is also affected by seasonal
income from working abroad, which replaced local factory work as a source of income
after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In recent years, green tourism has been developing in Bohdanska Dolyna and a number
of residents, including the head of Bohdan, Stepan A. Mylchevych, are hopeful that it will
become a significant source of income for the residents. As Figure 5 depicts, green
tourism adds another way the forest influences the well-being of residents.
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Figure 5: Green tourism and other influences on the well-being of residents.

In Figure 6, the causal loop diagram provides insight into the decision situations through
which the well-being of residents would be affected by adverse climate change. For
example, two out of their three income sources would be devastated.
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Figure 6: Climate change and other Influences on the well-being of residents.

2.4.2 Residents and related decision-making
This subsection presents the results from analyzing interviews with residents and village
records. The results include: (a) demographic statistics and resident profiles, (b)
descriptions of decision situations and their respective knowledge heuristics, and (c)
insight into local adaptation through collective action.

2.4.2.1 Demographics and resident profiles
Demographic data is essential in the multi-agent modeling of social systems, as
demographic patterns can significantly influence a social system’s development path.
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Initially, the plan was to gather demographic data when conducting forest-use interviews
with residents of Luhy. However, plans to interview a representative sample of Luhy
residents had to change due to the local political climate and therefore another way of
getting demographic data had to be found. The situation was saved by Luhy’s village head,
Maryna V. Shemota, who offered to provide access to Luhy’s village records in return for
having them digitized in an Excel spreadsheet. The village records were organized by
household and included demographic and other data on every household member.
Portions of the analysis of the demographic data from the village records are provided in
Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Demographic and other data on household members in Luhy.

As of 2016, there were 492 households in Luhy, with 1544 village residents, of whom 55%
were female. Although half of the households have two or less members, household sizes
range from 1 to 18 members. Nearly two thirds of the population in Luhy is of working
age. However, with a significant portion of working-age men working abroad (one third
of the entire workforce), the village throughout most of the year is significantly female.
The “other” employment category captures all the other small percentages and includes,
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to name a few, nurses, teachers, store clerks, and bus drivers. The village is also
predominantly Ukrainian Orthodox, with only less than a half of a dozen members being
Greek Catholic.
During the process of digitizing the village records, the possibility of assisting the village
council in applying for international development grants was discussed and the usefulness
of referencing poverty statistics on Luhy was identified. To the knowledge of the village
head, no prior socio-economic analysis was ever conducted in Luhy or Bohdanska Dolyna.
As a result, a focus group consisting of two of Luhy’s village deputies and the village head
came together to use the village records for estimating each household’s poverty level.
Analysis of the estimates found more than 80% of the village population living in poverty,
while nearly 60% of the population living in extreme poverty – not having enough money
for food or basic necessities.
The collected demographic data included enough information to create resident profiles,
which were differentiated by: (a) sex, (b) age range, (c) income opportunities, (d)
household status, and (e) participation in a social network. The profiles include those who
were: (a) disabled, (b) retired (with pension), (c) minors (not of work-age), (d) work-age
women, and (e) work-age men.
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2.4.2.2 Decision situations and their respective heuristics
Information on decision situations within which residents make relevant decisions and
their respective knowledge heuristics was identified through the analysis of twenty-four
interviews with residents of Luhy.
Initially, Luhy residents were selected using respondent driven sampling (Heckathorn
1997, Heckathorn 2002, Salganik & Heckathorn 2004, Wejnert & Heckathorn, 2007).
However, during the initial interviews, it was found that many of the initial respondents
did not provide referrals, making respondent driven sampling impossible to implement.
Additionally, some of the respondents showed signs of discomfort when asked questions
about their forest use. After some investigation, it became evident that recent bad
publicity regarding illegal logging by forestry enterprises in the area created tension
among some residents, making some of those who worked at a local forestry enterprise
suspicious of outsiders that may be critical of their employer.
Upon realizing this, the implementation of respondent driven sampling was halted. It was
also observed that there was significant homogeneity in the responses already received.
As a result, the focus of knowledge acquisition in relation to forest use was shifted from
acquiring new knowledge to confirming the validity of the knowledge that was already
acquired. Specifically, the stated forest use practices were confirmed with village deputies
of Luhy, who unanimously verified the acquired knowledge, as well as the information in
the village records. The following was deduced from the acquired knowledge:
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a. The households of Luhy are mostly poor with primary concerns being (a) feeding
household members and (b) keeping the household warm through winters, which
tend to be long and cold. Both concerns require income and therefore acquiring and
possibly increasing income is the primary household goal.
b. In terms of feeding household members, income sources include: (a) work, (b)
pension, and/or (c) disability living allowances. Work options include (a) working at
the forestry enterprise, (b) working at the family business, (c) working in one of the
“other” categories, (d) collecting and selling mushrooms, and/or (e) working abroad.
Fuel options for cooking include (a) timber, (b) electricity, and/or (c) propane gas.
Although pensions are small, many households rely on the pensions of their
household member(s) through the winter.
c. Household members qualified to work at the forestry enterprise prefer to work
there over working abroad. But if work at the forestry enterprise is not available,
qualified household members go abroad. The two main factors determining
qualification (for both working at the enterprise and abroad) are sex (male) and age
(18 – 59). Mushroom picking requires time (not working) and health (at least ten
years of age and not on disability or pension).
d. Owning a business is a collective action among household members and considered
when a household has sufficient initial investment funds (savings). The solvency of a
business depends on the level of unfulfilled demand that is met by that business.
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e. In terms of keeping a household warm, fuel options are limited to timber. Household
members share their incomes and expenses, and therefore, the household’s savings
are based on the cumulative incomes and expenses of its members. The household’s
budget is managed by the household head and how much timber is required for
heating a household depends on the household’s size. Household size may be
organized into two categories: small (1-3 members) and large (4-18 members). A
small household requires one truckload of wood, while a large household requires
two truckloads for the length of the winter.

During interviews, some respondents showed familiarity with a variety of other activities,
but frequently explained that they did not engage in them because they anticipated that
there would be no economic benefit.
Based on the acquired knowledge, residents were found to engage on an annual basis in
two main decision situations, namely (a) employment search and (b) choice of heating
material. The decision options related to employment search were formulated into the
following knowledge heuristics:
1. IF ( Age <=59 AND Disability = True ), THEN ( Agent_income =
Income_from_disability )
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2. IF ( Age >= 18 AND Age <=59 AND Sex = Male AND Disability = False AND
Forestry_work_available = Yes ), THEN ( Agent_income =
Income_from_forestry_enterprise )
3. IF ( Agent_is_active = True ), THEN ( Agent_income = Income_from_housework )
4. IF ( Age >= 60 ), THEN ( Agent_income = Income_from_pension )
5. IF ( Age >= 60 AND Disability = True ), THEN ( Agent_income =
Income_from_disability_and_pension )
6. IF ( Age >= 8 AND Age <=70 AND Disability = False ), THEN ( Agent_Income =
Income_from_picking_mushrooms )
7. IF ( Age >= 18 AND Age <=59 AND Sex = Male AND Disability = False AND
Forestry_work_available = No ), THEN ( Agent_Income =
Income_from_working_abroad )

While decision options related to the choice of heating material were formulated into the
following knowledge heuristics:
1. IF ( Price_of_timber <= Price_of_electricity ), THEN ( Energy_expense =
Price_of_timber )
2. IF ( Price_of_electricity < Price_of_timber ), THEN ( Energy_expense =
Price_of_electricity )
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Table 2 provides the initial conditions for variables included in the above-listed knowledge
heuristics.
Table 2: Parameters relevant in resident decision situations.
Parameter
Employment
Income from disability
Income from forestry enterprise
Income from housework
Income from pension
Income from picking mushrooms
Income from working abroad
Energy
Price of electricity
Price of timber

Value (₴)
18,000
33,000
0
18,000
10,000
160,000
700
600

Other relevant parameters are minimum (18 yrs.) and maximum (59 yrs.) work age.

2.4.2.3 Adaptation through collective action
Twenty-nine interviews were conducted on the topic of adaptation through collective
action. Of them, three were with village heads from three of the four villages and twentyone were with village deputies from all four of the villages (Table 3). Additionally, village
deputies were asked to refer experts in relation to specific collective actions and, as a
result, five experts were interviewed from three of the four villages.
Table 3: Residents interviewed about adaptation in collective actions.
Village
Bohdan
Luhy
Roztoky
Vydrychka
Total

Head
1
1
0
1
3

Deputies
6
5
2
8
21

Experts
1
2
2
0
5
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In these interviews, respondents were asked to provide and describe examples of
collective actions that have taken place in their villages on the following four scales: (a)
household, (b) inter-household, (c) village, and (d) inter-village. Respondents were also
asked about how each collective action changed over time, in other words, how it adapted
to changes in personal, social, and/or ecological conditions. The Five W’s were used to
guide an interview, in relation to both a specific collective action and its adaptation.
Collective actions discussed included collecting hay, picking mushrooms, gardening,
shopping, starting a business, timber preparation, weaving, general house cleaning,
woodworking, finding employment, playing football, teaching beekeeping, buying
mushrooms and berries, preparing for and celebrating holidays, herding cows, organizing
and participating in children and women clubs, village territory cleaning, socializing, and
sheep breeding.
Analysis of the interviews showed a number of ways in which residents adapt to change
in collective actions. They included: (a) experimenting with and/or modifying the
properties of collective actions, (b) experimenting with adding new properties to the
collective actions, (c) reengaging in old collective actions, and in one case, (d) ending a
collective action. In the case of modifying the properties of a collective action, a common
approach was to alter the quantity of something, such as the distance or the number of
people involved in the collective action.
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There also appeared to be pushes and pulls when it came to adapting collective actions.
An example of a push is a new technology that residents experiment with in order to
improve the collective action. An example of a pull is a change in the political regime that
can either introduce a new collective action or modify or prohibit an existing one. The
largest number of adaptations within collective actions was identified at the level of the
village. However, the interviews suggested that collective action was mostly limited to
the immediate household members, since the economic hardship resulted in a lack of
trust in other village members.

2.4.3 Forest management and related decision-making
The profiles and heuristics that were documented of forestry enterprises were based on
discussions with the Head of Production and Technology Department at the Kyiv-based
Ukrainian State Forest Management and Planning Association, Mykola M. Rekovets, and
on the analysis of government documents that were relevant to forest management in
the Ukrainian Carpathians.
The interviews revealed that day-to-day harvesting was guided by a set of harvesting
guidelines that instructed how to conduct harvesting in watersheds and forests managed
by a forestry enterprise and a biosphere reserve. In terms of harvesting in watersheds,
the law is that harvesting could be conducted only if forest cover was no less than 65% of
the two thousand hectares surrounding the watershed. The parameters presented in
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Table 4 were identified as being relevant for harvesting in the Ukrainian Carpathians and
representable in LANDIS-II.
Table 4: Parameters relevant for forest management.
Tree species and harvesting age4
Oak
120
hornbeam
51
maple
100
beech
101
fir
80
spruce
101
Forest types
type 1
oak, hornbeam
type 2
beech
type 3
mixed, with 40-80% spruce
type 5
spruce
Slope angle
angle 4
steep (21-30 degrees)
angle 5
very steep (>30 degrees)
Soil stability
stability 1
unstable soil depth of ≤40 cm)
stability 2
semi-stable (soil depth of 41-70 cm)
stability 3
stable (soil depth of >70 cm)
Harvesting method
method 1
selective harvesting
method 2
gradual harvesting
method 3
clear-cut harvesting
method 4
mixed
Other
site density years since last harvest

The decision options related to harvesting in forests managed by forestry enterprises
were formulated into the following knowledge heuristics:

4

Harvesting ages of maple and fir were provided by Dominik Thom and Ivan Kruhlov, while the

harvesting ages of hornbeam, beech, and spruce are based on Girs and Lakida (2007).
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1. IF ( Species = )ak AND Age => 101 AND Forest_type = 1 AND Slope_angle => 2 OR
Soil_stability => 2 AND Years_since_last_harvest => 5 AND Density_level => 0.6 ),
THEN ( Harvesting_method = 2 )
2. IF ( Forest_type = 1 AND Soil_stability => 2 ), THEN ( Harvesting_method = 3 )
3. IF ( Forest_type = 2 AND Slope_angle => 4 OR Soil_stability = 1 AND
Years_since_last_harvest => 15 AND Density_level => 0.5 ), THEN (
Harvesting_method = 1 )
4. IF ( Forest_type = 2 AND Slope_angle => 2 OR Soil_stability => 2 AND
Years_since_last_harvest => 5 AND Density_level => 0.6 ), THEN (
Harvesting_method = 2 )
5. IF ( Forest_type = 3 ), THEN ( Harvesting_method = 3 )
6. IF ( Forest_type = 4 AND Years_since_last_harvest => 10 AND Density_level => 0.6),
THEN ( Harvesting_method = 1 )
7. IF ( Forest_type = 4 AND Slope_angle => 2 OR Soil_stability => 2 AND
Years_since_last_harvest => 5 AND Density_level => 0.6 ), THEN (
Harvesting_method = 2 )
8. IF ( Harvesting_method = 2 ), THEN ( Reduction_percentage = 10 )

The decision options related to harvesting in forests managed by the Carpathian
Biosphere reserve were formulated into the following knowledge heuristics:
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1. IF ( Forest_type = 1 AND Slope_angle => 4 OR Soil_stability = 1 AND
Years_since_last_harvest => 10 AND Density_level => 0.5 ), THEN (
Harvesting_method = 1 )
2. IF ( Forest_type = 1 AND Soil_stability => 2), THEN ( Harvesting_method = 3 )
3. IF ( Forest_type = 1 AND Slope_angle => 2 OR Soil_stability => 2 AND
Years_since_last_harvest => 5 AND Density_level => 0.6 ), THEN (
Harvesting_method = 2 )
4. IF ( Forest_type = 2 AND Slope_angle => 4 OR Soil_stability = 1 AND
Years_since_last_harvest => 15 AND Density_level => 0.5 ), THEN (
Harvesting_method = 1 )
5. IF ( Forest_type = 2 AND Slope_angle => 2 OR Soil_stability => 2 AND
Years_since_last_harvest => 5 AND Density_level => 0.6 ), THEN (
Harvesting_method = 2 )
6. IF ( Forest_type = 3 ), THEN ( Harvesting_method = 3 )
7. IF ( Forest_type = 4 AND Years_since_last_harvest => 10 AND Density_level => 0.6),
THEN ( Harvesting_method = 1 )
8. IF ( Harvesting_method = 2 ), THEN ( Reduction_percentage = 10 )

2.5 Contribution
The main contribution described in this chapter is the new SOSIEL method for acquiring
and operationalizing local knowledge for parameterizing and initializing cognitive, multi61

agent, and knowledge-based models. The method is unique in its ability to acquire both
the breadth in knowledge that is characteristic of heterogeneous populations and the
depth in knowledge that is characteristic of expert systems. By describing the method and
its implementation in the context of parameterizing and initializing SHE for Bohdanska
Dolyna, the chapter serves as a proof of concept of the new method and as a guide for
others who are interested in acquiring and operationalizing knowledge for cognitive,
multi-agent, and knowledge-based models.
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Chapter 3: Self-Organizing Social and Inductive Evolutionary Learning (SOSIEL)
Chapter 3 describes and provides theoretical support for SOSIEL, a novel cross-disciplinary
framework for designing a new generation of multi-agent (MA) models in which each
agent is empowered with their own cognitive architecture consisting of theoreticallygrounded cognitive processes and agent-specific and empirically-grounded knowledge.
Section 3.1 provides a summary of the SOSIEL framework. Section 3.2 describes the
SOSIEL agents and their social structure and population dynamics. Section 3.3 describes
the cognitive architecture of SOSIEL agents, which consists of a learning processes
component, a memory structures component, and a decision-making processes
component. Lastly, Section 3.4 describes the ways in which the cognitive architecture of
SOSIEL agents and more generally the SOSIEL framework uniquely qualify for guiding the
design of cognitive, multi-agent, and knowledge-based models. In terms of the Section
3.3 description of the cognitive architecture of SOSIEL agents, it also includes comparisons
to three of the most prominent cognitive architectures (Langley et al. 2009), namely ACTR (Anderson 1983, Anderson et al. 2004), CLARION (Sun et al. 2001), and SOAR (Laird et
al. 1987, Laird 2012).

3.1 A summary of the new SOSIEL framework
SOSIEL (Self-Organizing Social and Inductive Evolutionary Learning) is a novel crossdisciplinary framework for designing a new generation of multi-agent models (Sun 2001,
2005, 2007) in which each agent is empowered with their own cognitive architecture that
63

consists of theoretically-grounded cognitive processes and agent-specific and empiricallygrounded knowledge.
The SOSIEL framework was designed to capture the spatiotemporal complexity of social
contexts in which the heterogeneity of perspectives, the need for adaptation, and the
potential for collective action play a significant role. Such contexts include, but are not
limited to, community-managed: coastal fisheries (Schlager 1994), forests (Agrawal
1994), groundwater systems (Blomquist 1994), and irrigation systems (Tang 1994).
Models designed in line with the SOSIEL framework simulate the generational progression
of SOSIEL agents, which interact among themselves and/or with coupled natural systems,
learn from their and each other’s experience, create new practices, and make decisions
about taking and then take (at-times collective) actions.
The SOSIEL framework’s name reflects its design objectives and characteristics. The term
self-organizing (Camazine et al. 2003) emphasizes the decentralized and localized nature
of agents’ interactions and influence, and the emergent properties they may produce.
The term social highlights the possibility of social interactions, social learning, and social
outcomes, such as the emergence of new norms and collective action(s). The term
inductive links the framework’s cognitive architecture with Holland and colleagues’ (1986)
mental model framework that initially inspired it. And, lastly, the term evolutionary
learning connects the framework with genetic algorithms (Bäck 1996), with which it
shares high-level design objectives.
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A SOSIEL agent can represent a human individual or an organization of individuals (a
household, business, governmental or non-governmental agency).5 In turn, each agent is
represented by (a) a cognitive architecture (Sec. 3.3), which consists of a learning
processes component, a memory structures component, and a decision-making
processes component; and (b) knowledge, which is stored in the memory structures, is
modified by the learning processes, and is implemented by the decision-making
processes.
The uniqueness of the SOSIEL framework is in the cross-disciplinarity of its methodological
and theoretical foundations, which allow it to meet the criteria for both general socialecological frameworks (Binder et al. 2013, Cumming 2014, Dorward 2014) and complex
and adaptive social (Arthur et al. 1997, Miller & Page 2007), ecological (Levin 1998, 1999),
and social-ecological systems (Liu et al. 2007a, b). Its unique modeling methodology is
founded in:
1. Cognitive architectures (Holland et al. 1986, Sun 2007, Langley et al. 2009), and
particularly ACT-R (Anderson 1983, Anderson et al. 2004), CLARION (Sun et al. 2001),
and SOAR (Laird et al. 1987, Laird 2012), which guide the representation of
knowledge and agent cognition;

5

It is advisable, however, that an agent represent a group only when the group includes only one relevant
decision-maker. Groups with more than one relevant decision-maker should be represented with an equal
number of decision-making agents. This is because the decision-making process of two or more individuals
is fundamentally different from the decision-making process of one individual and this difference may have
a significant influence on the result of the process.
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2. Decision support systems (Power 2002, 2008), and in particular knowledge-based
decision support systems (Klein & Methlie 1995, Holsapple & Whinston 1996), which
provide user criteria;
3. Evolutionary learning (Holland et al. 1986, Bäck 1996, Arifovic 1994, Arifovic et al.
2007), which guides the design of structural dynamics;
4. Knowledge-based systems (Weiss & Kulikowski 1984; Negnevitsky 2011), which
guide the representation of knowledge; and
5. Multi-agent modeling (Wooldridge 1997, Jennings 2000, Shoham & Leyton-Brown
2009), which guides the design of system structure and agent interactions.
Furthermore, the design of SOSIEL agents was guided by the following cognitive and social
theories: behavioral (Fudenberg & Levine 1998, Camerer 2003) and evolutionary (Weibull
1995) game theory, bounded rationality (Simon 1957, Rubinstein 1998, Gigerenzer et al.
2002), collective action (Bicchieri 2006, Gilbert 2006), conditional reasoning (JohnsonLaird & Byrne 1991; Johnson-Laird et al. 1992, Oaksford et al. 2000, Johnson-Laird & Byrne
2002, Evans & Over 2004), heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman 1974, Simon 1995, Gigerenzer
et al. 1999), mental models (Kelly 1955, 1970; Norman 1983; Landry et al. 1983, Carley &
Palmquist 1992; Johnson-Laird 2006; Nersessian 2007), signaling (Spence 1973, Bratman
1992), and social multi-network theory (Padgett & Powell 2012). Lastly, the underlying
foundation that underpins the selection of both methodological and theoretical
foundations is systems science (Klir 1991).
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3.2 Social structure and inter-generational population dynamics
A SOSIEL agent may be a member of one or more social networks (e.g., household,
employment, community engagement), which determines who they can learn from and
engage in collective action with. The emergent web of (potentially overlapping) social
networks allows for the transfer of knowledge from members in one social network to
another, which, from the perspective of Padgett and Powell (2012), is a major social
source of ingenuity. The structure of a specific social network (and, in turn, the web of
social networks) may change over time, as agents join or leave specific social networks.
Agents can be organized into one or more agent types, which can be organized further
into agent sub-types. Agent type is an optional categorization that organizes the order in
which different types of agents are processed during a simulation, with agents of the
same type sharing contextual variables and goals. This is useful when the activity of one
type of agent (employee) depends on the outcome of the activity of another type of agent
(employer). When the order in which agent types are processed is irrelevant, all agents
can be initialized as being of one type. Agent sub-type is another optional categorization
that simplifies the process of initializing identical agents by turning an agent profile into
a sub-type, and assigning that sub-type to other agents.
Socially-networked populations of SOSIEL agents undergo generational progression,
which includes SOSIEL agents being born, dying, and/or migrating. The processes of birth,
death and migration are described below.
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The process of birth introduces new agents into an existing population of agents through
three steps:
1. Every time period, two agents meeting a specified personal (age within a specified
interval) and/or social (membership within shared social networks) criteria are
randomly selected, using a uniform distribution, and are randomly matched, also
using a uniform distribution. In the case they are matched, a new social network
representing their new household is created, consisting of the two matched agents,
who are also designated as heads of this new household.
2. Additionally, at every time period, a set of household heads is randomly selected,
using a uniform distribution. The chance of a birth in each of the selected
households is determined randomly, using a power-law distribution that is aligned
with the average age of the selected agent and their counterpart. The higher the
average age, the less likely a birth is to occur. The combination of the randomly
selected number of households and the likelihood of a birth, based on the average
age of the two household heads, is the population birth rate.
3. In the case of a birth, a new agent with an identical but empty (of knowledge
heuristics) memory structure is introduced into the population and is socially linked
to the matched agents and their household networks.
Alternative approaches to representing birth are replicator dynamics, such as the WrightFisher approach (Imhof & Nowak 2006) or the Moran process (1958, 1962), which are
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commonly found in models of evolutionary game theory (Weibull 1995). The need to
reflect age and manage household structure and dynamics is the main reason for
differentiating the approach used in the SOSIEL framework from existing approaches.
The process of death removes agents from a population through a single step. During a
time period, a number of agents are randomly selected, using a reversed power-law
distribution that increases the likelihood of dying with age. If an agent is selected, their
status becomes inactive for the remainder of a simulation.
The process of emigration does not require a designated process and can be modeled
using already available infrastructure, namely knowledge heuristics (Sec. 3.3.1.4), which
can offer emigration as an optional decision, and other context-specific variables (Sec.
3.3.1.1), which can record who has emigrated. Immigration is not currently available in
the SOSIEL framework, but can be introduced with a process similar to but simpler than
the one producing births.

3.3 Cognitive architecture
The cognition of a SOSIEL agent is represented with a cognitive architecture (Sun 2007,
Langley et al. 2009), which is both horizontally and vertically modular. In line with Langley
and colleagues (2009), the cognitive architecture of a SOSIEL agent represents, acquires,
organizes, refines, and utilizes their knowledge.
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Figure 8 depicts the high-level overview of the cognitive architecture of a SOSIEL agent in
the context of their interacting with a social, ecological, and/or social-ecological (SE)
context. The architecture may be seen as consisting of three components: (a) a set of
learning processes that acquire and refine knowledge, (b) a set of memory structures that
store knowledge, and (c) a set of decision-making processes that utilize it. The arrows
represent information transfer and procedural flow, which is described in greater detail
in Section 3.3.2.
Figure 8: The cognitive architecture of a SOSIEL agent.

At the highest level, the memory structures component resembles what is referred to in
CLARION (Sun et al. 2001) as the non-action-centered subsystem, which stores
knowledge, while the learning and decision-making processes components resemble
CLARION’s action-centered subsystem, which acts on the knowledge. The specifications
of the components of a SOSIEL agent’s cognitive architecture, the memory structures
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(Sec. 3.3.1) and the learning and decision-making processes (Sec. 3.3.2), are described in
detail below.

3.3.1 Artificial memory structures
The memory structures of a SOSIEL agent’s cognitive architecture store the agent’s
knowledge, which is situation-specific information they use in making decisions in
respective decision situations. Decision situations are decision-specific contexts
observable to decision-makers through potentially-unique to them sets of conditions.
This definition of a decision situation is in line with Ostrom and colleagues’ definition of
an action situation (Ostrom 2005, Janssen & Ostrom 2006), which plays a central role in
Ostrom’s Social-Ecological System framework (Ostrom 2009).
At the lowest level, an agent’s knowledge consists of context-specific variables and
related meta-data (Sec. 3.3.1.1). At the highest level, the variables are organized into
potentially overlapping mental models (Sec. 3.3.1.2), with each model focused on a
specific decision situation within which an agent potentially needs to make a decision. In
cases when decision situations involve making sub-decisions, mental models become
chains of mental sub-models (Sec. 3.3.1.3), with each sub-model focused on making a subdecision within a specific decision situation (Fig. 9).
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Figure 9: The memory module of the cognitive architecture.

Mental (sub-)models, in turn, are clusters of knowledge heuristics (Sec. 3.3.1.4), with each
knowledge heuristic representing a possible (sub-)decision within a decision situation.
Lastly, knowledge heuristics are clusters of combinations of antecedents and
consequents, which, in turn, are clusters of the above-mentioned context-specific
variables and the relations between them. As a result, an agent’s knowledge is a nestedlyhierarchical network of context-specific variables. In cases agents are connected through
social networks, which establish links between the mental (sub-)models of agents, the
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entire multi-agent model becomes a nestedly-hierarchical network of context-specific
variables.
Using a network of variables to represent an agent’s knowledge structure adheres to the
prominent approach to representing knowledge, called cognitive maps (Tolman 1948,
Eden 1988) or semantic nets (Borgida & Sowa 1991), which consist of a collection of
concepts and the relations among them. For example, Hoffman and colleagues (2014)
studied the shared perspectives on sustainable agriculture of farmers and found their
perspectives to be hierarchically structured networks of concepts, with sustainability goal
concepts centrally embedded and linked to a variety of related strategy concepts. While
networks of concepts are convenient for a static representation of knowledge, additional
structures and processes are required for operationalizing the knowledge for learning and
decision-making.

3.3.1.1 Context-specific variables
Context-specific variables form the lowest level of a SOSIEL agent’s knowledge structure
and uniquely embed them into a specific context. The three categories of variables that
comprise the knowledge structures of SOSIEL agents are as follows:
1. Goal(s), be they selfish or altruistic, guide agent decision-making and can either be
unique to or shared by a set of agents. A goal may be to attain the (a) highest or (b)
lowest value of a goal variable, to maintain a goal variable (c) above or (d) below a
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threshold, or to maintain a goal variable (e) at a focal value or (f) within an interval.
Meta-data for a goal includes an importance level that is set initially and reflects the
goal’s relative level of importance in relation to the agent’s other goals. The
importance level of a goal changes relatively to the importance levels of other goals
as a result of an agent’s relative success in achieving it.
2. Attributes of an agent define their personal (age, employment status, gender
identity, amount of savings) and social (network membership) states.
3. Other variables characterize the context within which an agent makes decisions and
may be unique to or shared by a set of agents.
The above three categories of context-specific variables are compatible with the
extensive list of variables that has been developing over decades, first, as part of the
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework and, currently, as part of Ostrom’s
Social-Ecological System framework (Ostrom 2007, 2009; McGinnis & Ostrom 2014;
Hinkel et al. 2014).
SOSIEL agents of a specific agent type (Sec. 3.2.1) are characterized by the same set of
attribute categories. Agents of a specific agent sub-type (Sec. 3.2.1) are initially
characterized by the same (a) goals and goal values, (b) set of attribute categories and
attribute values, and (c) set of other variables and other variable values. Goal, attribute,
and other variable values may change for agents during a simulation, as a result of their
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unique experience. It is of note that the knowledge associated with an agent is limited to
that which is relevant for decision-making, be it by them or about them.

3.3.1.2 Artificial mental models
At the highest level, the knowledge of a SOSIEL agent is organized into mental models,
which are knowledge structures focused on making decisions about taking actions in
specific decision situations (Landry et al. 1983). A SOSIEL agent may have as many mental
models as the number of decision situations in which they need to take an action.
In accordance with Johnson-Laird (2006), each mental model of an agent consists of what
the agent believes to be possible decisions in a decision situation. For SOSIEL agents, these
choices are possible knowledge heuristics (Sec. 3.3.1.4), which are decision situationspecific shortcuts humans use in making decisions.
The maximum number of knowledge heuristics a specific mental model can hold is set
during initialization. The actual number of knowledge heuristics a mental model contains
at any time period may fluctuate (at or below the max) as a result of learning (Sec.
3.3.2.2). In line with Gilhooly and colleagues (1993) and others (Baddeley 2003, Handley
et al. 2004), the restriction on the possible number of knowledge heuristics in a mental
model represents limitations on the agent’s working memory.
Integrating the mental model concept into the cognitive architecture of SOSIEL agents
opens the door for cross-disciplinary collaboration, not only among psychologists and
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cognitive scientists studying conditional reasoning, human behavior, mental models, and
cognitive architectures, but also more broadly social scientists. For example, the mental
model concept is embedded within Ostrom’s Social-Ecological System framework
(Ostrom 2007, 2009). It is also increasingly being implemented within the context of
environmental cognition (Jones et al. 2011).

3.3.1.3 Artificial mental sub-models
Some decision situations require a chain of sequential sub-decisions, as opposed to just
one decision. In such cases, mental models consist of a chain of mental sub-models. Each
sub-model, before last, is focused on making some sub-decision that must be made
before a sub-decision in a subsequent sub-model can be made. The last mental sub-model
within a chain of sub-models is focused on selecting an action.

3.3.1.4 Artificial knowledge heuristics
Between the lower and higher levels of the nestedly-hierarchical representation of a
SOSIEL agent’s knowledge are knowledge heuristics, which are decision situation-specific
shortcuts used in making decisions, especially in decision situations that are not fully
understand (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman 1974). In the cognitive architecture of SOSIEL
agents, these knowledge heuristics are organized into decision situation-specific mental
(sub-)models, and can diffuse through the process of social learning (Sec. 3.3.2.2.2). The
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use of knowledge heuristics allows researchers to embed context- and individual-specific
decisions into a mental (sub-)model structure.
There is a co-evolutionary relationship between the specific combination of knowledge
heuristics making up an agent’s decision situation-specific mental (sub-)model and the
agent’s perspective on how to behave within a decision situation. While an agent’s
perspective influences which knowledge heuristics are accepted into or are removed from
a mental (sub-)model, it is the unique combination of knowledge heuristics that forms the
agent’s perspective in the first place.
In the SOSIEL framework, knowledge heuristics are represented as conditional (IFTHEN)
statements, which is a common approach to representing knowledge in knowledge-based
systems (e.g., Weiss & Kulikowski 1984; Negnevitsky 2011) and some cognitive
architectures, e.g., SOAR (Laird et al. 1987, Laird 2012). Each knowledge heuristic consists
of the following three parts (Fig. 10): (a) one or more antecedents, (b) one consequent,
and (c) one or more anticipated influences.
Figure 10: The basic structure of a knowledge heuristic.

IF ( 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡1 AND … AND 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑛 ), THEN ( 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡1 )
Anticipated influence on 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙1
…
Anticipated influence on 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙N
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a. One or more antecedents, with each antecedent representing the current state of a
situation-specific condition (factor) that the knowledge heuristic associates with a
specific decision;
b. One consequent, which is a situation-specific decision that the knowledge heuristic
associates with the current states of the situation-specific conditions;

Each antecedent and consequent consists of a context-specific variable and its value,
linked through a mathematical operator (is, are, >, ≥, =, etc.). The “AND” (conjunction) in
the above structure can also be replaced with an OR (disjunction).6
c. One or more anticipated influences, with the value of each anticipated influence
representing the influence the agent anticipates taking the decision under those
conditions will have on a respective goal that is associated with the mental (sub)model to which the knowledge heuristic belongs.

The use of goal-specific anticipated influences permits for the evaluation of the
knowledge heuristic’s performance to be goal-specific, a process that occurs during
anticipatory learning (Sec. 3.3.2.2.1.1).
Additionally, each knowledge heuristic carries a freshness measure, which states the
number of periods since it was last used and thereby identifies the least-popular

6

In line with Negnevitsky (2011), it is inadvisable to include both conjunctions and disjunctions in one
knowledge heuristic.
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knowledge heuristics that can be replaced by new knowledge heuristics learned through
innovation (Sec. 3.3.2.2.1.4) or social learning (Sec. 3.3.2.2.2).
In addition to turning each SOSIEL agent into a knowledge-based system, the use of
conditional statements makes the SOSIEL framework compatible with theories of
conditional reasoning (e.g., Oberauer 2006) and Crawford & Ostrom’s (1995)
representation of institutions/norms; while referring to the conditional statements as
knowledge heuristics links them to the study of heuristics in experimental psychology
(e.g., Gigerenzer et al. 1999).
An example of a knowledge heuristic could be to engage in collective action, which would
require the participation of a specified minimum number of participants who are
members of one of the specified social networks (Sec. 3.3.2.1.2). It could also be to do
nothing. Knowledge heuristics used by a large portion of the community of agents can be
seen as norms (Crawford & Ostrom 1995). Knowledge heuristics making up a mental submodel may or may not be consistent, allowing agents to internally hold conflicting views
on a matter.
Although SOSIEL agents are autonomous entities driving decision-making and, in turn, a
system’s dynamics, knowledge heuristics are the first level of organized knowledge and
are therefore the foundational building blocks of a model designed in line with the SOSIEL
framework. With knowledge heuristics organized into mental sub-models, and submodels into mental models, and mental models into agent sub-types, and agent sub-types
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into agent types, a multi-agent model designed in accordance with the SOSIEL framework
is essentially an evolving nested hierarchy of knowledge heuristics. In this regard, agents
can be seen as niches for knowledge heuristics that during social learning (Sec. 3.3.2.3.2)
spread from one niche to another.
Another approach to representing conditional statements was introduced by JohnsonLaird and Byrne (2002). Instead of IFTHEN, they propose using IFPOSSIBLY, where the
presence of a combination of antecedents increases the possibility of a consequent. While
in theory more realistic, the approach introduces an additional variable, the possibility of
something occurring, which may be difficult to procure in the process of eliciting
knowledge.

3.3.2 Learning and decision-making processes
The learning and decision-making processes of the cognitive architecture of a SOSIEL
agent (Fig. 11) autonomously identifies, processes, modifies, and implements the
knowledge stored in the memory module (Sec. 3.3.1) in the process of the agent making
decisions in and adapting to specific decision situations. The use of conditional statements
as knowledge-storing structures (Sec. 3.3.1.4) aligns the SOSIEL framework’s approach to
representing cognition with other approaches representing conditional reasoning
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne 1991; Johnson-Laird et al. 1992, Oaksford et al. 2000, JohnsonLaird & Byrne 2002, Evans & Over 2004).
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The learning and decision-making processes components together consist of eight
cognitive processes, which include: (a) four individual learning processes (anticipatory
learning, goal prioritization, counterfactual thinking, and innovation), (b) one social
learning process, and (c) three decision-making processes (satisficing, signaling interest in
a collective action, and action-taking).
Figure 11: The learning and decision-making module of the cognitive architecture.

The cognitive processes in turn consist of cognitive heuristics (Gigerenzer et al. 1999),
which are shortcuts humans use in recognizing, processing, modifying, creating, and/or
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implementing knowledge. For example, in the context of social learning (Sec. 3.3.2.2.2),
Biele and Rieskamp (2013) suggested that averaging the advice of neighbors is a possible
cognitive heuristic. In the context of satisficing (Sec. 3.3.2.1.1), Klein (1998) proposed
take-the-first as a possible approach, while Czerlinski and colleagues (1999) proposed
take-the-last. Cognitive heuristics are conceptually and structurally, but not functionally,
similar to knowledge heuristics, which have already been defined in Section 3.3.1.4.
Cognitive heuristics are used in the SOSIEL framework instead of optimization techniques
because the goal is to study the relationship between actions and humanly possible and
not necessarily optimal outcomes. However, even if that were not the goal, the level of
external (as opposed to internal to the agent) complexity in many social, ecological, and
social-ecological contexts would likely make information- and computationally-intensive
processes, such as optimization techniques, impractical for decision-making. Such
techniques make the cost of deliberation high (Conlisk 1996) and create a tradeoff
between cognitive effort and judgment accuracy (Pitz & Sachs 1984).
Furthermore, overcoming external complexity does not necessarily require cognitive
complexity (Barrett et al. 2007). As many psychology experiments have demonstrated
(Gigerenzer et al. 1999, Hertwig & Hoffrage 2013), cognitive heuristics are simpler, faster,
and often more accurate than optimization techniques. According to Todd and Gigerenzer
(2012), cognitive heuristics work better than optimization, when a decision situation
includes: (a) a high level of uncertainty, (b) there are a large number of alternatives, (c)
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only small sample sizes are available, (d) there is redundancy, and/or (e) there is variability
in the importance of conditions.
In line with Duncker (1945) and others (e.g., Kahneman 2011), an agent may activate
some or all of the five (individual or social) learning processes during a given time period,
depending on how well they understand a decision situation. As displayed in Figure 11,
three of the learning processes that are intuition-based, namely anticipatory learning,
goal prioritization, and social learning, are always activated, while two of the learning
processes that are reasoning-based, namely counterfactual thinking and innovation, are
activated only when an agent is unconfident in their understanding of a decision situation.
This is in line with the duel-process theories of cognition (e.g., Sloman 1996, Kahneman
& Frederick 2002; Evans 2003, 2010; Evans & Stanovich 2013), which organize cognition
into:
a. System 1, which is intuition-based and within the SOSIEL framework consists of
anticipatory learning, goal prioritization, and social learning; and
b. System 2, which is reasoning-based and within the framework consists of
counterfactual thinking and innovation.

Additionally, SOSIEL agents signal to other agents their interest in engaging in a collective
action only when their preferred action is a collective one and commit to participating
only if a sufficient number of other agents are also interested.
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The cognitive processes of decision-making are activated after the cognitive processes of
learning had a chance to update and modify the SOSIEL agents’ mental models. This holds
true for all time periods except time period one, during which only decision-making
processes are activated to generate feedback-based values for variables that are utilized
by learning processes in subsequent time periods. For this reason alone, decision-making
processes are listed first in the below description of the learning and decision-making
process of SOSIEL agents. In time period two and those that follow, the decision-making
processes are activated after the learning processes.
The selection of which cognitive processes to include among the learning and decisionmaking processes of SOSIEL agents and in which sequence to order them relied partially
on: (a) the study of individual (Kahneman & Miller 1986, Miller et al. 1990) and social
(Hilgard et al. 1940, Festinger 1942, Wheeler 1966, Bandura 1977, Taylor et al. 1984,
Hertwig & Hoffrage 2013) learning and decision-making (Simon 1955, 1956; Mintzberg et
al.1976) processes; (b) the work by Mintzberg and colleagues (1976) and others (Wallace
1926, Pólya 1954, Simon 1956), who identified distinct steps in decision-making; and (c)
experimentation that took place during the development and operationalization of the
SOSIEL Human Extension (SHE) for LANDIS-II.
The cognitive processes comprising the learning and decision-making of SOSIEL agents
together produce a biologically inspired variation of a machine learning technique, called
reinforcement learning (Newell & Rosenbloom 1981, Anderson 1982, Kaelbling et al.
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1996, Sutton & Barto 1998, Stolzmann 1998, Aarts & Dijksterhuis 2000, Butz 2002,), which
is a widely used and one of the most successful techniques for representing learning and
decision-making by artificial agents (Anderson 1983).
A number of other approaches exist to represent the learning and decision-making of
artificial agents (Weiss & Indurkhya 1995, Fudenberg and Levine 1998, Camerer 2003,
Urbanowicz & Moore 2009, Hélie & Sun 2014), with a prominent example being Bayesian
reasoning (Oaksford & Chater 2007). The new variation of the anticipatory reinforcement
learning approach was chosen over others partially for the ease with which it can be
grounded in psychology and sociology and partially for the ease with which it can be
operationalized with other concepts utilized in the SOSIEL framework, such as mental
models (Sec. 3.3.1.2) and knowledge heuristics (Sec. 3.3.1.4).

3.3.2.1 Decision-making
The process of decision-making selects which knowledge heuristics are to be
implemented as (sub-)decisions. The process may result in the activation of two
(satisficing and action-taking) or three (satisficing, signaling interest in a collective action,
and action-taking) sub-processes, depending on whether or not the knowledge heuristic
selected during the first sub-process is a collective action.
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The three processes of decision-making are activated sequentially for: (a) each agent
type; (b) each agent sub-type; (c) every agent within each agent sub-type; if relevant, (d)
each mental model; and, if relevant, (e) each mental sub-model.

3.3.2.1.1 Satisficing
The sub-process of satisficing is part of every decision-making process. The concept of
satisficing was coined by Simon (1955) referring to a limit humans impose on their search
for the best decision in a decision situation. It involves using experience to establish what
an acceptable outcome could be and ending the search process as soon as a decision that
is expected to lead to an acceptable outcome is found (Simon 1956).
Satisficing is one of the three cognitive processes representing agent perception, with the
other two being anticipatory learning (Sec. 3.3.2.2.1.1) and signaling interest in a
collective action (Sec. 3.3.2.1.2). Specifically, it perceives the decision situation-specific
personal, social, and ecological conditions that an agent considers when making a
decision situation-specific decision. The other cognitive processes have to do with the
processing of perceived and stored knowledge.
Baron (2008) described the decision-making process through the interaction of three
types of knowledge: (a) the possibilities, which in our case are represented by knowledge
heuristics; (b) the evidence, which in our case are the updated anticipated influences on
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goals of the knowledge heuristics; and (c) the goals, which correspond to the same term
in the SOSIEL framework.
In accordance with Baron, the process of satisficing uses the anticipated influences of
matching knowledge heuristics in choosing a knowledge heuristic. Specifically, the
process of satisficing involves choosing a knowledge heuristic from those available within
a mental (sub-)model: (a) with antecedents that match current conditions and (b) that
has the most beneficial (or the least harmful) anticipated influence on the goal.
If a mental model consists of a chain of sub-models and if the consequents of chosen
heuristics in earlier sub-models are among the antecedents of available heuristics in later
sub-models, then only those knowledge heuristics whose antecedents are satisfied by the
consequents are considered for possible selection. Since the satisficing process in the
SOSIEL framework is limited to the one available (to an agent) and not to all possible
knowledge heuristics, agents select what they think is best for them, which may not be
the same as what is ultimately best for them.
The above-described process of satisficing is in line with the approach Mintzberg and
colleagues (1976) found to be commonly used in organizations. It is also similar to the
approach Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) coined as take-the-best, which chooses the
decision that ranks best according to one cue. In the cognitive architecture of SOSIEL
agents, the cue is the anticipated influence of a knowledge heuristic on a goal of interest.
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Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) and others (e.g., Rieskamp & Hoffrage 1999; Bröder
2000) have shown that the cognitive heuristic take-the-best does well in many decision
situations and against other decision-selection processes. It is worth noting that larger
numbers of possible knowledge heuristics do not necessarily benefit the decision-making
process. After a point, increases in the number of knowledge heuristics slow the decisionmaking process down (Holland et al. 1986).
The functionality of the process of satisficing in SOSIEL agents is similar to the search
mechanisms of reasoning engines in other cognitive architectures (e.g., Carbonell et al.
1990), in that it searches through possible decisions for the one that meets specific
criteria. Because satisficing humans typically only consider a relatively small number of
options, machine learning algorithms, such as breadth-first search, are not necessary and
are therefore not used.
Manzini and Mariotti (2012) proposed a similar two-step selection process, called
categorize then choose. In their process, the first step is to categorize decisions based on
shared features before choosing decisions based on decision-specific features. While
similar, their approach seems to capture the last two steps of what in a real-world context
would be a three-step approach, with the first step categorizing decisions based on
whether or not they meet current conditions.
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3.3.2.1.2 Signaling interest in a collective action
If a knowledge heuristic selected during satisficing was to take a collective action, then
interest in the collective action is signaled (Spence 1973, Bratman 1992) and the process
of action selection is put on hold while other agents engage in decision-making. If a
sufficient number of other agents is also signaling interest in the same collective action,
then the collective action becomes the selected decision. If, however, not a sufficient
number of other agents signal interest in the same collective action, then the collective
action is removed from the possible decisions during the current period and the process
of satisficing is reactivated.
Signaling interest in a collective action is one of the three cognitive processes
representing agent perception, with the other two being anticipatory learning (Sec.
3.3.2.2.1.1) and satisficing (Sec. 3.3.2.1.1). Specifically, it perceives the number of agents
expressing interest in a specific collective action.
A collective action is engaged in by a collection of agents only when it is the preferred
action for the interested agents (Blomquist et al. 1991) and all of the interested agents
commit to engaging in the action (Tuomela 1984, Velleman 1997). Their collective action
may be seen as an action taken by a collective agent (Gilbert 2006), which has the power
of transforming a decision situation resembling, for example, the tragedy of the commons
(Hardin 1968), into a coordination game (Bicchieri 2006).
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According to Gilbert (2006), at the root of collective action is joint commitment that is
formed by participating agents pursuing their personal goals (Velleman 1997) and
believing that their goal cannot be better achieved than with the participation of a
sufficient number of others (Tuomela & Miller 1985).
In line with Bicchieri (2006), a set of agents engage in a collective action when: (a) they
know about it, i.e., their mental (sub-)model contains taking collective action as an option;
(b) they prefer it, i.e., the process of satisficing selects the collective action; and (c) enough
agents signal interest in participating in the collective action.
A new engagement in a collective action may be seen as the emergence of a new social
network and it may arise from a number of social and ecological conditions (Ostrom
2009). In line with Padgett (2012), collective action may emerge as a result of other social
networks breaking up, with collective action either filling a void or taking advantage of
new conditions. Padgett views this emergence of new from the breakup of something old
as a form of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1943).
Which agents are participating in a collective action may change over time. A collective
action will continue to persist as long as there is a sufficient number of participants. A
collective action will cease if: (a) it has a term limit that expires, (b) the conditions for a
number of participants changes and it stops being the preferred choice of action for a
sufficient number of agents (Gilbert 2006), and/or (c) the conditions change and it
completely becomes unnecessary or even unfavorable (Ostrom 2009).
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The behavior of SOSIEL agents may be driven by various combinations of values,
principles, or preferences and interest in engaging in a collective action may be selfishly
or altruistically motivated. For example, behavior may be driven by strict self-gain or by
other-regarding drivers, such as aversion to inequality (Fehr & Schmidt 1999) or intentionbased reciprocity (Fehr & Schmidt 2006). Behavior, however it may be driven, is defined
by the knowledge heuristics in an agent’s unique mental (sub-)model, which captures
what it means to the agent to succeed in a specific decision situation.

3.3.2.1.3 Action-taking
The process of taking action involves SOSIEL agents implementing one or more decisions,
which may include doing nothing or engaging in collective actions. Whether the actiontaking by agents is simultaneous or sequential is set during initialization for all agents,
time periods and decision situations.

3.3.2.2 Learning
Learning is the process of modifying knowledge based on analysis of known and/or new
information. In the context of the cognitive architecture of SOSIEL agents, knowledge is
an agent’s unique perspective emergent from known (to them) information; known
information about a decision situation is the content of an agent’s respective mental (sub)model; new information is the feedback from a coupled system and/or that which is
socially learned; analysis is the process of comparing new information to known
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information; and modification is the process of using what was learned during the analysis
to update known information with new information, as well as generating new
information based on known information. The learning process being autonomous
implies that it occurs without outside help from, for example, a researcher.
It is worth noting that the above definition of learning is focused on the analysis and
modification of knowledge and not on whether or not the learning improves on what is
known, with respect to achieving a goal, or on whether or not the learning is intentional.
The reason why the definition of learning does not depend on whether or not the process
helps to achieve a goal is because it is important to study the process of learning even
when it is unsuccessful, especially with regards to trying to understand complex and
adaptive decision situations. The reason it does not depend on whether it is intentional is
because learning can be passive, as well as active. These points are relevant in the context
of descriptive and prescriptive models of human behavior, which aim to replicate
humanly possible (as opposed to optimal) behavior.

3.3.2.2.1 Learning processes
The cognitive architecture of SOSIEL agents includes four individual learning processes
and one social learning process.
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3.3.2.2.1.1 Individual learning
The four individual learning processes are: (a) anticipatory learning, (b) goal prioritization,
(c) counterfactual thinking, and (d) innovation. Some or all of these processes are
activated for: (a) every agent type; (b) every agent sub-type; (c) every agent of every agent
sub-type; if relevant, (d) every location assigned to an agent; if relevant, (e) each mental
model; and, if relevant, (f) each mental sub-model.
Anticipatory learning and goal prioritization are always activated. Counterfactual thinking
is activated if, as a result of anticipatory learning, an agent becomes unconfident.
Innovation is activated if, after counterfactual thinking, an agent remains unconfident.
Distinguishing among these learning processes as those activated when an agent is
confident or unconfident is in line with the family of duel-process theories (e.g., Sloman
1996) that make a distinction between, for example, intuition- and reasoning-based
thought processes (e.g., Evans 2010).

3.3.2.2.1.1 Anticipatory learning
Anticipatory learning is the process of using the prior expectations to check the validity
(Mintzberg et al. 1976) or normalcy (Kahneman & Miller 1986; Miller et al. 1990) of the
current decision situation. If the decision situation after implementing a set of decisions
is worse than anticipated, confidence in one’s ability to make a right decision within the
specific decision situation is lost (Hoch & Loewenstein 1989).
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Anticipatory learning is one of the three cognitive processes representing agent
perception, with the other two being satisficing (Sec. 3.3.2.1.1) and signaling interest in a
collective action (Sec. 3.3.2.1.2). Specifically, it perceives the change in the states of an
agent’s goal variables.
The process of anticipatory learning involves SOSIEL agents using the changes (from prior
to current period) in the states of their goal variables to: (a) update the anticipated
influences (on goals) of the knowledge heuristics that were implemented in the prior
period; (b) assess the success of the knowledge heuristics in contributing to the attaining
of goals; and (c) establish whether, by consequence, the agent is confident or unconfident
in attaining a goal.
Numerous other approaches exist to modeling anticipatory learning (Butz et al. 2003).
The one closest to the approach used in the SOSIEL framework is utilized in anticipatory
learning classifier systems (Stolzmann 1998, Butz 2002), where anticipated effects
(instead of anticipated influences) are assigned to decision rules.

3.3.2.2.1.2 Goal prioritization
Goal prioritization is the process of using what was learned during anticipatory learning
to reevaluate the importance levels of goals and, if necessary, reprioritize the goals. Goal
prioritization has a stabilizing effect on agent behavior, and can be turned off as a
mechanism if its stabilizing effect contrasts the behavior being represented.
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The process is in line with Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who argued that decisionmaking is influenced by the potential value of losses and gains, with Sober and Wilson
(1998), who assigned values to different preferences in order to distinguish among a
variety of personality types, and with Barron (2000), who discussed the varying strengths
of beliefs and how they change as a result of a person’s state.
Other approaches involve agents making decisions as a result of the simultaneous
consideration of various goals (Barron 2000). In line with Simon’s (1955) concept of
satisficing, however, the goal selection processes in the cognitive architecture of SOSIEL
agents involves agents focusing on a single decision situation-specific goal at a time.

3.3.2.2.1.3 Counterfactual thinking
Counterfactual thinking is the cognitive process of hypothetically modifying a factual prior
event with the aim of assessing the consequences of the modification (Lewis 1973,
Kahneman & Miller 1989, Kahneman & Varey 1990, Markan et al. 1993, Roeses & Olson
1996, Roese 1997, Kai & Roese 2008). Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and Wells and
colleagues (1987) have referred to this process as mental simulation.
In accordance with (Baron 2008) and Johnson-Laird and colleagues (2004), a loss of
confidence during the process of anticipatory learning (Sec. 3.3.2.2.1.1) triggers
counterfactual thinking as an effort to explain the discrepancy between the anticipated
and actual results of an action. Specifically, in the cognitive architecture of SOSIEL agents,
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the process of counterfactual thinking checks whether or not the agent would have
behaved differently (i.e., if an available alternate decision had been selected) had they
known in the prior period (which is represented by a prior set of conditions) what they
know in the current (which is represented by updated anticipations).
If an alternative satisfactory decision is identified, then confidence is regained and the
agent moves on to the process of social learning (Sec. 3.3.2.2.2). If, however, an
alternative decision is not identified, then the agent remains unconfident and continues
with individual learning by engaging in innovation (Sec. 3.3.2.2.1.4), before moving on to
social learning.
A process that resembles modeling counterfactual thinking is found as part of Arifovic’s
(1994) approach to modeling individual evolutionary learning. Her process involves
agents testing the performance of other decisions in the prior period’s context. The main
difference is in that the prior period’s context in Arifovic’s approach is defined by global
information, which in reality would not be available to an agent. By contrast, the prior
period’s context in the SOSIEL framework’s process of counterfactual thinking is defined
strictly by local information that in reality would be available to an agent.

3.3.2.2.1.4 Innovation
Complex adaptive social and social-ecological systems may produce novel decision
situations for which agents would require new knowledge to base decisions on. The
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process of innovation involves the deliberate creation of new knowledge in the form of a
new knowledge heuristic that may be more fitting for the decision situation than those
currently present in a respective mental (sub-)model. The process is activated when an
agent is unconfident about their understanding of a decision situation and counterfactual
thinking did not reinstate confidence.
In line with Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982) work into how new hypothetical options can
be created during the process of counterfactual thinking, SOSIEL framework’s process of
innovation involves an agent using the information learned during anticipatory learning
(Sec. 3.3.2.2.1.1.) and the prior period’s knowledge heuristic to create a new knowledge
heuristic that includes the same antecedents, but a new consequent and an aligned set
of new anticipated influences.
Once a new knowledge heuristic is created, it is introduced into the respective mental
(sub-)model and made available for decision-making (Sec. 3.3.2.1). The creation of only
one knowledge heuristic is in line with Mintzberg and colleagues (1976), who found that
due to time and energy constraints only one solution is typically created during an
innovation process.
Modeling innovation is challenging, mainly due to the frame problem (McCarthy & Hayes
1969), which is the challenge of providing a sufficient amount of information about the
environment to facilitate meaningful innovation. As a result, the process of innovation in
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the SOSIEL framework is currently limited to a logic that only alters the values of
consequents and anticipated influences.
The SOSIEL framework’s approach to creating knowledge is similar to one of the ones
taken in ACT-R, called analogy (Lebiere, Wallach, Taatgen 1998; Salvucci & Anderson
1998; Taatgen & Anderson 2002). In ACT-R, the process of analogy involves retrieving
from memory a similar rule and using it as a template for creating a new one. Similarly, in
the SOSIEL framework, the process of innovation involves retrieving from memory the
unsuccessful knowledge heuristic from prior period and using it as a template, in
combination with updated information, to create a new knowledge heuristic.
Alternatively, innovation can be modeled completely randomly, as is the process of
mutation in the genetic algorithm (Holland 1975, 1986; Arifovic 1994, Lanzi et al. 1998).
In terms of the genetic algorithm, the process of innovation in the SOSIEL framework can
be seen as a form of guided mutation, in the sense that the new consequent and
anticipated influence values are selected randomly, but using a power-law (as opposed
to uniform) distribution and in what is anticipated by the agent to be the desired
direction.
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3.3.2.2.2 Social learning
Social learning is a learning process that takes place through interactions (observation,
communication) with other actors (Bandura 1977). According to Hertwig and Hoffrage
(2013), social learning is the most important source of a decision-maker’s knowledge.
In the SOSIEL framework, social learning is activated regardless of whether the agent is
confident or not. This is because both passive and active social learning are captured in
the process, as opposed to just active (Bicchieri 2006). In line with Siegrist and colleagues
(2003), agents socially learn from confident social network neighbors. This can be seen as
their engaging in upward comparison, which, according to Wheeler (1966), takes place
with the aim of improving one’s performance. SOSIEL agents are not capable at this point
of engaging in downward comparison, which involves comparison to those less fortunate
(Taylor et al. 1984). Membership in more than one social network allows successful
knowledge heuristics to cross from one social network to another.
Alternative approaches to modeling social learning include crossover, as in the genetic
algorithm (Holland 1975, 1986; Arifovic 1994, Lanzi et al. 1998). Whereas pure imitation
is a common approach to modeling social learning in, for example, evolutionary game
theory (Weibull 1995), it assumes that the social learning, satisficing (Sec. 3.3.2.1.1), and
action-taking (Sec. 3.3.2.1.3) processes are all one and the same, which seems
unreasonable for any organism above the most-basic level of cognition.
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As was discussed above, social learning is the last learning process out of the five and is
followed by a set of decision-making processes (Sec. 3.3.2.1).
In conclusion, agent behavior may change from one period to another as a result of any
one or a combination of the following six reasons:
1. The social, ecological, and/or personal conditions have changed;
2. Anticipated influences of the prior period’s knowledge heuristics have changed;
3. Relative importance levels of goals have changed;
4. A newly-created knowledge heuristic is preferred and selected over the previous,
5. A socially-learned knowledge heuristic is preferred and selected over the previous,
and/or
6. The addition of a newly-created or socially-learned knowledge heuristic to a mental
(sub-)model pushes out a previously-preferred and -selected knowledge heuristic.
From an evolutionary learning perspective, the knowledge-heuristic-creating process of
innovation is variety producing, while the homogenizing process of social learning and the
(adjustable during initialization) size of a mental (sub-)model are variety reducing. The
interactions among variety producing and reducing processes, as well as the influences
from context-specific variables and other processes exert natural-selection pressures on
knowledge heuristics, for which mental (sub-)models of agents serve as niches within an
ecosystem of agents.
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In summary, Figure 12 depicts the three components of a SOSIEL agent’s cognitive
architecture.
Figure 12: The three modules of the cognitive architecture.
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3.4 Contribution
The main contribution described in this chapter is the new SOSIEL framework for
designing a new generation of multi-agent models in which each agent is empowered
with their own cognitive architecture that consists of theoretically-grounded cognitive
processes and agent-specific and empirically-grounded knowledge. As was pointed out
throughout the description of the SOSIEL framework, the cognitive architecture of a
SOSIEL agent shares a number of similarities with the three most prominent cognitive
architectures (ACT-R, CLARION, and SOAR). At a high level, similarities are found in its
structure, while, at a low level, they are found in the function and technique of some of
the learning and decision-making processes.
In addition to the similarities, there are also a number of differences that make the
cognitive architecture of SOSIEL agents and more generally the SOSIEL framework
uniquely qualified for guiding the design of cognitive, multi-agent, and knowledge-based
social components of social-ecological models. One of the key qualifications is the SOSIEL
framework’s and, specifically, its cognitive architecture’s compatibility with Ostrom’s
Social-Ecological System framework (Ostrom 2009), which has been recognized as one of,
if not the, leading general social-ecological framework (Binder et al. 2013, Cumming
2014). Below are three qualities of the SOSIEL framework that make it compatible and
allow for full integration with Ostrom’s Social-Ecological System framework:
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a. The cognitive architecture has been embedded within a multi-agent structure. This is
a necessity for the application of Ostrom’s Social-Ecological System framework
(Ostrom 2005, Janssen & Ostrom 2006).
b. SOSIEL agents can choose to engage in self-organized collective action, a property
that is essential for sustainable management of common-pool resources and is
foundational in the work of Ostrom and colleagues (Ostrom 1990, Ostrom et al.
1994).
c. The cognitive architecture of SOSIEL agents operationalizes action decision
situations (Sec. 3.3.1), context-specific variables (Sec. 3.3.1.1), mental models (Sec.
3.3.1.2 and 3.3.1.3), and conditional statements (Sec. 3.3.1.4), in a way that is in line
with Ostrom’s Social-Ecological System framework.
Another difference that makes the cognitive architecture of SOSIEL agents and more
generally the SOSIEL framework uniquely qualified is the compatibility of its learning
processes with inherent properties of social-ecological contexts. Below are two qualities
of the SOSIEL framework that make it compatible with inherent properties of socialecological contexts:
a. SE interaction is often driven by more than one and often conflicting goals. For
example, a forest manager is likely to be interested in maximizing both short-term
profit from and long-term sustainability of a forest. The learning process of goal
prioritization (Sec. 3.3.2.2.1.2) is designed to deal with such scenarios, basing the
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reprioritization of a goal’s importance to an agent on the current and relative state
of achieving it. As result, in the above example, which one of the two goals a forest
manager pursues in any time period depends on their inherent relative importance
and their current and relative state of being achieved. And example of this using
LANDIS-II and SHE is provided in Chapter 5.
b. SE contexts are complex and adaptive, which at times makes them difficult to
understand and require innovation. Innovation, however, is an energy-intensive and
not-always successful process. The learning process of counterfactual thinking (Sec.
3.3.2.2.1.3) uses an updated perspective to reevaluate the need for innovation and,
as a result, potentially helps to avoid unnecessary adaptations in an already poorly
understood environment.
In their call for a general social-ecological framework, Cumming (2014) and Dorward
(2014) underlined the importance of the framework to stimulate the pursuit of new
research questions and to provide guidance in designing new empirical studies. In a
review of the ten most prominent social-ecological frameworks, Binder and colleagues
(2013) found that only three of the frameworks provided such guidance (with Ostrom’s
Social-Ecological System framework being one of them).
As will be demonstrated in Chapter 5 through the application of LANDIS-II and SHE in the
context of two hypothetical examples, the SOSIEL framework stimulates the pursuit of
new research questions by expanding the type of information about human behavior that
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is being collected and the type of questions that as a result are being explored in the study
of social-ecological systems. In relation to Bohdanska Dolyna, some of the new questions
that can be explored using LANDIS-II with SHE and with relevance to other locations
include: What are the relationships among: (a) the forest use practices of forestry
enterprises, (b) the sustainability of the forest landscape, (c) the well-being of local
residents, and (d) climate change? As previously mentioned, climate change is currently
not being taken into consideration by the forest managers, planners, or village leaders.
Another related question is: In which way can forest use practices be modified in order to
mitigate future adverse effects of climate change, to preserve the forest landscape, and
to improve the lives of local residents? Other questions include: How do the mental
models of forest users evolve over time as they prepare for climate change? How do social
network structures evolve over time and influence the adaptation to climate change?
And, What is required to enable and sustain a transition to green tourism and is this a
preferable long-term option?
Binder and colleagues (2013) further highlighted the importance of frameworks to
provide guidance in the analysis of social-ecological problems. The SOSIEL framework
provides guidance in designing new empirical studies by providing a structure for the type
of information that needs to be collected. Furthermore, it provides guidance in the
analysis of social-ecological problems by showing how questions can be explored.
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Chapter 4: The SOSIEL platform
Chapter 4 describes characteristics of the SOSIEL platform, which is an open-source
modeling tool that is the first operationalization of the SOSIEL framework (Ch. 3). Section
4.1 briefly introduces the platform, Section 4.2 describes the information needed for
parameterization and initialization of the platform, Section 4.3 describes the four
cognitive levels to which the cognition of agents can be set, Section 4.4 provides the main
call directive of the platform’s algorithm, Section 4.5 provides the pseudo-code that
served as the template for programming the three decision-making and five learning
modules of the SOSIEL platform, and Section 4.6 lists the differences between some parts
of the platform’s design and the corresponding parts in the SOSIEL framework.

4.1 Introduction
The SOSIEL platform is the first operationalization of the SOSIEL framework (Ch. 3). It was
designed as part of this dissertation and developed in C# in collaboration with
programmers at EffectiveSoft. In collaboration with Robert Scheller and EffectiveSoft, the
platform was also coupled with LANDIS-II (Scheller et al. 2007), which is a forest-climate
change model, to create the SOSIEL Human Extension (SHE), which with LANDIS-II can
simulate co-evolutionary human-forest-climate interactions (Ch. 5). The platform can also
be used independently to simulate individual and social behavior, as well as be coupled
with other models.
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4.2 Parameterization and initialization
This section describes the process of parameterizing and initializing the SOSIEL platform
and lists the required information. The process of parameterizing and initializing may be
separated into two steps. The first step involves creating:
a. The context-specific variables, and assigning to those that are not agent-specific
their initial states;
b. The goals, and configuring the meta-data of each;
c. The artificial mental (sub-)models and configuring the meta-data of each; and
d. The artificial knowledge heuristics and configuring the meta-data of each.

The second step involves:
a. Building agent profiles from agent-specific common variables and artificial
knowledge heuristics and initializing them with agent-specific values, and
b. Associating agents with specific social networks.

The required data for parameterizing and initializing the SOSIEL platform is listed below.
1. Context-specific variables
a. A variable
i. Current_state, which indicates the current state of the variable.
ii. Is_cumulative, which indicates whether the variable is cumulative.
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b. A goal
i. Reference_variable, which is the variable that the goal is trying to affect or
manage.
ii. Type, which indicates whether a goal is to maximize or minimize a
reference variable, manage it above or below a focal value, at a focal value,
or within an interval.
iii. Focal_value(s), which is/are the value(s) of the reference variable
corresponding to goal type.
2. Artificial mental models
a. An artificial mental (sub-)model
i. Associated_goals, which indicates which goals are associated with the
artificial mental (sub-)model.
ii. Modifiable, which indicates whether the artificial knowledge heuristics in
the artificial mental (sub-)model can undergo innovation.
iii. Max_number_of_artificial_knowledge_heuristics, which indicates how
many knowledge heuristics the mental (sub-)model can hold.
3. An artificial knowledge heuristic
a. Associated_artificial_mental_(sub-)model, which indicates which artificial mental
(sub-)model the artificial knowledge heuristic is associated with.
b. An antecedent
i. A context-specific variable
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ii. A mathematical operator
iii. The state of the context-specific variable
c. The consequent
i. A context-specific variable
ii. The state of the context-specific variable
d. Required_number_of_participants, which indicates how many other agents from
indicated social networks must also signal interest in the knowledge heuristic for
it to be actionable.
e. Is_decision, which indicates whether the knowledge heuristic is the last in the
chain of situation-specific heuristics and therefore the decision.
4. Agent profiles
a. An agent-specific variable
i. Name
ii. The state of the variable
b. A goal
i. Importance, which indicate the relative importance of the goal in relation
to other goals.
ii. Prior_period_state, which indicates the prior state of the goal variable.
c. A knowledge heuristic
i. Anticipated_influence_on_a_goal, which indicates the influence the agent
anticipates the decision will have on a goal.
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d. A social network
i. Name
Initialization also includes indicating whether the process of action-taking by agents is
implemented simultaneously or sequentially.

4.3 Four cognitive level settings
The research objective may not always be to study the decisions of individually and
socially learning agents. For example, it may be to compare the outcomes of two nonadaptive decision-making processes or to study the differences that individual and/or
social learning contribute to a specific decision-making process. Additionally, the research
objective may be to study the behavior of agents with simpler cognitive abilities than that
of humans (e.g., bears).
For such cases, the modular structure of the SOSIEL platform’s cognitive processes
permits a simulation to be initialized for one of four different cognitive levels (CLs), with
each subsequent level including more of the cognitive processes (Tab. 5).
Table 5: The four cognitive levels that serve as simulation settings.
CL1
1. action selection
2. action-taking

1.
2.
3.
4.

CL2
anticipatory learning
prioritization
action selection
action-taking

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

CL3
anticipatory learning
prioritization
social learning
action selection
action-taking

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

CL4
anticipatory learning
prioritization
counter. thinking
innovation
social learning
action selection
action-taking
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As Table 5 displays, CL1 utilizes the most basic level of cognition, which involves the
activation of only the decision-making processes. This limits decision-making to selecting
a decision only based on the current state of a set of context-specific variables. CL2 utilizes
cognition that, in addition, involves the activation of System 1 (intuition-based) individual
(but not social) learning processes; CL3 utilizes cognition that, in addition, involves the
activation of the social learning process; while CL4 utilizes cognition that, in addition,
involves the activation of System 2 (reasoning-based) learning processes.
These CLs should not be seen as describing different types of cognitive levels existing
among species in the real world, at least not at this point of our understanding of the
animal psyche. The composition of each CL setting was selected first and foremost with
user convenience in mind. For example, CL1 represents the level of cognition typically
found in evolutionary game theory (e.g., Weibull 1995), while simplified versions of CL2
represent the level of cognition found in classic game theory and some evolutionary
learning mechanisms (e.g., Arifovic 1994).
While some models in evolutionary game theory explore cognitive levels requiring only
social learning and action-taking, it may be argued that it is too farfetched to assume that
an organism has the capacity for social learning and not also some form of individual
learning. With that said, it would be easy enough to introduce an additional cognitive level
setting that only pairs up the social learning and action-taking processes.
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4.4 The algorithm’s main call directive
This section provides the main call directive of the platform’s algorithm, which depicts
the sequence of module activation during each time period. It highlights the difference
between which modules are called in the first and in later time periods. In the first time
period, only the following four modules have the potential of being called: (a) goal
prioritization; (b) satisficing; potentially, (c) signaling interest in a collective action; and
(d) action-taking. As was explained in Chapter 3’s Subsection 3.3.2, this is because most
learning processes require feedback, which can be produced only after an action has been
taken. In the second and later time periods, all of the modules have the potential of being
called, including: (a) anticipatory learning; (a) goal prioritization; potentially, (c)
counterfactual thinking; potentially, (d) innovation; (e) social learning; (f) satisficing;
potentially, (g) signaling interest in a collective action; and (h) action-taking (which is
followed by maintenance). Section 4.5 uses pseudo-code to describe the steps of each
module.
Below is the main call directive of the SOSIEL platform’s algorithm:
FOR each time period
. Randomly sort agents, if required by configuration;
. Randomly sort sites, if required by configuration;
. IF time period = 1
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.. FOR each agent type
… FOR each agent
…. CALL Goal prioritization;
… END FOR
.. END FOR
. END IF
. IF time period > 1
.. FOR each agent type
… FOR each agent
…. CALL Anticipatory Learning;
…. IF any goals with confidence = FALSE
….. FOR each site
…… FOR each mental model of the agent
……. Select first goal;
……. IF selected goal’s confidence is FALSE
…….. FOR each mental sub-model of the mental model
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……… IF mental sub-model is modifiable
………. IF number of heuristics matched in prior period >= 2
……….. CALL Counterfactual thinking;
………. END IF
.. IF Counterfactual thinking result is FALSE OR number of heuristics matched in prior
period < 2
……….. CALL Innovation;
………. END IF
……… END IF
…….. END FOR
……. END IF
…… END FOR
….. END FOR
…. END IF
… END FOR
.. END FOR
. END IF
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. IF time period > 1
.. FOR each agent type
… FOR each agent
…. FOR each mental model of the agent
….. FOR each mental sub-model of the mental model
…… CALL Social Learning;
….. END FOR
…. END FOR
… END FOR
.. END FOR
. END IF
. FOR each agent type
.. FOR each agent
… FOR each site
…. FOR each mental model of the agent
….. FOR each mental sub-model of the mental model
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…… CALL Satisficing;
….. END FOR
…. END FOR
… END FOR
.. END FOR
. END FOR
. FOR each agent type
.. FOR each agent
… FOR each site
…. FOR each mental model of the agent
….. FOR each mental sub-model of the mental model
…… CALL Signaling interest in a collective action;
….. END FOR
…. END FOR
… END FOR
.. END FOR
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. END FOR
. FOR each agent type
.. FOR each agent
.. FOR each site
…. CALL Action-taking;
… END FOR
.. END FOR
. END FOR
. CALL Maintenance;
END FOR

4.5 Pseudo-code describing learning and decision-making
This section provides the pseudo-code that served as the template for programming the
five learning and three decision-making processes (modules) of the SOSIEL platform. The
pseudo-code describes the steps of each process, with the processes organized in the
same order that they are called in the main algorithm of the platform, starting with the
first time period. For the algorithm’s main call directive, see Section 4.4. For the
explanation and theoretical grounding of the sequence of processes, see Chapter 3’s
Subsection 3.3.2. The differences between the SOSIEL platform’s algorithm and the
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SOSIEL framework (Ch. 3) are described in Section 4.6 and are planned to be resolved in
the next version of the platform.
The call order during the first time period is as follows: (a) goal prioritization; (b)
satisficing; if relevant, (c) signaling interest in a collective action; and (d) action-taking.
The call order during the second and later time periods is as follows, (a) anticipatory
learning; (b) goal prioritization; if relevant, (c) counterfactual thinking; if relevant, (d)
innovation; (e) social learning; (f) satisficing; if relevant, (g) signaling interest in a collective
action; and (h) action-taking.

4.5.1 Goal prioritization (partial)
The process of goal prioritization (Ch. 3’s Subsec. 3.3.2.2.1.2) was designed primarily to
respond to the feedback an agent receives after taking an action in the prior period. In
particular, to the influence the feedback has on the agent’s confidence. In the first time
period, however, no action has yet been taken, there is therefore no feedback, and, as a
result, the agent has not yet had a chance to lose their confidence. Therefore, in the first
time period, the process of goal prioritization always operates as if the agent is confident.
For this reason, only the pseudo-code for the option of when the agent is confident is
provided in this subsection. The process’ complete pseudo-code is provided in Subsection
4.5.6.
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Below is the partial pseudo-code for the process of satisficing (Ch. 3’s Subsec. 3.3.2.2.1.2),
called for each agent:
1. If there are no no-confidence goals, then:
a. For each goal, generate a list: (a) the length of which equals the goal’s
proportional importance (provided as an initial condition) multiplied by 100 and
rounded up to a whole number, and (b) the elements of which are the goal’s ID.
b. Generate the goal importance distribution by combining the above-mentioned
lists (in a descending order, based on proportional importance). The length of
the distribution will be approximately one hundred and its elements will be the
IDs of the agent’s goals.
c. Generate the goal of focus list:
i. Use a uniform distribution to choose a goal from the goal importance
distribution. Let's say it's G1. Place it in first place in the goal of focus list.
ii. Shorten the goal importance distribution by removing from it all G1
elements.
iii. Use a uniform distribution to choose another goal from the shortened
vector. Let's say it's G2. Place it in second place in the goal of focus list.
iv. Shorten the goal importance distribution by removing from it all G2
elements.
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v. Repeat steps i-iv until the last goal has been selected from the goal
importance distribution and added to the ordered goal of focus list. The
result should be a list of goals, approximately ordered by their level of
importance. Approximately because at any point chance may lead to
selecting a less important goal.
The product of the process of goal prioritization is the goal of focus list.

4.5.2 Satisficing
Below is the pseudo-code for the process of satisficing (Ch. 3’s Subsec. 3.3.2.1.1), called
for each mental sub-model:
1. For a specific mental sub-model:
a. Choose from the goal of focus list the first goal associated with the mental submodel.
b. Identify knowledge heuristics with antecedents that meet current conditions.
c. If only one knowledge heuristic is identified, then set its:
i. Activation_status = yes
ii. KH_freshness_status = 0
iii. Number_of_KHs_that_matched_conditions = 1

120

iv. Note: because each mental sub-model includes a do-nothing knowledge
heuristic, this is the case in which the do-nothing knowledge heuristic is
chosen.
d. If more than one knowledge heuristic is identified, then:
i. If the goal is to:
a. maximize a variable, then choose the knowledge heuristic with the
highest anticipated influence. If more than one knowledge heuristic has
equally-high anticipated influence, then use a uniform distribution to
randomly choose one of them.
b. minimize a variable, then choose the knowledge heuristic with the
lowest anticipated influence. If more than one knowledge heuristic has
equally low anticipated influence, then use a uniform distribution to
randomly choose one of them.
c. manage a variable equal to or above a focal value, then choose the donothing knowledge heuristic.
ii. Number_of_KHs_matching_conditions variable to the number of
knowledge heuristics matching current conditions.
iii. Set the chosen heuristic’s:
a. Activation_status = yes
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b. If the knowledge heuristic is not a collective action (required
participants < 2), then set its knowledge heuristic freshness status to
zero.
The product of the process of satisficing is a knowledge heuristic.

4.5.3 Signaling interest in a collective action
Below is the pseudo-code for the process of signaling interest in a collective action (Ch.
3’s Subsec. 3.3.2.1.2), called for each mental sub-model:
1. If the knowledge heuristic chosen during satisficing is a collective action (i.e., the
number of required participants is ≥ 2) and:
a. The number of neighbors (other agents) in relevant social network(s) is ≥1, then:
i. Share the idea of the collective action with all neighbors in relevant
network(s) by adding the collective action with its anticipated influence(s)
to their respective mental sub-model, avoiding duplication; and
ii. Increase the value of the Number_of_agents_committed_to_
the_collective_action variable by one.
b. The number of neighbors (other agents) in relevant social network(s) is < 1, then:
i. Change the collective action’s activation status to “no” and re-engage in
satisficing, this time excluding the chosen collective action from the list of
possible options.
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2. If a sufficient number of agents from relevant social network(s) also signals interest
in the collective action, then maintain the value of the collective action’s
Activation_status variable at “yes”; otherwise, change the value of the collective
action’s Activation_status variable from “yes” to “no,” reengage in the process of
satisficing, and exclude the collective action as a potential option during this time
period.

4.5.4 Action-taking (and maintenance)
The process of taking action (Ch. 3’s Subsec. 3.3.2.1.3) is called for each agent and involves
implementing the knowledge heuristics with “yes” Activation_status values and
calculating respective variables. Before completing the time period, a number of
maintenance tasks must be completed, including: (a) increasing the value of each
knowledge heuristic’s KH_freshness_status variable by one, (b) reducing the value of the
Number_of_agents_committed_ to_the_collective _action variable to zero, and (c)
changing the state of each knowledge heuristic’s Activation_status variable to no.

4.5.5 Anticipatory learning
Anticipatory learning (Ch. 3’s Subsec. 3.3.2.2.1.1) is the first process activated during the
second and later time periods. Below is the pseudo-code for the process of anticipatory
learning, called for each agent, starting with the first knowledge heuristic and associated
goal:
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1. Calculate the Anticipated_Influence(t) of prior period’s knowledge heuristic for each
associated goal:
a. If goal variable is cumulative, then: anticipated influence = goal variable value(t)
– goal variable value(t-1)
b. If goal variable is not cumulative, then: anticipated influence = goal variable
value(t)
2. Update the anticipated influence(t) of knowledge heuristic activated in prior period
(the one with knowledge heuristic freshness status(t) = 1).
3. Assess the success of prior knowledge heuristic in achieving each associated goal:
a. If the goal is to maximize a variable, then:
i. If goal variable is cumulative, then:
a. Calculate difference between prior goal value and twice prior goal value
= goal value(t-1) – goal value(t-2)
b. Calculate difference between current goal value and prior goal value =
goal value(t) – goal value(t-1)
c. Calculate confidence:
i. If the difference between prior goal value and twice prior goal
value ≤ difference between current goal value and prior goal
value, then confidence = yes
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ii. If the difference between prior goal value and twice prior goal
value > difference between current goal value and prior goal
value, then confidence = no
ii. If goal variable is not cumulative, then:
a. If prior goal value ≤ current goal value, then confidence = yes
b. If prior goal value > current goal value, then confidence = no
b. If the goal is to minimize a variable, then:
i. If goal variable is cumulative, then:
a. Calculate difference between prior goal value and twice prior goal value
= goal value(t-1) – goal value(t-2)
b. Calculate difference between current goal value and prior goal value =
goal value(t) – goal value(t-1)
c. Calculate confidence:
i. If the difference between prior goal value and twice prior goal value
≥ difference between current goal value and prior goal value, then
confidence = yes
ii. If the difference between prior goal value and twice prior goal value
< difference between current goal value and prior goal value, then
confidence = no
ii. If goal variable is not cumulative, then:
a. If prior goal value ≥ current goal value, then confidence = yes
125

b. If prior goal value < current goal value, then confidence = no
c. If the goal is managing a variable equal to or above a focal value, then:
i. Calculate difference between prior goal value and focal goal value = goal
value(t-1) – focal goal value(t)
ii. Calculate difference between current goal value and focal goal value = goal
value(t) – focal goal value(t)
iii. Calculate anticipated direction towards goal:
a. If the difference between current goal value and focal goal value is < 0,
then anticipated direction towards goal(t) = up
b. If the difference between current value of goal variable and focal goal
value is ≥ 0, then anticipated direction towards goal(t) = stay
iv. Calculate confidence:
a. If anticipated direction towards goal(t) = stay, then confidence(t) = yes.
b. If anticipated direction towards goal(t) = up, then
4. Choose the next goal (e.g., G2, G3, …) and continue repeating the process above
until all goals for the specific knowledge heuristic have been processed.
5. Choose the next knowledge heuristic of the agent, until all have been processed.

4.5.6 Goal prioritization (complete)
Below is the pseudo-code for the process of goal prioritization (Ch. 3’s Subsec.
3.3.2.2.1.2), called for each agent:
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1. If there are no no-confidence goals, then:
a. For each goal, generate a list: (a) the length of which equals the goal’s
proportional importance (provided as an initial) multiplied by 100 and rounded
up to a whole number, and (b) the elements of which are the goal’s ID.
b. Generate the goal importance distribution by combining the above-mentioned
lists (in a descending order, based on proportional importance). The length of
the distribution will be approximately one hundred and its elements will be the
IDs of the goals.
c. Generate the goal of focus list:
i. Use a uniform distribution to choose a goal from the goal importance
distribution. Let's say it's G1. Place it in first place in the goal of focus list.
ii. Shorten the goal importance distribution by removing from it all G1
elements.
iii. Use a uniform distribution to choose another goal from the shortened
vector. Let's say it's G2. Place it in second place in the goal of focus list.
iv. Shorten the goal importance distribution by removing from it all G2
elements.
v. Repeat until the last goal has been selected from the goal importance
distribution and added to the ordered goal of focus list. The result should
be a list of goals of focus, approximately ordered by their level of
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importance. Approximately because at any point chance may lead to
selecting a less important goal.
2. If there are one or more no-confidence goals, then adjust importance proportions of
no-confidence goals:
a. Calculate the adjusted importance proportions of all no-confidence goals:
i. For each no-confidence goal, normalize the difference between prior goal
value and goal value, using the following formula:
a. normalized difference between prior goal value and goal value = |
actual difference / max difference |
b. For each no-confidence goal, adjust up proportion:
i.

Adjusted proportional importance of a no-confidence goal =
unadjusted proportional importance of a no-confidence goal *
(1 + normalized difference between prior value of goal variable
and goal value).

ii.

Save in adjusted G_set.

iii.

Add up the adjusted proportions of no-confidence goals to
create the total adjusted proportions of no-confidence goals.

iv.

Add up the unadjusted proportions of confidence goals to
create the total unadjusted proportions of confidence goals.

a. For each confidence goal, adjust down proportion:
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i. Adjusted proportional importance of a confidence goal =
unadjusted proportional importance of a confidence goal * (1 –
total adjusted proportions of no-confidence goals) / total
unadjusted proportions of confidence goals
ii. Save in adjusted G_set.
b. For each goal, generate a list: (a) the length of which equals the goal’s
proportional importance (provided in the adjusted G_set) multiplied by 100 and
rounded up to a whole number, and (b) the elements of which are the goal’s ID.
c. Generate the goal importance distribution by combining the above-mentioned
lists (in a descending order, based on proportional importance). The length of
the distribution will be approximately one hundred and its elements will be the
IDs of the goals.
d. Generate the goal of focus list:
i. Use a uniform distribution to choose a goal from the goal importance
distribution. Let's say it's G1. Place it in first place in the goal of focus list.
ii. Shorten the goal importance distribution by removing from it all G1
elements.
iii. Use a uniform distribution to choose another goal from the shortened
vector. Let's say it's G2. Place it in second place in the goal of focus list.
iv. Shorten the goal importance distribution by removing from it all G2
elements.
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v. Repeat until the last goal has been selected from the goal importance
distribution and added to the ordered goal of focus list. The result should
be a list of goals for focus, approximately ordered by their level of
importance. Approximately because at any point chance may lead to
selecting a less important goal.

4.5.7 Counterfactual thinking
Counterfactual thinking (Ch. 3’s Subsec. 3.3.2.2.1.3) is activated only if mental sub-model
= modifiable AND confidence(t) = no AND number of knowledge heuristics matching
conditions(t-1) ≥ 2. Below is the pseudo-code for the process of counterfactual thinking,
called for each mental sub-model:
1. For a specific mental sub-model, choose from the list of goals generated in
anticipatory learning the goal to focus on:
a. Check if the first ranked goal on the list is associated with the sub-model.
i. If it is, choose it as the goal of focus.
ii. If it is not, then check the next goal on the list.
2. If the critical goal is to maximize a variable, then (out of the set of knowledge
heuristics matching conditions in the prior period) choose the knowledge heuristic
with the largest anticipated influence(t) ≥ 0.
3. If the critical goal is managing a variable above a focal value, then (out of the set of
knowledge heuristics matching conditions in the prior period) choose the knowledge
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heuristic with anticipated influence(t) ≥ 0 AND anticipated influence(t) > the
difference between current value of goal variable and focal value(t) AND anticipated
influence(t) ≤ anticipated influence(t) of other knowledge heuristics in the set
matching conditions.
4. If the critical goal is managing a variable below a focal value, then (out of the set of
knowledge heuristics matching conditions in the prior period) choose the knowledge
heuristic with anticipated influence(t) < 0 AND |anticipated influence(t)| >
|difference between current value of goal variable and focal value(t)| AND
anticipated influence(t) ≤ anticipated influence(t) of other knowledge heuristics in
the set matching conditions.
5. Determine the success of the mental sub-model specific counterfactual thinking:
a. If 0 knowledge heuristics are identified, then the mental sub-model specific
counterfactual thinking(t) = unsuccessful.
b. If 1 knowledge heuristic is identified:
i. If it is prior period's knowledge heuristic OR the do-nothing knowledge
heuristic, then mental sub-model specific counterfactual thinking(t) =
unsuccessful.
ii. If it is not prior period's knowledge heuristic OR the do-nothing knowledge
heuristic, then mental sub-model specific counterfactual thinking(t) =
successful.
c. If >1 knowledge heuristic are identified:
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i. If all of them are prior period’s knowledge heuristic or the do-nothing
knowledge heuristic, then the mental sub-model specific counterfactual
thinking(t) = unsuccessful.
ii. If at least one of them is not prior period’s knowledge heuristic or the donothing knowledge heuristic, then the mental sub-model specific
counterfactual thinking(t) = successful.

4.5.8 Innovation
Below is the pseudo-code for the process of counterfactual thinking (Ch. 3’s Subsec.
3.3.2.2.1.4), called for each sub-model if counterfactual thinking = unsuccessful:
1. Choose goal of focus:
a. If innovation is following counterfactual thinking, then use the respective goal of
focus for each mental model as in counterfactual thinking.
b. If innovation is not following counterfactual thinking, then, for a specific mental
model, choose from the list of goals generated in anticipation learning the goal
to focus on and check if the first ranked goal on the list is associated with the
mental model.
i. If it is, choose it as the goal of focus.
ii. if it isn’t, then check the next goal on the list.
2. In the specific mental sub-model, if prior period’s knowledge heuristic is a dosomething knowledge heuristic, then choose prior period’s knowledge heuristic (i.e.,
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knowledge heuristic freshness status = 1). If prior period’s knowledge heuristic is a
do-nothing knowledge heuristic, then chose the knowledge heuristic from the
period before prior (i.e., knowledge heuristic freshness status = 2). If before prior
period’s knowledge heuristic is also a do-nothing knowledge heuristic, then chose
the knowledge heuristic from one period before (i.e., knowledge heuristic freshness
status = 3), until a do-something knowledge heuristic is identified.
3. If selected knowledge heuristic’s anticipated direction towards goal (which was
assigned during anticipatory learning) is either “up” or “down”, then:
a. If selected anticipated direction towards goal = up AND the selected knowledge
heuristic’s consequent’s relationship with goal variable = +, then do the
following:
i. Generate a new consequent value using the following logic:
a. Generate a new set of potential values(t) = (selected knowledge
heuristic’s consequent, highest potential value of selected knowledge
heuristic’s consequent]
b. Calculate the number of potential values(t) == |value of selected rule’s
consequent – highest potential value of selected knowledge heuristic’s
consequent|
c. Use a power-law distribution to generate a set of numbers, with:
i. the set size equaling the above number of potential values(t), and
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ii. the frequency of elements in the set decreasing as their value
increases. In other words, the values of more frequent elements
are closer to the value of selected knowledge heuristic’s
consequent than the values of less frequent elements.
d. Use a uniform distribution to randomly select an element from the
above power-law-generated set.
e. Identify the element in the potential values(t) set that is in the same
place in the potential values(t) set as the randomly chosen element is in
the power-law-generated set.
f. Set the variable new consequent(t) equaling to the value of this
element.
g. Generate a new anticipated influence value using the following logic:
i. Calculate: percentage change in consequent = | new consequent
value - selected knowledge heuristic’s consequent value | /
selected knowledge heuristic’s consequent value
ii. Calculate: new anticipated influence value = selected knowledge
heuristic’s anticipated influence + | percentage change in
consequent * selected knowledge heuristic’s anticipated influence
|
b. If selected knowledge heuristic’s anticipated direction towards goal = up AND
consequent’s relationship with goal variable = -, then do the following:
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i. Generate a new consequent value using the following logic:
a. Generate a new set potential values(t) = (selected knowledge heuristic’s
consequent, lowest potential value of selected rule’s consequent]
b. Calculate the number of potential values(t) == |value of selected
knowledge heuristic’s consequent – lowest potential value of selected
knowledge heuristic’s consequent|
c. Use a power-law distribution to generate a set of numbers, with:
i. The set size equaling the number of potential values(t), and
ii. The frequency of elements in the set decreasing as their values
decrease. In other words, the values of more frequent elements
are closer to the value of selected knowledge heuristic’s
consequent than the values of less frequent elements.
d. Randomly choose an element from the above power-law-generated
set.
e. Identify the element in the potential values(t) set that is in the same
place in the potential values(t) set as the randomly chosen element is in
the power-law generated set.
f. Set the variable new consequent(t) equaling to the value of this
element.
ii. Generate a new anticipated influence value using the following logic:
a. If:
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i. Selected knowledge heuristic’s consequent value = 0,
then assign 0 to percentage change in consequent.
ii. Selected knowledge heuristic’s consequent value > 0,
then calculate: percentage change in consequent = |
new consequent value - selected knowledge heuristic’s
consequent value | / selected rule’s consequent value
b. Calculate: new anticipated influence value = selected
knowledge heuristic’s anticipated influence + | percentage
change in consequent * selected knowledge heuristic’s
anticipated influence |
b. If anticipated direction towards goal = down AND consequent’s relationship with
goal variable = +, then do the do as in “b” above.
c. If anticipated direction towards goal = down AND consequent’s relationship with
goal variable = -, then do as in “a” above.
4. Generate a new knowledge heuristic, as follows:
a. The IF-part:
i. Consists of the set of antecedents of selected knowledge heuristic. For
each antecedent:
a. Use the left side and sign in the expression of the selected knowledge
heuristic’s antecedent as the left side and sign of the generated
knowledge heuristic’s expression.
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b. In the case the right side consists of a variable that is not the
consequent of a previous sub-model, use the most current value of the
variable that is on the right side of the selected knowledge heuristic’s
expression as the value of the variable that is on the right side of the
generated knowledge heuristic’s expression.
c. In the case the right side consists of a variable that is the consequent of
a previous sub-model:
i. If, during the current time period, a new knowledge heuristic was
generated for that previous sub-model, then use its consequent
as the right side in the expression of the present sub-model’s
generated knowledge heuristic’s antecedent.
ii. If, during the current time period, a new knowledge heuristic was
not generated for the previous sub-model, then use the right side
in the expression of the present sub-model’s selected knowledge
heuristic’s antecedent as the right side in the expression of the
present sub-model’s generated knowledge heuristic’s antecedent.
b. The THEN-part:
i. Set equaling to the new consequent, i.e., the value generated in step 2 of
this section.
c. Assign to the new knowledge heuristic the newly generated anticipated
influence.
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5. Add the new knowledge heuristic:
a. If the agent has enough room in the mental sub-model, i.e., if the number of
knowledge heuristics in the mental sub-model is less than the max number of
knowledge heuristics allowed in that mental sub-model, then simply add the
generated knowledge heuristic.
b. If the agent has no more room in the mental sub-model, i.e., if the number of
knowledge heuristics in the mental sub-model equals the max number of
knowledge heuristics allowed in that mental sub-model, then use the generated
knowledge heuristic to replace the knowledge heuristic in the mental sub-model
that has the highest knowledge heuristic freshness status. If there are more than
one knowledge heuristics with the highest knowledge heuristic freshness status,
then use a uniform distribution to randomly choose one of them.

4.5.9 Social learning
Below is the pseudo-code for the process of counterfactual thinking (Ch. 3’s Subsec.
3.3.2.2.2), called for each mental sub-model:
1. For each mental sub-model and for each neighbor:
a. Select the first mental sub-model in the first mental model.
b. Using a uniform distribution, randomly select without replacement the first
social network neighbor.
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c. Identify the knowledge heuristic the social network neighbor activated in prior
period (i.e., knowledge heuristic freshness status = 1).
d. Add the identified knowledge heuristic of the neighbor to the agent’s respective
mental sub-model, avoiding duplicates. In other words, make sure the agent
does not already have the knowledge heuristic in the mental sub-model.
i. If the agent has enough room in the mental sub-model, i.e., if the number
of knowledge heuristics in the mental sub-model is less than the max
number of knowledge heuristics allowed in that mental sub-model, then
simply add the identified rule.
ii. If the agent has no more room in the mental sub-model, i.e., if the number
of knowledge heuristics in the mental sub-model equals the max number of
knowledge heuristics allowed in that mental sub-model, then use the
neighbor’s knowledge heuristic to replace the knowledge heuristic in the
mental sub-model that has the highest knowledge heuristic freshness
status. If there are more than one knowledge heuristic with the highest
knowledge heuristic freshness status, then randomly choose one of them.
e. Assign to the added knowledge heuristic the anticipated influences of the
respected knowledge heuristic.
f. Set the added knowledge heuristic’s knowledge heuristic freshness status to “0”.
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g. Using a uniform distribution, randomly select the next neighbor and repeat steps
c-g until the number of neighbors learned from all neighbors in the list have
been processed.
h. Select the next mental sub-model in the selected mental model and repeat steps
b-h until all mental sub-model have been processed.
i.

Select the first mental sub-model in the next mental model and repeat steps b-i
until all mental models have been processed.

4.5.10 Satisficing, potentially signaling, and action-taking
The above-described process of social learning (Subsec. 4.5.9) is followed by the
processes of satisficing (Subsec. 4.5.2), potentially signaling interest in a collective action
(Subsec. 4.5.3), and action-taking (Subsec. 4.5.4). Action-taking is always the last process
of any time period.

4.6 The differences between the SOSIEL platform and the SOSIEL framework
There are several differences between the current design of the SOSIEL platform and the
SOSEIL framework. These differences are briefly described in this section.

1. Inter-generational population dynamics. To date, only an evolutionary game
theoretic version of the inter-generational population dynamics process has been
implemented and verified. Implementation of the inter-generational population
dynamics process described in Chapter 3’s Section 3.2 will occur after LANDIS-II’s
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SOSIEL Human Extension (Ch. 5) is fully parameterized with the agent data described
in Chapter 2.
2. Signaling interest in a collective action. In the SOSIEL framework, agents that are
considering engaging in a collective action wait for others to also consider. This has
not been implemented in the current version of the SOSIEL platform, in which
agents do not wait. This design difference will be resolved in the next version of the
platform.
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Chapter 5: The SOSIEL Human Extension (SHE) for LANDIS-II
Chapter 5 describes LANDIS-II’s SOSIEL Human Extension (SHE), which is the result of
coupling the SOSIEL platform (Ch. 4) with an open-source forest-climate change model,
called LANDIS-II. Together, LANDIS-II with SHE can simulate context-specific, co-evolving
human-forest-climate interactions, which is exemplified in the chapter with two
hypothetical examples. Chapter 5 begins with a discussion in Section 5.1 of the need for
SHE and describes other platforms that simulate human-forest interactions, while Section
5.2 briefly describes LANDIS-II, SHE, and the two of them coupled together. The chapter
also describes a part of the effort to implement LANDIS-II with SHE in the Ukrainian
Carpathians, which involved simulating the model with simplified variations of the locally
acquired knowledge that was discussed and presented in Chapter 2. To this end, Section
5.3 describes two hypothetical examples, one involving innovation in forest management
and the other involving social learning and collective action in a forest-dependent
community. Lastly, Section 5.4 discusses how LANDIS-II with SHE can be used in more
complicated examples, how applying formulation from evolutionary game theory can
introduce rigor into the analysis of decision-outcome relationships, and how SHE
contributes overall to our ability to analyze human-forest-climate interactions.

5.1 Introduction
Anthropogenic emission of greenhouse gases (Ballantyne et al. 2012) is destabilizing
historic climate patterns in unprecedented ways with potentially devastating
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consequences to human well-being. Forest ecosystems are essential in mitigating climate
change through carbon sequestration (Canadell & Raupach 2008). However, the change
in climate has already started affecting some and is expected to affect all forest
ecosystems (IPCC 2007), in turn influencing their ability to sequester carbon (Seidl et al.
2014).
For example, in mid-latitude forests, a warming climate is likely, on one hand, to lengthen
the growing season and thereby increase the rates of tree growth, while, on the other, to
increase the frequency and magnitude of droughts and biotic disturbances, such as insect
infestations (IUFRO 2009). The net effect on forest ecosystems is not easily understood
and is further complicated by land use practices that disrupt the adaptive and migratory
processes of forest species (Davis & Shaw 2001) and alter forest composition (Thompson
et al. 2011). The effect on forest-dependent communities and more broadly on users of
forest products is also not easily understood.
Decision-related activities, such as bottom-up and top-down policy development,
analysis, and planning in human-forest-climate contexts stand to benefit from the
development and application of cognitive, multi-agent, and knowledge-based models
that are capable of representing spatiotemporal human behavior in local contexts. A
number of modeling platforms that simulate human-forest or human-forest-climate
interactions already exists, which overcome some of the challenges and meet some of the
criteria described in Chapter 1’s Section 1.1. They include:
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a. LANDIS-II (Scheller et al. 2007), which is a platform for modeling region-scale forest
dynamics and disturbances (such as climate change), and its Base Harvest extension
(Gustafson et al. 2000), which simulates harvesting and planting;
b. Evoland (Bolte et al. 2006), which models spatially-explicit actor-based approaches
to landscape change;
c. LUDAS (Le et al. 2008), which models land-use-related household decision-making;
and
d. iLand (Seidl et al. 2012), which is a platform for modeling tree-scale forest dynamics
and disturbances, and its multi-agent extension, called ABE (Rammer & Seidl 2015),
which simulates forest management.

This chapter describes a new extension for LANDIS-II (LANdscape DIsturbance and
Succession), called the SOSIEL Human Extension (SHE), which advances the field by
overcoming and meeting all of the challenges and criteria described in Chapter 1’s Section
1.1.

5.2 LANDIS-II with SHE
LANDIS-II in combination with SHE is a computer-based platform designed for studying
co-evolving and context-specific human-forest-climate interactions, in which LANDIS-II
represents the forest-climate component and SHE represents the human one. Below are
brief descriptions of LANDIS-II and SHE.
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LANDIS-II (Fig. 13) is a second-generation spatiotemporal forest landscape model
(Scheller et al. 2007) that simulates broad-scale (>105 ha) landscape dynamics generated
by interactions among carbon and climate dynamics, inter- and intra- species
competition, a variety of disturbances (fire, harvesting, windthrow, insects), seed
dispersal, and succession (Scheller & Mladenoff 2004; Scheller et al. 2007).
Figure 13: A descriptive image of LANDIS-II.

Source: Scheller and colleagues (2007).

In LANDIS-II, interactions are driven by ecosystem processes, each of which functions at
its own spatiotemporal scale and has its own spatiotemporal boundary. Soil and species
composition, the climate, and succession all guide the inter- and intra- species
interactions (Scheller & Mladenoff 2004). Linking the various ecosystem and disturbance
processes are living and dead biomass, which also serve as feedback to these processes
(Scheller & Mladenoff 2004).
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From a multi-agent modeling perspective, LANDIS-II consists of an environment,
represented as a matrix of interacting sites, and a set of agents, each representing a
cohort of trees. A site, which is defined by a specific soil type and climate, can include
more than one cohort, each defined by the average tree age, above-ground biomass,
density, and size (Scheller & Mladenoff 2004; Scheller et al. 2007). LANDIS-II also comes
accompanied by a library of ecological processes, cohort data, and biomass dynamics.
Each process in LANDIS-II’s architecture is represented by an extension.
To date, LANDIS-II has been used in numerous studies around the world, including in Chile
(Swanson 2009, Newton et al. 2011), Kyrgyzstan (Cantarello et al. 2014), and the United
States (Xi et al. 2009, Ravenscroft et al. 2010, Shinneman et al. 2010, Scheller et al. 2011a,
Scheller et al. 2011b, Syphard et al. 2011, Thompson et al. 2011, Duveneck et al. 2013,
Steenberg et al. 2013, Loudermilk et al. 2014, Thomas-Van Gundy & Sturtevant 2014,
Wang et al. 2014, Pauli et al. 2015).
As a part of this dissertation, the SOSIEL platform (Ch. 4) was coupled with LANDIS-II,
creating the SOSIEL Human Extension (SHE) for LANDIS-II and allowing for co-evolutionary
and context-specific human-forest-climate interactions. The decision-making simulated
by SHE can be directly related to the forest, such as forest management (Gustafson et al.
2000, Bolte et al. 2006, Rammer & Seidl 2015), or indirectly related, such as various socioeconomic decisions made by members of forest-dependent communities (Le et al. 2008).
Each agent may interact with one or more of LANDIS-II’s sites. Guidance on what type of
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information is needed for parameterizing and initializing the SOSIEL platform is provided
in Chapter 2’s Subsection 2.3.2.1.1.
Figure 14 provides a process-focused depiction of LANDIS-II with SHE. The processes are
represented by arrows. The red-colored arrows represent human processes, the greencolored arrows represent forest processes, and the blue-colored arrows represent
climate processes.
Figure 14: A process-focused depiction of LANDIS-II in combination with SHE.

Alternatively, Figure 15 depicts the relationship between LANDIS-II and SHE from the
perspective of a SOSIEL agent. A SOSIEL agent interacts with LANDIS-II through LANDIS-IIspecific decision situations, each of which is represented in a SOSIEL agent’s cognitive
architecture with a mental model. For example, harvesting and planting trees may be
treated as two different decision situations, with each requiring its own knowledge and
mental model and involving its own learning and decision-making process. Each decision
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situation may be assigned one or more of LANDIS-II sites, and a SOSIEL agent will engage
in decision-making on as many sites as are assigned.
Figure 15: Link between LANDIS-II and a SOSIEL agent's cognitive architecture.

The ability to incorporate different types of agents at different scales allows a researcher
to independently or simultaneously experiment with, for example, interactions between
top-down (government-level) sustainable forest management policies and/or bottom-up
(community-level) human-forest practices, thereby testing, in the context of climate
change, potential effects on forest dynamics, the profitability of forest management,
community well-being, or all of the above. It also allows for the inclusion and comparison
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of behaviors of any combination of agents, some of which may be replicating the behavior
of agents in other models (Gustafson et al. 2000; Bone & Dragićević 2009; Rammer & Seidl
2015).
SHE can be used to explore a number of pertinent social-ecological questions relevant for
adaptation to climate change, including: Which forest management and household
practices best facilitate adaptation to climate change? How do mental models evolve as
they adapt to climate change? And, How does social network structure influence the
potential for collective action and adaptation to climate change?

5.3 Two hypothetical examples
SHE can simulate uni- and bi-directional agent-forest and agent-agent interactions at a
variety of spatiotemporal scales. This section describes SHE simulations within
hypothetical contexts that exemplify decision situations with bi-directional human-forest
and human-human interactions.
The examples include agents of two types, a forestry enterprise agent in one and
household member agents in the other. The example with the forestry enterprise agent
involves individual learning through innovation, while the example with the household
member agents involves collective action and inter-network social learning. Both
examples provide insight into how the mental models of agents evolve as a result of
interactions and are described in greater detail below.
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The creation and exploration of these examples are part of the effort to verify LANDIS-II
with SHE for implementation in Bohdanska Dolyna. Therefore, the examples use
simplified variations of knowledge that was acquired in Bohdanska Dolyna and presented
in Chapter 2.

5.3.1 Forestry enterprise agent adapting through innovation
The example with the forestry enterprise agent involves individual learning through
innovation by simulating how the forestry enterprise agent makes harvesting decisions
over a span of 1,000 years and adapts them to changes in a simple forest landscape. The
example, of course, is an over-simplification. However, its sole objective is to verify the
agent’s behavior, and for this purpose the described configuration is appropriate. To
allow for innovation, SHE is set to simulate decision-making at cognitive level 4 (Ch. 4’s
Sec. 4.3).
The forestry enterprise agent has two conflicting goals, both of which are allocated equal
importance. One goal (G1) is to maximize profit, which is linearly related to the amount
of biomass that the forestry enterprise harvests during a period, while the other goal (G2)
is with respect to sustainability, which means maintaining the average biomass on the
landscape above a certain minimum, in this case set at 10,400 units.
The forestry enterprise agent makes its harvesting decisions every ten years based on two
LANDIS-II variables: the biomass of a site and the average biomass of the landscape, which
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it gains access to at the beginning of every new harvesting period. The decision of by how
much to reduce a specific site’s biomass is made for every one of the forested sites on the
landscape that was assigned to the agent. The decision-making during any specific period
is driven by one of forestry enterprise agent’s two goals (Tab. 6), which is selected based
on its relative importance, the level of which may or may not have been adjusted based
on how poorly/well the forestry enterprise agent is doing in achieving it.
Table 6: The goals of the forestry enterprise.
Goal
G1
G2

Purpose
profit
sustainability

Initial importance level
0.5
0.5

Type
highest
above min

Focal value
≥0
10,400

The forestry enterprise agent starts with the following two knowledge heuristics in their
mental model:
1. IF ( Biomass >= 0 ), THEN ( Reduction_percentage = 0 )
a. Anticipated_influence_on_G1: 0
b. Anticipated_inlfuence_on_G2: 0

The first knowledge heuristic may be selected for a site with any level of biomass, if
selected it does not reduce the biomass of a site at all, and it is anticipated to have no
influence on either one of the goals.
2. IF ( Biomass >= 0 ), THEN ( Reduction_percentage = 10 )
a. Anticipated_influence_on_G1: 1,000
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b. Anticipated_inlfuence_on_G2: 1,000

The second knowledge heuristic may also be selected for a site with any level of biomass,
if selected it reduces the biomass of a site by 10%, and it is anticipated to increase biomass
by 1,000 units. The initial values of the anticipated influences of both of the heuristics are
likely to be inaccurate because they were not selected to reflect the initial site-specific
biomass-level conditions and the site-specific increases in biomass that are likely to occur
during period one as a result of succession. However, in the context of 1,000 years of
forest management, these initial inaccuracies are insignificant and are updated in period
one during anticipatory learning with actual values.
If during a simulation the prior period’s harvesting activity on a site in question resulted
in worse than anticipated results (in respect to the goal in focus), thereby making the
agent unconfident in their decision-making on the site, the agent engages in
counterfactual thinking. If the process of counterfactual thinking does not identify in the
agent’s mental model another knowledge heuristic that is anticipated to have had the
potential to produce better results, the agent engages in innovation, which involves
creating a new knowledge heuristic. The value of the consequent generated for the new
knowledge heuristic depends partly on the value of the consequent of prior period’s
knowledge heuristic applied to the specific site and partly on the goal that is being focused
on. If G1 (or G2) is in focus, then in pursuit of profit (or sustainability), the forestry
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enterprise agent will generate a knowledge heuristic that increases (or reduces) the
amount by which biomass is reduced.
Figure 16 depicts the results of a 1,000-year simulation. The average biomass starts
around 17,000 units. Initially, with both goals of equal importance, the forestry enterprise
agent randomly switches (using a uniform distribution) between reducing site biomass
sometimes by 0 and sometimes by 10%, which by year 100 results in the average biomass
dropping to below the sustainable minimum of 10, 400 units. This, in turn, results in the
forestry enterprise agent being significantly further away from achieving G2 than G1,
which leads it to reevaluate the relative importance levels of its goals and proportionally
add more importance to G2.
Figure 16: Innovative forest management.
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A new focus on G2 leads to the agent generating more than 1,200 heuristics for a variety
of sites, which help it get the average biomass back above the sustainable minimum. The
remainder of the simulation depicts the forestry enterprise agent continuing to tailor
biomass reduction amounts to each site in a way that satisfies both of its goals. In year
1,000, the average biomass is at 17,435 units and the forestry enterprise agent’s mental
model contains 3,600 site-specific knowledge heuristics.
The above example demonstrates the complex relationships among factors influencing
decision-making, which, in this case, included potentially conflicting goals, site-specific
expectations, decision options, and dynamic macro- and micro-level landscape
conditions. These complex relationships make it difficult for forest managers to accurately
anticipate the levels of influences of specific knowledge heuristics and, in turn, accurately
select knowledge heuristics that are most appropriate for achieving their goals.
Recognizing and analyzing these complex relationships has the potential of improving our
understanding of forest management and, in turn, our ability to manage forests.

5.3.2 Households adapting through social learning
The example with the household member agents involves collective action and internetwork social learning by simulating how household member agents from two
households over a period of 10 years make employment decisions and learn from each
other about available employment options.
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One of the households, household 1, consists of three household member agents: (a)
household member 1 is a 35-year-old female, who in addition to working also keeps track
of expenses and savings; (b) household member 2 is a 30-year-old male, also working; and
(c) household member 3 is a 75-year-old female, who receives a pension. Household
member agents 1 and 2 operate a family-owned green business. The family-owned
business is a collective action that, first, requires at least two household member agents
to be interested in and committed to participating in at the beginning of each period and,
second, at least 100,000 monetary units of savings.
The other household, household 2, consists of a family of four: (a) household member 1
is a 40-year-old female, who works abroad; (b) household member 2 is a 35-year-old male,
who in addition to engaging in housework also keeps track of expenses and savings; (c)
household member 3 is a 14-year-old female, who picks and sells mushrooms for income;
(d) and household member 4 is a 50-year-old male, who receives disability.
Each household represents a social network comprised of its member agents. In addition,
the second household member agents from both households are also members of a social
group, which is a third social network, connecting the two households. The social network
structure is depicted in Figure 17. As shown, only household member agents 1 and 2 from
the first household are engaged in the collective action of operating a family-owned green
business. However, this changes in a period of six years.
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Figure 17: The social network structure of the two households over time.

The above-described and -depicted social learning can be traced from period to period by
analyzing SHE’s output (Tab. 7).
Table 7: Output depicting evolution of mental models.
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In period two (P2), the second household member agent from the second household (H2
M2) learns from the second household member agent from the first household (H1 M2)
about the idea and the details of operating a green business. However, since the second
household does not have the necessary savings (the savings of H2 is ₴26,300 < ₴100,000),
its second member agent does not immediately share this new knowledge with other
household member agents. In period five (P5), the third member agent from the second
household (H2 M3) becomes 18 years old and joins the first household member agent (H2
M1) in working abroad. The new influx of higher income (from ₴500 to ₴16,000) speeds
up the second household’s ability to reach the minimum for starting a green business. In
period 6 (P6), the second member agent of the second household (H2 M2) sees that his
household’s savings are now above the minimum for starting a family-owned green
business (₴107,000 > ₴100,000) and shares the idea and details of operating a familyowned green business with his fellow household member agents (H2 M1, M3, and M4).
As a result, they agree to and start a green business that period.
The above example demonstrates the complex relationships among factors influencing
decision-making, which, in this case, included access to knowledge and personal- and
household-level constraints. Recognizing and analyzing these complex relationships has
the potential of improving our understanding of context-specific social change and, in
turn, our ability to adapt to climate change.
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The above two examples are of relatively simple decision situations and decision
processes. SHE is capable of reflecting much higher levels of complexity, as is being
implemented in the Ukrainian Carpathians (Ch. 2). For instance, harvesting decisions by
forestry enterprises there are based on a set of tree (e.g., species, age) and landscape
(e.g., forest type, slope angle, soil stability) attributes. These additional factors are
incorporated as conditions in the respective knowledge heuristics.
Additionally, in the Ukrainian Carpathians, the specific combinations of tree and
landscape attributes determine the harvesting method used, which implies that the
appropriate harvesting method needs to be selected before the selection of the biomass
reduction amount. This is done by constructing the mental model that is aligned with this
decision situation out of two connected mental sub-models, the first focused on selecting
a harvesting method and the second using the chosen method in selecting the biomass
reduction amount.
Lastly, in the above hypothetical examples, decisions are made within only one decision
situation. However, in the Ukrainian Carpathians, household members can make a variety
of decisions that pertain to different forest-related decision situations. For example, in
addition to choosing forest-related employment decisions, household members also
choose forest-related heating options. SHE allows for agents to engage in more than one
decision situation.
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5.4 Contribution
The main contribution described in this chapter is the new open-source extension for
LANDIS-II, called SHE, which allows for the study of co-evolutionary human-forest-climate
interactions. SHE can be used as a platform for mechanism design (Maskin 2008), which
involves experimenting with different sets of initial conditions in order to influence the
outcome in a desirable direction. In the case of each simulated decision situation, this can
involve searching for what is referred to in evolutionary game theory (Weibull 1995) as
the evolutionarily stable strategies. The objective of a researcher can then be to select
the set of initial conditions that would result in the desirable set of evolutionarily stable
strategies.
In cases when there are more than one agent (sub)type, SHE can be used to study coevolutionary dynamics (Perc & Szolnoki 2010) among them, and search for evolutionarily
stable strategies for each. Furthermore, if a tree species is viewed as a landscape’s
strategy, then the evolutionary game theoretic analysis can be extended to include both
social and ecological ‘players.’
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Chapter 6: The doubly-bounded rationality of artificial agents
Chapters 2 through 5 focus on the acquisition and operationalization of knowledge for,
and design, operationalizing, and application of a new cognitive, multi-agent, and
knowledge-based system that was developed as a part of this dissertation. Chapters 6 and
7 more generally focus on analyzing, improving, and testing such systems.
Chapter 6 first describes a new framework for analyzing the bounded rationality in
decision-makers that is rooted in competing schools of thought and consolidates a variety
of related concepts to establish a comprehensive relationship between a decision
situation and a decision. The chapter then describes the new framework for analyzing the
doubly-bounded rationality of artificial agents that expands on the framework for
analyzing BR and advances our understanding of the relationships among: (a) a decision
situation, (b) a decision-maker making a decision within that decision situation, (c) a
modeler modeling the decision-maker, and (d) an artificial agent designed by the modeler
to represent the decision-maker.

6.1 Introduction
The concept of rationality has been contemplated throughout history and in all parts of
the world (Biderman & Scharfstein 1989). More recently, Herbert Simon (1957) qualified
the concept of human rationality with the concept of boundedness to highlight the
limitations humans face when making decisions in decision situations that are not fully
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understood. Simon (1960) identified these limitations as those resulting from information
and/or information processing power and/or time. Faced with these limitations, he
argued, humans engage in multi-step decision-making processes (Simon 1978), which
involve choosing and implementing (cognitive and knowledge) heuristics in hopes of
circumventing the above-mentioned limitations (Simon 1995).
Following Simon’s pioneering work, studies by experimental psychologists have provided
support for the idea of human rationality being bounded (Selten 1998, Gigerenzer &
Selten 2001) and for heuristics being the tools we use to help us navigate, especially
through decision situations that are not fully understood (Tversky & Kahneman 1974,
Gigerenzer et al. 1999). They have also shown how the use of such heuristics can either
hinder (Tversky & Kahneman 1974) or help (Gigerenzer et al. 1999, Gigerenzer & Selten
2001, Todd et al. 2012) our decision-making, depending on whether they mismatch or
match a decision situation, respectively.
In addition to developing internal tools, such as heuristics, researchers also develop
external tools, such as algorithm- and equation-based models, also with the aim of
circumventing the bounds on our rationality. Some of these models are normative, used
to analyze the relationships among various human decisions and optimal social outcomes;
some are descriptive, used to analyze the relationships among various human decisions
and humanly possible social outcomes; while some are prescriptive, used to identify
human decisions that can improve humanly possible social outcomes.
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It is worth noting that the boundedness of human rationality is not (if at all) as relevant
in the normative models of human behavior as it is in the descriptive and prescriptive
ones. This is because the searches for optimal outcomes do not need to take the bounds
of human rationality into account, while the searches for humanly possible outcomes
must.
This being the case, the concept of bounded rationality (BR) has entered the world of
descriptive and prescriptive modeling (Conlisk 1996, Rubinstein 1998, Bell et al. 1998,
Munier et al. 1999, Camerer 2003, Baron 2004, Crawford 2013, Harstad & Selten 2013),
and a significant number of approaches to bounding the rationality of artificial agents
representing boundedly-rational human behavior have been developed. In contrast, the
concept of unbounded (better known as perfect) rationality (UR) dominates the world of
normative models of human behavior (Bell et al. 1998, Baron 2004).
Incorporating the boundedness of human rationality in models of human behavior,
however, introduces the risk of misrepresentation. This is because the rationality of
artificial agents representing BR human behavior can be said to be doubly-bounded, by a
first and second layer of boundedness. The first layer of boundedness is intentional and
reflects to some limited degree of success the BR of the human behavior being modeled.
Its success is limited by a second layer of boundedness, which is unintentional and reflects
the BR of those modeling the human behavior, as well as any technical limitations
involved in modeling.
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The differences discovered between the BR humans being modeled and the doubleboundedly-rational (DBR) artificial agents representing them can stem: (a) from an
incomplete understanding of the BR being modeled, (b) from an incomplete
understanding of how to model BR, and/or (c) from not yet having the appropriate
technology to model BR.
The above three reasons, which vary in degree by context, characterize the first and
second layers of boundedness and the extent to which the DBR of an artificial agent
(mis)represents the BR of the human behavior modeled. Despite the potentially
significant differences between bounded and doubly-bounded rationality, what is being
distinguished in this paper as DBR is typically referred to in the literature as just BR
(Conlisk 1996, Rubinstein 1998, Munier et al. 1999, Camerer 2003, Crawford 2013,
Harstad & Selten 2013). In other words, a distinction is not made between the BR of
humans being modeled and the DBR of the artificial agents representing their behavior.
As a result, the relationship between bounded and doubly-bounded rationality is poorly
understood. For example, no standard method currently exists for analyzing the extent
to which a case of BR is (mis)represented by a case of DBR, or for identifying and/or
reducing the second layer of boundedness. Understanding the relationship between
bounded and doubly-bounded rationality, however, is essential for developing descriptive
and prescriptive models with artificial agents aimed at helping better understand BR
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human behavior, because the actions-outcomes relationships that are of interest to the
users of such models significantly depend on it.
The main objective of this chapter is to introduce a new framework for studying the DBR
of artificial agents and to discuss approaches for increasing the first layer of boundedness
and reducing the second. This is done by first introducing a new framework for analyzing
the BR of decision-makers, upon which the framework for analyzing the DBR of artificial
agents is based. The effort is also a step towards developing the DBR method for testing
the success of DBR artificial agents in representing BR human behavior, which is described
and applied in Chapter 7.

6.2 The new framework for analyzing the DBR of artificial agents
This section first introduces the new framework for analyzing the BR of decision-makers
and then applies it in describing the framework for analyzing the DBR of artificial agents.

6.2.1 The new framework for analyzing the BR of decision-makers
In the context of human decision-making, rationality is the quality of behaving logically in
a decision situation, in the sense of making decisions that are in accordance with one’s
goal(s) in that decision situation. At the root of the concept of bounded rationality (Simon
1957) is the fact that mismatches can and do arise between one or more properties of a
decision situation on one hand and one or more properties of a decision-maker’s
knowledge and/or cognition on the other (Simon 1990, Selten 1998, Todd 2001, Todd et
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al. 2012), making the understanding of a decision situation and the rational decisionmaking within it, difficult.
In this context, a decision situation is a time-sensitive context within which a decisionmaker needs to make a decision (e.g., Ostrom et al. 1994). A decision-maker’s knowledge
refers to what they understand about a decision situation and their cognition refers to
their ability to perceive, process, store, and select a decision based on that knowledge. A
property is an essential attribute of a decision situation or of a decision-maker’s
knowledge or cognition, which is required for making a rational decision within a given
decision situation. Lastly, a mismatch is the inability of one or more properties of a
decision-maker’s knowledge and/or cognition to represent with sufficient accuracy some
property within a decision situation.
Mismatches associated with knowledge and/or its perception, processing, and storage
produce mental misrepresentations of a decision situation. In turn, mental
misrepresentations and/or mismatches associated with selecting a decision bound
rationality. The terms mismatch and bound are two sides of the same coin. Mismatches
between properties are bounds on rationality, which are mental limitations that affect
the selection of which decisions are available to choose from and which is/are ultimately
chosen. These influences bias decision-making, where a bias (Wilke & Mata 2012) is a
tendency to behave in a certain way given certain bounds on rationality.
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The above is also applicable within the context of the DBR of artificial agents representing
human decision-making. The rationality of a DBR artificial agent is additionally bounded
by the inability of a BR modeler to understand a BR decision-maker’s decision-making
and/or accurately represent it using a computer program. Understanding the doubleboundedness of an artificial agent’s rationality in a specific decision situation can benefit
from an analysis of what causes double-boundedness in that specific decision situation as
well as what results from it.
The next subsections explore in detail the reasons for mismatches between properties of
a decision situation and properties of knowledge and/or cognition, the types of
(mis)representations that can occur, bounds on rationality, and biases in behavior.

6.2.2 (Mis)matches in properties
Boundedness at both the first and second layer is caused by mismatches. This section
describes the mismatches that can arise at each of the layers.

6.2.2.1 First layer (mis)matches
In the context of decision-making and in line with Simon (1990) and others (e.g., Selten
1998, Todd 2001, and Todd et al. 2012), bounds on human rationality arise from
mismatches between one or more properties of a decision situation on one hand and one
or more properties of a decision-maker’s knowledge and/or cognition on the other.

166

6.2.2.1.1 Decision situation
Properties within a decision situation that can make that decision situation difficult to
understand were referred to by Selten (1998) as external complexities. For example, and
in line with Sterman’s (2000) definition of complexity, there is combinatorial complexity,
which results from a large number of possible combinations of relevant factors, and
feedback complexity, which results from the presence of direct and indirect feedback
loops. The presence of such complexities in a decision situation can make the decision
situation difficult for a human to understand (e.g., Dörner 1980, 1996; Kotovsky et al.
1985; Kotovsky & Simon 1990).
In addition to Sterman’s types of complexities, there are other types that also make a
decision situation difficult to understand. For example, another type of complexity is
added when a decision situation is an evolving one, with the complexity particularly
magnified when the evolution is shaped by external factors that are also complex and
evolving.
Yet another type of complexity may be added from the way in which an otherwise
relatively simple decision situation is framed (Tversky & Kahneman 1981, 1983, 1986,
1991). For example, the presence of uncertainty can significantly influence the perceived
complexity in a decision situation (Shafir & Tversky 1992). Similarly, the presence of
familiar objects at unfamiliar scales can result in their not being recognized (Eckstein et
al. 2017). Lastly, combinations of properties stemming from different types of complexity
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can reduce the level of understanding of a decision situation and increase the possibility
of a mismatch.
In the context of SOSIEL agents, which were designed to interact with ecological systems,
examples of properties of a social-ecological decision situation that can make the decision
situation difficult to understand include (Lie et al. 2007a, b): (a) alternative regimes with
critical thresholds and regime shifts, (b) bidirectional social-ecological interactions with
feedbacks that cut across spatial and temporal scales, (c) the emergence of new
properties, (d) exogenous factors that have been increasing in influence, (e) indirect
effects that come from places not where the action takes place, (f) legacy effects, (g)
spatial and temporal variations, (h) time lags that vary in duration and may be
unpredictable, and (i) unexpected outcomes.
In the case of Bohdanska Dolyna, such decision situations arise from the interactions
between forest landscape dynamics and forest use practices. They are confronted by
forest management planners, who are tasked with taking complex and adaptive dynamics
of the forest landscape into account in devising and updating their ten-year harvesting
plans.
Furthermore, there are properties that are unique specifically to social contexts, such as
those pertaining to problems that are inherently wicked. According to Rittel and Webber
(1973), who coined the now popular term, wicked problems are ill-defined and difficult
to formulate, and, because they are never fully understood, solutions to them may always
168

be improved. It is also impossible to identify an exhaustive set of potential solutions for
wicked problems.
Other features of wicked problems are that they have no good or bad solutions and
therefore solutions to them are always subjective; they are embedded in such an
intertwined way into the decision situation that solutions to them may produce
unintended repercussions, delaying the possibility of an accurate evaluation; solutions to
wicked problems change the decision situation and the problem, making experimentation
with different solutions to the same problem impossible; each wicked problem is at least
to some extent unique and it is challenging to tell with certainty the significance of its
uniqueness; and, lastly, all wicked problems are symptoms of other wicked problems, and
typically of more than one, which contributes to making the identification of one best
solution an impossible task.
In the case of Bohdanska Dolyna, wicked decision situations arise from conflicting
interests between forestry enterprises, which as the primary employers enjoy and take
actions to preserve their monopolistic benefits, and some local residents who are
interested in seeing the valley developing in directions other than forest management.
Such decision situations are confronted by village heads, who are tasked with taking the
interests of both into account in devising development plans for their villages.
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6.2.2.1.2 Decision-making
The properties of a decision-maker’s knowledge and/or cognition that can limit a
decision-maker’s ability to understand a decision situation and/or make successful
decisions within it were referred to by Selten (1998) as internal constraints. The
properties of a decision-maker’s knowledge that serve as internal constraints in a decision
situation are knowledge gaps and inaccuracies. The properties of a decision-maker’s
cognition that serve as internal constraints are neurological limitations (e.g., Klein 2002,
Miller et al. 2002, Alvarez & Emory 2006) and learning deficiencies. Such internal
constraints are not only situation-, but are also individual-specific (Stanovich & West
1998).
In many decision situations that are either familiar and/or well understood, cognitive
heuristics are fast and robust ways of circumventing one or more of one’s internal
limitations and thereby making a satisficing decision (Simon 1995, Gigerenzer et al. 1999,
Gigerenzer & Selten 2001, Todd et al. 2012). Heuristics that do this can be said to by-pass
the undefined structure of a decision situation (Todd 2001, Todd et al. 2012).
However, in less familiar and/or understood decision situations, the implementation of
an unfitting cognitive heuristic is more likely, leading to unsuccessful decision-making
within it. Evidence from experimental psychology has shown that such mis-associations
can arise even in otherwise relatively simple decision situations in which solutions are not
obviously presented (Tversky & Kahneman 1981, 1983, 1986, 1991).
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For example, presenting a monetary sum in a relatively simple experimental context as a
loss as opposed to a gain can significantly increase a decision-maker’s attachment to it
(Tversky & Kahneman 1981, 1986, 1991). The cause for this may be a mismatch between
the properties of a decision situation and an emotion (a property of the decision-maker’s
cognition), which could increase the perception of risk in the case of losing something
monetary as opposed to gaining it and, as a result, impede a decision-maker’s ability to
recognize the monetary gain and loss as being equivalent (Johnson & Tversky 1983).
Mismatches between the properties of a decision situation and a decision-maker’s
knowledge and cognition can appear in a number of places and in a number of ways. This
becomes apparent when considering how information is perceived, processed, and
stored in preparation for and in the process of decision-making. To explore this here in
greater depth, human cognition is represented with a high-level hypothetical cognitive
architecture (Fig. 18). The cognitive architecture, which for the benefit of the broader
discussion in this dissertation resembles that of a SOSIEL agent, is only hypothetical
because our understanding of human cognition is still significantly incomplete.
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Figure 18: A hypothetical cognitive architecture.

In Figure 18, the larger box that contains the learning, memory, and decision-making
components represents at a high-level a hypothetical cognitive architecture. The learning
component stands for those parts of human neurology and related processes that
perceive information about a decision situation and use it to update and modify its mental
(mis)representation. The memory component stands for those parts of human neurology
and related processes that store mental (mis)representations of decision situations,
which are updated and modified by the learning component. Lastly, the decision-making
component stands for those parts or functions of human neurology and related processes
that utilize the mental (mis)representation of a decision situation to make decisions
within it.
In the case of the hypothetical cognitive architecture, a mismatch between a property of
a decision situation and a property of the learning and/or memory component can
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produce a mental misrepresentation of that decision situation. While a mental
misrepresentation and/or a mismatch between a property of a decision situation and a
property of the decision-making component can bound rationality and as a result bias
which decisions are available for selection and which are selected.
Human cognition includes processes that try to offset the mismatches by devising
solutions that reduce one or more external complexities and/or internal constraints. For
example, decision situations with uncertainty can be transformed into certain decision
situations by transforming them into simpler decision situations without the missing
information (Frisch & Baron 1988).
From a duel-system perspective of human cognition (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick 2002;
Evans 2003, 2010; Evans & Stanovich 2013) and in the context of SOSIEL agents, these
processes are typically seen as belonging to the set of reasoning-based thought processes
(counterfactual thinking and innovation), which, in contrast to intuition-based processes
(anticipatory learning, goal prioritization, social learning, action selection, and actiontaking), are slow and computationally expensive.
In summary, the properties of a human’s knowledge and/or cognition can either match
or mismatch the properties of a decision situation, with mismatches potentially resulting
in the activation of cognitive processes that attempt to offset them.
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6.2.2.2 Second layer (mis)matches
For those modeling BR decision-making, external complexities are the properties of the
BR decision-maker’s knowledge and cognition and the limitations in technology for
modeling them, while internal constraints are properties of the BR modeler’s knowledge
and cognition that limit their ability to understand BR decision-making and to model it.
Therefore, additional bounds arise from mismatches between the above mentioned
external complexities and internal constraints.
With SOSIEL agents as examples, empowered with knowledge-based cognitive
architectures, mismatches can arise during the processes related to: (a) acquiring and
processing the knowledge of a BR decision-maker (e.g., Weiss & Kulikowski 1984, Jackson
1986, Negnevitsky 2011) and (b) representing it (e.g., Negnevitsky 2011) and its related
cognition (e.g., Langley et al. 2009) in a computer program.

6.2.2.2.1 Knowledge acquisition and processing
Knowledge acquisition (Weiss & Kulikowski 1984, Jackson 1986, Negnevitsky 2011) often
involves acquiring knowledge from both material sources and directly from BR decisionmakers. Acquiring relevant and sufficient knowledge from BR decision-makers is often the
most difficult part in developing a knowledge-based system (Weiss & Kulikowski 1984;
Jackson 1986). Decision-makers may have a difficult time identifying relevant knowledge
and/or provide not fully accurate reasons for why they do or did something (Boose 1986).

174

A major challenge with knowledge acquisition is the human inability to clearly articulate
what one knows (Buchanan et al. 1983, Norman 1983, Boose 1986).
Additionally, Boose (1986) pointed out a number of other issues that arise specifically as
a result of and that influence the knowledge acquisition process, such as the decisionmaker potentially feeling insecure during an interview or defensive about their
knowledge, or feeling uncomfortable about their knowledge being computerized.
Moreover, without being familiar enough with a context, those acquiring the knowledge
may not know the full scope of the knowledge that needs to be acquired to provide a full
description of a decision situation. As a result, acquired knowledge may be fragmented
and incomplete.
Additional mismatches may arise during the processing of acquired knowledge, when
relevant information may be overlooked or mis-organized or irrelevant information
overemphasized.
In other words, in terms of knowledge acquisition and processing, mismatches may arise
between: (a) what decision-makers actually know, think, and do and what they say they
know, think, and do; and (b) what decision-makers say they know, think, and do and what
those acquiring knowledge understand as what the decision-makers know, think, and do.
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6.2.2.2.2 Representation of knowledge and cognition
In terms of the representation of knowledge and cognition, mismatches can arise from
the cognitive architecture’s design specifications. Figure 19 builds on Figure 18 in
Subsection 6.2.2.1.2 by depicting the additional places and ways in which mismatches can
be introduced during the development of an artificial agent.
Figure 19: The framework for analyzing the DBR of artificial agents.

For example, in the case of SOSIEL agents, choosing to use mental (sub-)models and
knowledge heuristics for the representation of knowledge impacts the results of learning
and decision-making (Johnson-Laird 1983, Anderson 1990, Rehder 2003), as does the
decision to represent knowledge through IFTHEN type of conditional statements,
instead of, for example, the IFPOSSIBLY type. However, the judge is still out on whether
(sub-)models and knowledge heuristics are sufficiently appropriate constructs for
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organizing knowledge a decision maker uses in their decision-making.

Similarly,

mismatches can arise between a BR decision-maker’s cognitive processes and those
learning and decision-making processes of SOSIEL agents selected to represent them.
Furthermore, initialization decisions, such as setting the size of a mental (sub-)model, or
model design specifications, such as setting the frequency of the processes of
counterfactual thinking, innovation, or social learning, may be the causes of mismatches.
Lastly, simulation results may be significantly influenced by software-specific (as opposed
to design- or context-based) specifications (Dawid & Kopel 1998), which introduce noise
and potentially more mismatches.
Such mismatches are not unique to modeling bounded rationality. For example, Higgins
and colleagues (2003) identified three types of uncertainties – model, parameter, and
inherent uncertainty – present in the process of modeling forecasts, such as plant
migration rates. They find these uncertainties stemming from an incomplete
understanding, an incomplete data sample, and/or limitations in statistical tools.
Any mismatch between some property of a BR decision-maker’s knowledge and/or
cognition and a property of the BR modeler’s mental representation of it can result in the
creation of a DBR artificial agent with an artificial misrepresentation of the BR decisionmaker’s mental (mis)representation of a given decision situation and/or a cognitive
architecture that does not accurately represent the BR decision-maker’s cognition.
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6.2.3 (Mis)representations of domains
BR decision-makers base their decisions on their mental (mis)representations of decision
situations, BR modelers likewise base their designs of DBR artificial agents on their mental
(mis)representations of BR decision-makers’ knowledge and cognition, and, in turn, DBR
artificial agents base their (simulated) decisions on their artificial (mis)representations of
a BR decision-maker’s mental (mis)representation of a decision situation.
From a mathematical perspective, a (mis)representation can be seen as a morphism, from
a domain (in our case, the decision situation) into a codomain (in our case, the mental
(mis)representation). From this perspective, a unique set of (mis)matches can be seen as
defining the character of a morphism. Morphisms can be organized into the following four
categories (Fig. 20): injective non-surjective, surjective non-injective, injective surjective,
and non-injective non-surjective.
Figure 20: Four categories of morphisms.

a. An injective (one-to-one), but non-surjective morphism is one in which every
attribute in the domain is represented by a corresponding attribute in the respective
codomain. In other words, no two attributes in the domain are represented by the
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same attribute in the codomain. An injection non-surjection leaves the possibility of
the codomain including attributes that have not been mapped to from the
respective domain.
b. A surjective (onto), but non-injective morphism is one in which every attribute in the
codomain has been mapped to from the respective domain. A surjection noninjection leaves the possibility of the codomain including an attribute(s) that
represent(s) more than one entity in the respective domain.
c. An injective and surjective morphism (a.k.a. a bijection) is one in which every
attribute in the domain is represented by a corresponding attribute in the codomain
and every attribute in the codomain has been mapped to from the respective
domain.
d. A non-injective and non-surjective morphism is one in which not every attribute in
the domain is represented by a corresponding attribute in the respective codomain
and not every attribute in the codomain has been mapped to from the respective
domain.
Furthermore, a morphism of a morphism, which is what an artificial (mis)representation
is, can be seen as a composition of morphisms. Figure 21 depicts an example of such a
composition, in which both the mental and artificial representation are injective nonsurjective morphisms.
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Figure 21: An example of a composition of morphisms.

In what form are decision situations or mental (mis)representations morphed (i.e., as
mental models, schemas, etc.) is still a debatable topic. To take the most general
perspective on what is being morphed and remain in line with the form used by SOSIEL
agents, a systems perspective is assumed (Klir 1991), which implies that a mental
representation of a decision situation is a set of (a) elements with (b) relations among
them and (c) processes that transform the decision situation from one period to the next.
To keep things simple for the discussion, the elements, relations, processes and relevant
resulting patterns are all viewed as properties comprising the mental (mis)representation
of that decision situation. Referring to all the elements, relations, processes, and relevant
patterns as properties (each with its unique characteristics) does not lose any information
about them, as the uniqueness of each property can be fully preserved.
Mismatches

between

a

decision

situation

and

a

decision-maker’s

mental

(mis)representation or between a decision-maker’s mental (mis)representation and a
modeler’s mental (mis)representation of it can lead to essential elements, relations,
and/or processes being misunderstood or altogether missed. It may also (unintentionally,
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due to misunderstanding) introduce (unessential) elements, relations, and/or processes
into their representation of a decision situation.
The different possible combinations of mismatches at each level produce different
morphisms, which can be organized into the following six categories:
1. Total with perfect, for the cases in which all essential properties are represented
perfectly and no properties are added (Fig. 22).
Figure 22: The total with perfect category.

This category includes unbounded (perfect) representations. In the case of mental
representations of decision-makers, this would imply that all the properties of a decision
situation are completely and accurately captured by the mental representation of that
decision situation and no other properties are inaccurately assumed to be essential. In
the case of artificial representations of artificial agents, this would imply that all the
properties of a decision-maker’s mental (mis)representation of a decision situation are
completely and accurately captured by the artificial representation and no other
properties are mistakenly assumed to be essential.
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This is the category of representations that is required for unboundedly (perfectly)
rational artificial agents. It is worth noting that in addition to this unbounded
representation of a decision-maker’s mental (mis)representation, unbounded rationality
also requires the perfect representation of all components of the decision-maker’s
cognitive architecture.
2. Total with gain, for the cases in which all essential properties are represented and at
least one unessential property is introduced (Fig. 23).
Figure 23: The total with gain category.

In the case of mental (mis)representations of decision-makers, this would imply that all
the properties of a decision situation are completely and accurately captured by the
mental misrepresentation of that decision situation and at least one additional property
that is thought to be essential is mistakenly added. In the case of artificial
(mis)representations of artificial agents, this would imply that all the properties of a
decision-maker’s mental (mis)representation of a decision situation are completely and
accurately captured by the artificial misrepresentation and at least one additional
property that is thought to be essential is mistakenly added.
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3. Total with one or more simplifying substitutions, for the cases in which all properties
are represented, but with at least one substitution (Fig. 24).
Figure 24: The total with one or more simplifying substitutions category.

In the case of mental (mis)representations of decision-makers, this would imply that all
the properties are captured by the mental (mis)representation of that decision situation,
but at least one property is substituted with a simpler variant. In the case of artificial
(mis)representations of artificial agents, this would imply that all the properties of a
decision-maker’s mental (mis)representation of a decision situation are captured by the
artificial (mis)representation, but at least one property is substituted with a simpler
variant.
This category may reflect a process that Kahneman and Frederick (2002) referred to as
attribute (in this case property) substitution, which is implemented when a decision
situation or parts of it are too complex to otherwise grasp. In such cases, the process
substitutes the complex property with a simpler one, a heuristic (Gigerenzer et al. 1999,
Kahneman & Frederick 2002), that can potentially offset a mismatch. Such substitution
also has a place in the process of modeling, during which modelers represent both a
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decision-maker’s knowledge and cognition with simplifications that, if clever enough, still
have the potential of representing the decision-maker’s behavior.
4. Partial with perfect, for the cases in which at least one of the properties is
represented perfectly, while at least one is not represented at all (Fig. 25).
Figure 25: The partial with perfect category.

In the case of mental (mis)representations of decision-makers, this would imply that at
least one of the properties is completely and accurately captured by the mental
(mis)representation of that decision situation, while at least one is overlooked altogether.
In the case of artificial (mis)representations of artificial agents, this would imply that at
least one of the properties of the decision-maker’s mental (mis)representation of a
decision situation

is completely and accurately captured by the artificial

(mis)representation, while at least one is overlooked altogether.
5. Partial with gain, for the cases in which at least one of the properties is perfectly
represented and at least one is not, and at least one unessential property is
introduced (Fig. 26).
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Figure 26: The partial with gain category.

In the case of mental (mis)representations of decision-makers, this would imply that at
least one of the properties of a decision situation is captured by the given mental
(mis)representation of that decision situation and at least one property is not, while at
least one unessential property is mistakenly thought to be essential to the decision
situation. In the case of artificial (mis)representations of artificial agents, this would imply
that at least one of the properties representing the mental (mis)representation is
captured and at least one property is not, while at least one unessential property is
mistakenly thought to be essential to the decision situation.
6. Partial with one or more simplifying substitutions, for the cases in which at least one
property is represented, at least one property is substituted, and at least one
property is not represented (Fig. 27).
Figure 27: The partial with one or more simplifying substitutions category.
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In the case of mental (mis)representations of decision-makers, this would imply that at
least one of the properties is completely and accurately captured by the given mental
(mis)representation of that decision situation, at least one property is substituted with a
simpler variant, and at least one property is not represented. In the case of artificial
(mis)representations of artificial agents, this would imply that at least one property of the
mental (mis)representation of a decision situation is completely and accurately captured
by the given artificial (mis)representation, at least one property is substituted with a
simpler variant, and at least one property is not represented.
The above categorization of possible (mis)representations not only shows that first and
second layers of boundedness can significantly misrepresent a decision situation or the
mental representation of a decision situation, respectively, but that they can do this in a
number of ways. Furthermore, it highlights the potential of misrepresenting bounded
rationality with DBR artificial agents – with there being six categories of mental and
artificial (mis)representations, any composition of the two can fall into one of thirty-six
combinations. It is further worth noting that the number of combinations of possible
(mis)representations does not reflect the total number of possible (mis)representations,
since each category allows for an infinite number of possible (mis)representations within
it.
Lastly, since the causal relationship between first and second layer boundedness is not
clear, there is the possibility of boundedness introduced in the second layer offsetting
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some of the boundedness introduced in the first, thereby bringing the artificial
(mis)representation closer to an unbounded representation of a decision situation than
is the mental (mis)representation upon which it is based.

6.2.4 Bounds on rationality
Mismatches produce bounds on rationality. Using Manktelow’s (2004) terminology, these
bounds can be on epistemic rationality, limiting how much a decision-maker understands
the decision situation they are making a decision in, and/or instrumental rationality,
limiting the ability to logically select from available information a decision that is in
accordance with one’s goal(s). These bounds on rationality influence which decisions are
available for selection and which are selected.
For example, bounds on rationality may make BR decision-makers, BR modelers, and/or
DBR artificial agents unaware of decision options that are best fitting for achieving their
goal(s) and/or unaware and/or capable of sorting through all the relevant decision
options to select the best fitting one.

6.2.5 Biased behavior
By influencing decision-making, bounds on rationality bias behavior. Examples of biases
in behavior include: (a) the conservatism bias (Edwards 1982), which reflects a tendency
by some decision-makers to be against sufficiently revising beliefs when confronted with
new information; (b) the ambiguity effect (Frisch & Baron1988), which reflects a tendency
187

by some decision-makers to be against more favorable options with less-certain
outcomes; (c) the zero-sum bias (Meegan 2010), which reflects a tendency by some
decision-makers to perceive a decision situation as being zero-sum even when it is not,
and (d) the loss aversion effect (Tversky & Kahneman 1991), which reflects a tendency by
some decision-makers to attribute greater value to losses than to equivalent gains.
Different bounds (or combinations of bounds) lead to different biases. For example,
Stanovich and West (2008) found that a significant number of well-recognized biases arise
independently of intelligence. In some cases, bias can be reduced or removed through
debiasing (Baumeister & Bushman 2011), which can involve reducing external complexity
(Thaler & Sunstein 2008), internal constraints (Morewedge et al. 2015), or both.

6.3 Contributions
The main contributions described in this chapter are the two frameworks, the one for
analyzing the BR of decision-makers and the one for analyzing the DBR of artificial agents.
The first advances the study of human decision-making by consolidating a variety of
related concepts to establish a comprehensive relationship between a decision situation
and a decision. The second advances our ability to model human decision-making by
providing deeper insight into the relationships among (a) a decision situation, (b) a
decision-maker making a decision within that decision situation, (c) a modeler modeling
the decision-maker, and (d) an artificial agent designed by the modeler to represent the
decision-maker. The insight advances our understanding of how and where undesirable
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biases can enter the process of modeling decision-making and of how and where
improvements can be made with respect to an artificial agent’s ability to represent human
decision-making.
Improving knowledge acquisition may involve using new methods or improving old ones,
increasing the number of people from whom knowledge is acquired, and/or expanding
the knowledge being acquired. A number of significant hurdles still exist in this direction.
For example, it is not clear at this point how to overcome some of the challenges inherent
in acquiring knowledge, which were discussed in Section 6.2.2.2.1. Improving the
representation of knowledge and cognition involves improving our understanding of how
knowledge is perceived, processed, stored, and used in decision-making. Also, improving
our understanding of which properties in the human mind are causing the mismatches
will help to better understand which external tools could be useful in reducing
boundedness. The above process for improvement should simultaneously increase the
first layer and reduce the second layer of boundedness, bringing the BR of a decisionmaker and the DBR of an artificial agent closer together.
Lastly, the framework can be used to point out that influences between a decision
situation, a BR decision-maker, a BR modeler, and a corresponding DBR artificial agent
are not uni-directional and that boundedness is not static (Fig. 28).
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Figure 28: The dynamic framework for analyzing DBR of artificial agents.

Decisions that BR decision-makers make have the potential of reducing both a decision
situation’s complexities and their own internal constraints, producing bi-directional coevolutionary interactions that occur among the decision situation, their knowledge, and
their cognition. An example of such a decision option from the field of agriculture is to
engage in a monoculture, which (in the short- to medium-term) reduces the external
complexities stemming from biodiversity. Another example is to develop an external tool,
such as a prescriptive model with artificial agents, which could improve our
understanding of the decision-outcome relationship and thereby reduce internal
constraints. The testing and implementation of such a model could further reduce the
internal constraints of BR modelers as well as the DBR of the artificial agents in their
model.
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In turn, the resulting improvement in the ability of a set of DBR artificial agents to
represent a group of BR decision-makers would also improve the BR decision-makers’
understanding of the decision situation and therefore reduce their internal constraints.
For example, using DBR artificial agents to analyze potential outcomes from engaging in
monoculture could help BR decision-makers realize the long-term adversities related to
reducing biodiversity. For this reason, any acquired knowledge may also need to be at
times correspondingly updated to account for and balance out any discrepancies that may
have been introduced through the above-mentioned co-evolution.
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Chapter 7: The ability of artificial agents to represent BR decision-making
Chapter 7 presents and demonstrates the application of the DBR method for testing the
ability of artificial agents to represent human decision-making, building on the new
frameworks described in Chapter 6. The chapter demonstrates the new method by testing
and comparing the ability of SOSIEL and two other types of artificial agents to represent
the decision-making that takes place in a popular psychology experiment, called the
Voluntary Contributions Mechanism. Section 7.1 describes the general challenges in
testing the ability of artificial agents to represent the behavior of decision-makers. Section
7.2 describes the DBR method, its four steps, its relation to the Turing Test (Turing 1950),
and the respective decision situations within which BR decision-makers and UR and DBR
artificial agents are analyzed. Section 7.3 describes the application of the method in
attempting to invalidate the ability of SOSIEL and IEL agents to represent BR decisionmaking within the context of the common-pool resource problem. Lastly, Section 7.4
discusses the conclusion that can be drawn from the results, while Section 7.5 describes
how the DBR advances our ability to test artificial agents.

7.1 Introduction
Following Simon’s pioneering work on bounded rationality (BR), studies by experimental
psychologists have provided support for the idea of human rationality being bounded
(Selten 1998, Gigerenzer & Selten 2001) and numerous models of artificial agents
simulating the behavior of human decision-makers have been developed (Conlisk 1996,
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Rubinstein 1998, Munier et al. 1999, Camerer 2003, Crawford 2013, Harstad & Selten
2013) with the aim of improving our understanding of human behavior in a variety of
social decision situations.
Despite the increased number and popularity of such models, confidence in their ability
to represent human behavior remains limited. This is to a great extent due to the general
difficulties of validating models of open, complex, and adaptive systems (Naylor & Finger
1967, Oreskes et al. 1994, Pahl-Wostl 1995), such as humans and social systems. For
example, models of open systems cannot be completely validated (House & McLeod
1977, House & Ball 1980, Sargent 2004) because external forces of potentially high
significance are rarely completely known or understood. These models can only be
invalidated (Quade 1980, Sargent 2004) with the credibility of the model built upon the
failure to do so.
Furthermore, individual and social human behaviors permit both equifinality, which is
when varying initial conditions can lead to the same outcome, and multifinality, which is
when the same initial conditions can lead to varying outcomes. This limits the power of
the widely used method of validating simulated behavior against an empirical data set
(Windrum et al. 2007), because while there may be a statistically significant fit with that
data set (Marohn et al. 2013, Sun & Muüller 2013), there is also the risk of overfitting the
model to only one specific development path. This is even more of a critical issue when
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taking the adaptive nature of human behavior into account, which allows for the
possibility of unprecedented behavior.
Another challenge is that the artificial agents representing BR human behavior can be said
to be double-boundedly-rational (DBR), as opposed to just BR. As explored in Chapter 6,
this is because in addition to the behavior of these artificial agents intentionally reflecting
the BR of the human behavior, it may also reflect the unintentionally-captured BR of the
modeler who is modeling the behavior, which is the second layer of boundedness.
This second layer of boundedness is not sufficiently discussed in the literature on
modeling BR behavior (if at all) and subsequently the relationship between the first and
second layer of boundedness is poorly understood. This, in turn, makes it unclear what is
driving the behavior of DBR artificial agents at any specific point during a simulation,
bounds from the first layer, the second layer, or a combination of both. The very existence
of the second layer and the current lack of study of its relationship with the first (and in
turn our understanding of the relationship between the two) should perhaps further
reduce our confidence in the current models.
Therefore, in order to invalidate a DBR artificial agents’ ability to represent BR behavior,
we need to go beyond comparing their behavior. For example, comparing the behavior of
DBR artificial agents to that of unboundedly rational (UR) artificial agents alone (e.g.,
Brown et al. 2004) says little about the agents’ ability to behave like BR decision-makers.
This is because UR artificial agents are, by definition, not accurate representations of BR
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decision-makers (e.g., Selten 1998, Gigerenzer & Selten 2001). Similarly, comparing the
behavior produced by one set of DBR artificial agents to that of another alone (e.g., Axtell
et al. 1996, Brown et al. 2008) is also limited in usefulness, unless one of them has been
shown to accurately represent the behavior of BR decision-makers.
In summary, gaining credibility in a model with DBR artificial agents should include efforts
to invalidate the model, instead of validate it, and in both past and potential decision
situations, as opposed to solely past decision situations. Furthermore, models with DBR
artificial agents should be invalidated not only when they are unable to replicate the
behavior of BR decision-makers, but also when their behavior is not driven by the same
factors driving the behavior of BR decision-makers (as discussed in detail in the methods
section and exemplified in the results section). In other words, gaining credibility in a
model with DBR agents requires a number of significant changes in the way it is currently
being approached.
My objective in this chapter is to apply the DBR method that was developed as part of
this dissertation for testing the ability of artificial agents to represent human decisionmaking by attempting to invalidate the ability of SOSIEL agents to represent the behavior
of BR decision-makers within a common-pool resource problem, using the DBR method
that addresses all of the above issues. To have the ability to represent, in this context,
means to behave in a sufficiently similar way for sufficiently similar reasons. For further
comparative analysis, the ability of SOSIEL agents is also compared to that of IEL agents,
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which have outperformed other artificial agents in reproducing the behavior of BR
decision-makers in the common-pool resource problem context (Arifovic & Ledyard
2004).

7.2 The DBR method for testing the ability of artificial agents
The behavior of a BR decision-maker in any decision situation in which their
understanding is limited results from their implementation of one or more heuristics that
may or may not be fitting for that decision situation (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman 1974,
Simon 1990, Selten 1998, Gigerenzer et al. 1999, Todd 2001, Todd et al. 2012). The term
heuristic, here, is used to represent any shortcut (be it cognitive- or knowledge-based) in
understanding or behaving in a decision situation. The implementation of a heuristic is a
compensatory response to a mismatch between one or more properties of that decision
situation and one or more properties of the BR decision-maker’s knowledge of that
decision situation and/or cognition used to process it (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky 1982,
Simon 1990, Selten 1998, Todd 2001, Todd et al. 2012).
The fact that BR decision-makers tend to respond with similar heuristics to the same
matches and mismatches allows for an opportunity to understand and even predict with
some likelihood their behavior. It follows that any testing of a DBR artificial agent’s
inability to represent the behavior of BR decision-makers should take advantage of this
opportunity. Specifically, the test should check whether a DBR artificial agent’s knowledge
and/or cognition (mis)match with the properties of a decision situation in the same way
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that a respective BR decision-maker’s do and whether the DBR artificial agent responds
to the (mis)matches with the same heuristic(s) as the BR decision-maker does.
This proposition for testing a DBR artificial agent’s ability to represent BR behavior is in
line with practices used in experimental psychology for studying the behaviors of BR
decision-makers by comparing them to those of UR artificial agents (e.g., Kahneman &
Tversky 1982, Todd et al. 2012). The UR artificial agents, whose knowledge and cognition
perfectly match with properties of a decision situation, are used as a frame of reference
in identifying any mismatches between one or more properties of a decision situation and
one or more properties of the knowledge and/or cognition of DBR decision-makers.
If a DBR artificial agent’s ability is not tested using the method described above, but solely
on their ability to reproduce the behavior of BR decision-makers, then there is the
possibility of a test result being false positive. Such false positives can arise in cases where
different heuristics produce similar behaviors in some decision situations, but not in
others, or in cases where the DBR artificial agent’s behavior is driven by their second layer
boundedness and not their first.
Looking at the (mis)matches and their corresponding heuristics can also offer insight into
how the DBR artificial agent’s first-layer of boundedness can be increased and/or the
second-layer of boundedness reduced, with the aim of improving the ability of DBR
artificial agents to represent the behavior of BR decision-makers.
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Lastly, as in the above-mentioned case with BR decision-makers, testing the inability of
DBR artificial agents to represent the behavior of BR decision-makers also requires a
frame of reference, in order to identify specifically what property of their rationality is
bounded. Therefore, in the case of DBR artificial agents, UR behavior is used as a frame
of reference as well.
The DBR method involves comparing the underlying factors driving the behavior of DBR
artificial agents with those driving the behavior of BR decision-makers and UR artificial
agents. Subsection 7.2.1 describes the steps of the DBR method, Subsection 7.2.2
describes the DBR method in the context of the Turing Test (Turing 1950), while
Subsection 7.2.3 describes the respective decision situations within which BR decisionmakers and UR and DBR artificial agents are analyzed.

7.2.1 Steps
There are two main parts to the DBR method that together consist of four steps. The first
part of the method consists of three steps and builds on what Kahneman and Tversky
(1982) referred to in their approach to studying bounded rationality as positive and
negative analysis. The part involves analyzing what caused the BR and DBR behaviors by
comparing each to UR behaviors. The second part of the method consists of one step and
involves a comparison of the causes of BR and DBR behaviors. Any significant differences
between the causes of BR and DBR behaviors would invalidate the ability of DBR agents
to represent the behavior of BR decision-makers. The following are the first three steps:
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1. Create a list of any similarities and differences between the BR and DBR behavior(s)
and the UR behavior(s).
Whereas similarities represent unbiased BR behavior and the implementation of
heuristics that match the decision situation, in the case of DBR behavior, because the
second layer of boundedness has the potential of offsetting the first, similarities may or
may not represent unbiased DBR behavior. Differences, on the other hand, represent the
biases in BR and DBR behavior and the implementation of heuristics that mismatch the
decision situation. In the case of DBR behavior, these biases may be the result of the first
or second layer of boundedness, or of both layers.
2. Create a list of matches and mismatches between the properties of the decision
situation and the corresponding properties of the BR decision-maker’s and DBR
artificial agent’s knowledge and/or cognition of that decision situation that could
have produced the above respective behavior(s).
3. Create a list of heuristics that could have been activated in response to the
respective (mis)matches identified in Step 2 and could have produced the respective
behavior(s) identified in Step 1.
In the cases of any differences found between BR and UR behavior(s), a significant body
of literature exists in experimental economics and psychology (e.g., Todd & Brighton
2016) that can guide attempts to identify mismatches between the decision situation
properties and the knowledge and/or cognition of BR decision-makers. In the case of any
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differences found between DBR and UR behavior(s), the identification of mismatches
between the decision situation properties and the knowledge and/or cognition of DBR
artificial agents can be implemented through a careful analysis of model design
specifications, as exemplified in the results section of this chapter.
Lists of biases7 aid in characterizing those DBR behaviors that are not found in BR decisionmaking. Biases worthy of further consideration can be selected based on their: (a)
situational suitability, which refers to their relevance to the decision situation; and (b)
behavioral suitability, which refers to their compatibility with one or more of the
behaviors.
After the above three steps are completed for both BR decision-makers and DBR artificial
agents, the fourth step can be taken, which is:
4. Compare the lists of behaviors, (mis)matches, and heuristics.

7

Biases in behavior are currently an active area of research and new biases continue to be identified

(Wilke & Mata 2012). While peer-reviewed literature on biases provides an abundance of lists with
examples of biases (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman 1974, Wilke & Mata 2012, Stanovich 2016), Wikipedia’s
non-peer-reviewed list of nearly 200 mostly peer-reviewed biases currently both includes and dwarfs
most (if not all) of the other lists.
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As mentioned above, any significant differences in the causes of BR and DBR behavior(s)
invalidates the ability of DBR artificial agents to represent the behavior of BR decisionmakers.

7.2.2 The Turing Test, in comparison
Alan Turing’s (1950) test for assessing whether a machine can exhibit intelligent human
behavior in a way that is indistinguishable from human behavior has for decades been
debated and is still seen by many as the (to date unreachable) goal for artificial
intelligence (Saygin et al. 2000). The general design of the test involves one interviewer
and two respondents, with one a human and the other an artificial agent. The objective
of the interviewer, whose real-time and back and forth correspondence with the
respondents is limited to typed natural language, is to determine which one of the
respondents is the human, with both the human and the artificial agent permitted to try
and deceive the interviewer.
The new DBR method for testing the ability of artificial agents to represent human
decision-makers shares with the Turing Test one main structural characteristic –
both tests involve the comparison of DBR (artificial agent) to BR (human) behavior.
Beyond this similarity, the two tests differ in the following four ways: (a) the Turing Test
involves real-time and back and forth correspondence between the interviewer and the
respondents, while the DBR method is used after the experiments with human subjects
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and simulations with artificial agents have been completed; (b) the Turing Test permits
the participants to engage in any topic during the test, while the DBR method grounds
the test in a predetermined set of specific decision situations, which can be analyzed from
the perspective of UR, BR, and DBR; (c) the Turing Test does not provide any structure for
analyzing respondent behavior during the test or its results, while the DBR method is
grounded in methods of analysis from psychology; and (d) the Turing Test does not
provide any guidance for how to improve the ability of artificial agents to represent
human decision-making, while the DBR method does, by offering insight into how to
increase the first layer of boundedness and reduce the second. As a result of the abovementioned differences, the DBR method provides a structured and theoreticallygrounded alternative to the Turing Test.

7.2.3 Decision situations
One of the challenges in testing DBR behavior is finding a decision situation for which
sufficient data of both UR and BR behavior are available. An abundance of UR behavior
analysis has been done in game theory and an abundance of BR behavior analysis has
been done in experimental psychology, and therefore the objective is to find a decision
situation where the two overlap.
One such decision situation is called the common-pool resource problem (e.g., Ostrom et
al. 1994), which studies people’s willingness to contribute to a common pool. In classic
game theory, this decision situation is often studied using a finite repeated games, called
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the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), while in experimental psychology, this decision situation is
often studied using real-life participants in what is known as the Voluntary Contributions
Mechanism (VCM). There is also increasing research in testing the ability of DBR artificial
agents to replicate the behavior of BR decision-makers in this decision situation. These
are referred to here as artificial VCMs (aVCMs).
With that said, despite these decision situations being used to study the same behavior,
they belong to different disciplines, which implies, as often is the case, that there are
differences in their formulation. In some instances, these differences are significant and
therefore discussed. Below are descriptions of the decision situations.

7.2.3.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
In classic game theory, the game that resembles the common-pool resource problem is
called the Prisoner’s Dilemma (e.g., Kreps et al. 1982). The game typically consists of two
hypothetical players simultaneously making decisions over 𝑇 periods about whether to
cooperate with each other or to defect (compete). The players are payoff maximizers,
which means that their sole purpose is to receive the highest cumulative payoff for the
game. They are also UR, which means they possess all the necessary information
(including knowledge of what their opponent knows and thinks) and the cognitive ability
required to process that information and make the optimal decision (Fig. 29).
Figure 29: Formulation of a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Player 2
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Player 1

cooperate
defect

cooperate

defect

a, a
c, d

d, c
b, b

The above formulation represents what the UR players face in each one of 𝑇 periods,
where c > a > b > d.
This game has received great interest, mainly because of its puzzling yet recognizable
solution. Specifically, while both players cooperating would be profit maximizing for both,
a lack of trust between them leads to both defecting and as a result producing a
suboptimal solution that does not maximize their profits. From the perspective of the
common-pool resource problem, the players can be seen as two resource users who could
both benefit from contributing to the common pool, but out of a lack of trust do not.

7.2.3.2 VCM-I&W
In experimental psychology, numerous experiments have used the VCM to explore
questions related to the common-pool resource problem (e.g., Ledyard 1995, Levitt & List
2007, Holt & Laury 2008, Chaudhuri 2011, McGinty & Milam 2013). At the core of the
interest in VCM experiments has been the willingness of some participants to contribute
even though the UR solution is not to. For this study, the research by Isaac and Walker
(1988) was selected partially because their findings are representative of other VCM
experiments and partially because it allows for comparison, since their results were
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previously used by Arifovic and Ledyard (2012) to test the ability of IEL agents to replicate
the behavior of VCM participants.
VCM experiments generally involve multiple (𝑁) participants making token allocation
decisions over 𝑇 periods. The fact that the VCM has more than two participants may
suggest that it should be compared to an n-person finite repeated game as opposed to a
two-person one. However, despite the number of participants, each VCM participant only
interacts with a computer, which, from the perspective of classic game theory, is treated
as each playing against one player. The formulation is as follows:
At the beginning of each period, each participant 𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁) is endowed with 𝑤𝑖
tokens. Each participant’s task is to decide what portion of their endowment (if any) to
keep and what portion (if any) to contribute to the common pool. All tokens need to be
allocated as no tokens can be carried over from one period to the next. According to Holt
and Laury (2008), a participant’s payoff function, 𝜋𝑖 , in VCM experiments takes on a
common form (Eq. 1).
Equation 1: The common form of VCM experiments.

𝑐𝑖 + ∑𝑁−1
𝑗=1 𝑐𝑗
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 (𝑤𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 ) + 𝑚
𝑁
The payoff function, which is in line with the ones in Isaac and Walker (1988) and Arifovic
and Ledyard (2012), can use a further breakdown of elements in order to facilitate
analysis (Eq. 2).
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Equation 2: A further breakdown of the VCM form.

∑𝑁−1
𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑐𝑗
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 (𝑤𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 ) + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑚
𝑁
𝑁
In the payoff function, 𝑤𝑖 is participant 𝑖’s endowment of tokens at the beginning of each
period, 𝑝𝑖 is participant 𝑖’s marginal return from keeping a token during a period, 𝑐𝑖 = [0,
𝑤𝑖 ] is the number of tokens participant 𝑖 contributes to the common pool during a
period, ∑ 𝑐𝑗 is the total number of tokens contributed to the common pool by other
participants during a period, (𝑐𝑖 + ∑ 𝑐𝑗 )⁄𝑁 is the average number of tokens contributed
to the common pool during a period, 𝑚 is a participant’s marginal return from the
common pool during a period, 𝑚⁄𝑁 is the marginal return per capita from the common
pool during a period, and 𝑚 (𝑐𝑖 + ∑ 𝑐𝑗 )⁄𝑁 is a participant’s payoff from the common pool
during a period, or 𝛼 for short.
Symmetry among participants is commonly assumed in both the endowment size and in
the marginal return from keeping a token, where 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤 and 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝, respectively, and
where, for convenience, the marginal return from keeping a token is normalized at one
(𝑝 = 1).
Isaac and Walker (1988) also studied a decision situation with a formulation similar to the
one in the PD although with ten participants instead of two. Specifically, every
participant’s marginal return from the common pool during a period (𝑚 = 3.0) was set
higher than the marginal return from keeping a token (𝑝 = 1), which means that
participants would have benefited most if they contributed to the common pool.
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However, with the resulting marginal return per capita being less than the marginal return
from keeping a token (𝑚⁄𝑁 = 0.3), participants had significant incentive to not
contribute.
Isaac and Walker (1988) conducted six experiments with the above described
formulation.8 In these experiments, at the beginning of each period, each participant was
provided with the following information: (a) the total number of periods; (b) the total
number of participants; (c) the size of their own endowment (which they knew would
remain the same size throughout the experiment); (d) the total number of tokens
distributed to all participants; (e) that each participant receives the same payoff from the
common pool; and (f) that their total payoff at the end of the experiment will consist of
the cumulative sum of both the tokens they kept and the payoff they received from the
common pool.
At the end of each period, each participant was provided with information on their payoff
from keeping tokens for themselves, the payoff from the common pool, and the total
number of tokens contributed to the common pool. This end of period information was
made available to them at the start of the subsequent period, as prior-period information.
The participants did not know the endowment amounts distributed to others. They were
also not informed of what the marginal return would be from tokens contributed to the

8

Isaac and Walker (1988) also conducted other experiments, which are not discussed here solely because
the ones discussed are representative.

207

common pool, but it is worth noting that it is something they could have potentially
calculated themselves at the end of any period, using knowledge of their payoff,
endowment size, contribution amount for the period, the total number of tokens
contributed to the common pool during the period, and the number of participants, 𝑁
(Eq. 3).
Equation 3: The marginal return from tokens contributed to the common pool.

𝑚=𝑁

𝜋𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑤𝑖
𝑐𝑖 + ∑𝑁−1
𝑗=1 𝑐𝑗

From this, participants could have further calculated when it would have been worth
contributing (Eq. 4).
Equation 4: Calculation of when it is worth contributing.

𝑐𝑖 ≤

𝑚 ∑𝑁−1
𝑗=1 𝑐𝑗
𝑁−𝑚

They could have also calculated an approximation of when it is worth contributing (Eq. 5).
Equation 5: An approximation of when it is worth contributing.

𝑐𝑖 ≤ 𝑚

𝑐𝑖 + ∑𝑁−1
𝑗=1 𝑐𝑗
𝑁

where the right side of the inequality is 𝛼 – a participant’s payoff from the common pool
during a period that is provided to them at the end of each period.
The above calculations and comparisons, however, could only have been made for the
prior period, allowing participants to analyze the prior period’s state of the experiment,
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not the current. Whether such calculations or comparisons were made was not studied
or discussed in Isaac and Walker (1988).
The resulting comparison of the above-described VCM and the PD is not exact, due to
differences in the experiment/game design. Specifically, as Isaac and Walker (1988)
pointed out, the only choices in the PD are to cooperate or defect, while in the VCM they
ranged from 0 to 𝑤𝑖 . Also, VCM participants do not know the specific endowment
distributions or contributions of the other participants, while PD players do.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the aim of PD players is to maximize payoff. When
it comes to VCM participants, however, their aim is not clear, as it is not something they
receive instruction on (Isaac & Walker 1988). The aim of the VCM participants could
indeed be to maximize the number of tokens, and most likely for some, if not most, of
them it is. However, as will be discussed in Section 7.3, it is apparent that for at least some
of them their behavior is also, if not entirely, driven by something else, and by what may
change throughout the experiment.
Therefore, a PD is not a perfect decision situation for comparison with Isaac and Walker’s
(1988) VCM experiments. However, as mentioned earlier, there is a limited amount of
overlapping experiment and game theory data available and therefore, as often is the
case, we must make the best of what we have.
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7.2.3.3 aVCM
Numerous models, mostly in economics, have been developed to explain the BR behavior
observed in VCMs. These models vary in their approach to modeling DBR artificial agents
and in their success at modeling it.
Challenges in modeling the behavior of VCM participants exist in two main areas, namely
in gaining an understanding of: (a) the factors driving the behavior of participants and (b)
how to represent these factors and the cognition of participants that processes and uses
them in selecting decision options. Therefore, the ability of artificial agents to represent
the behavior of VCM participants can be invalidated based on a misrepresentation in
either one or in both of the above-mentioned areas of challenge.
In regards to the factors driving the behavior of participants, most modelers hypothesize
that the decline in average participant contribution per period is driven by: conditional
cooperation (Chaudhuri 2011), other-regarding preferences (Fehr and Schmidt 1999;
Bolton & Ockenfels 2000; Charness & Rabin 2002; Cox et al. 2007, 2008, Arifovic &
Ledyard 2012), or reciprocity (Rabin 1993, Charness & Rabin 2002, Dufwenberg &
Kirchsteiger 2004, Wendel & Oppenheimer 2010, Ambrus and Pathak 2011).
In terms of representing the cognition of participants that processes the factors and uses
them in selecting decision options, there have arisen two approaches (Arifovic & Ledyard
2012): (a) agents implement a static set of one or more pre-introduced decision options
(Anderson et al. 1998, Fehr & Schmidt 1999, Andreoni & Samuelson 2006, Ambrus &
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Pathak 2011), or agents implement a dynamic set of one or more pre-introduced decision
options that the agents modify based on their experience (Cooper & Stockman 2002,
Anderson et al. 2004, Janssen & Ahn 2006, Wendel & Oppenheimer 2007, Arifovic &
Ledyard 2012).
The application of the SOSIEL framework in designing agents for representing VCM
participants exemplifies a third approach that combines and goes beyond the abovementioned two, with SOSIEL agents implementing a dynamic set of one or more preintroduced decision options that they can modify and add new decision options to, based
on their experience.
IEL agents were selected for comparison because, according to Arifovic and Ledyard
(2004), they outcompeted other approaches (Cooper & Stockman 2002, Janssen & Ahn
2006) in reproducing human behavior and, according to Arifovic and Ledyard (2012), were
able to explain behavior in VCMs more robustly and comprehensively than any other
approach. In order to facilitate a comparison between the implementation of SOSIEL
agents within the aVCM context with that of IEL agents, the parameterization of SOSIEL
agents also follows the formulation described in Isaac and Walker (1988).
Subsections 7.2.2.3.1 and 7.2.2.3.2, respectively, present: (a) the factors hypothesized in
aVCM-IEL and aVCM-SOSIEL to explain the participant behavior in VCM experiments and
(b) ways in which these factors are represented. The cognition of IEL and SOSIEL agents
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that processes the factors and uses them in selecting decision options are discussed in
the results section.

7.2.3.3.1 aVCM-IEL
IEL (Individual Evolutionary Learning) is a multi-agent evolutionary learning approach,
inspired by the processes of genetic replication (mutation, natural selection). As in the
VCM-I&W, the aVCM-IEL simulates the decision-making of a group of IEL agents who
interact indirectly by contributing to and sharing the benefits of a common pool.
The agents in aVCM-IEL are differentiated through variations in three parameters of their
respective utility functions, which take on the following linear form:
Equation 6: Utility function of aVCM-IEL participants.

𝑢𝑖 = 𝑃𝜋𝑖 + 𝛽 𝑖 𝜋̅ − 𝛾 𝑖 max{0, 𝜋̅ − 𝜋𝑖 }
where 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 (𝑤𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 ) + 𝑚/𝑁(𝑐𝑖 + ∑𝑁−1
̅ = (𝜋𝑖 + ∑𝑁−1
𝑗=1 𝑐𝑗 ) and 𝜋
𝑗=1 𝜋𝑗 )⁄𝑁 . The first
element in the utility function (𝑃𝜋𝑖 ) represents an aVCM-IEL agent’s preference for selfbenefit, the second element (𝛽 𝑖 𝜋̅) represents their preference for common-benefit, and
the third element (𝛾 𝑖 max{0, 𝜋̅ − 𝜋𝑖 }) represents their preference for fairness-towardsself.
The three parameters that differentiate agents are their marginal returns from selfbenefit (𝑃𝑖 ≥ 0) common-benefit, (𝛽 𝑖 ≥ 0), and fairness-towards-self, (𝛾 𝑖 ≥ 0). The
average participant contribution per period results from VCM-I&W experiments are used
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to calibrate the values of these parameters, thereby determining the distribution of agent
profiles within a simulation.
Initial contributions are assigned to agents randomly, using a uniform distribution. It is
not explained in Arifovic and Ledyard (2012) whether this is based on the idea that
participants in VCM experiments choose their initial contributions randomly. However,
this generates an initial average contribution of approximately 50%, which is similar to
the initial average participant contribution observed in VCM-I&W experiments.
There are at least two significant differences between the aVCM-IEL and the VCM-I&W.
The first difference is in the use in the aVCM-IEL of the average payoff (𝜋̅) in both the
process of calibrating the marginal returns (𝑃𝑖 , 𝛽 𝑖 , 𝛾 𝑖 ) with VCM-I&W results and in the
process of calculating the utility functions of agents (𝑢𝑖 ) in each period. However, the
average payoff is not known to VCM participants, since they are not made aware and have
no way of calculating themselves the endowment sizes (𝑤𝑖 ) of other participants. This
difference and the theoretical basis for using the average payoff in the utility functions of
agents are not addressed in Arifovic and Ledyard (2012).
The other difference is in aVCM-IEL not using what is available to the VCM-I&W
participants, specifically the difference in the payoff from keeping tokens (𝑝𝑐𝑖 ) and the
payoff from the common pool (𝛼). To be exact, based on the above-provided formulation
of the utility functions, aVCM-IEL agents do not have the capacity to differentiate
between a payoff from tokens kept and a payoff from the common pool, information that
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is provided to VCM participants at the end of each period. This difference is also not
addressed in Arifovic and Ledyard (2012).

7.2.3.3.2 aVCM-SOSIEL
As in VCM-I&W experiments and aVCM-IEL simulations, the aVCM-SOSIEL simulates the
decision-making of a group of SOSIEL agents who interact indirectly by contributing to
and sharing the benefits of a common pool.
The aVCM-SOSIEL, like other models built in line with the SOSIEL framework, is a
knowledge-based system designed to utilize knowledge acquired from real-world
decision-makers. However, in cases where direct access to knowledge is not (for whatever
reason) possible, attempts to reconstruct such knowledge from available sources remains
the only alternative. This is an example of such an attempt.
The hypothesis used to explain the behavior of VCM participants and parameterize the
aVCM-SOSIEL can be organized into describing: (a) the profiles of participating agents and
(b) the distribution of these profiles in a simulation. Both are described below.

7.2.3.3.2.1 Agent profiles
Heterogeneity in behavior at both the beginning and end of VCM experiments suggests
the presence of heterogeneity among agent profiles. However, it is worth noting that the
heterogeneity in behavior does not necessarily imply heterogeneity in motivation, as is
concluded by many (e.g., Andreoni 1990, Rabin 1993, Fehr & Schmidt 1999, Falk &
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Fischbacher 2000, Bolton & Ockenfels 2000, Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger 2004, Arifovic &
Ledyard 2012), since confusion among a homogenous group could just as well be its
source.
With the question of Why are some BR participants willing to contribute even though the
UR solution is not to? being at the core of interest in VCM experiments, the formulation
of the aVCM-SOSIEL is based on Sober and Wilson’s (1999) proposition that humans can
be separated into the following four profiles:
1. An egoist is the one who only takes their own benefit into consideration, when
making decisions, and who is indifferent towards the benefit of others;
2. A more egoist than altruist is the one who takes their own benefit into consideration
first, when making decisions, but when there is no conflict between their own
benefit and that of others also takes the benefit of others into consideration;
3. A more altruist than egoist is the one who takes the benefit of others into
consideration first, when making decisions, but when there is no conflict between
the benefit of others and their own benefit also takes their own benefit into
consideration; and
4. An altruist is the one who takes the benefit of others into consideration, when
making decisions, and who is indifferent towards their own benefit.
The use of profiles is gaining interest in economics literature with respect to their relation
to social outcomes (Cooper & Kagel 2017). The idea of using agent profiles that do not
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change during an experiment is supported by Kurzban and Houser (2005), who profiled
participants based on their behavior in a set of experiments and then had them
participate in additional experiments, in which their profiles remained relatively stable.
Sober and Wilson (1999) proposed the above four profiles in the context of multi-level
selection theory, which is based on the premise that competition in a population of
individuals takes place not only among individuals, but also among groups that these
individuals form into, and that the groups with a higher number of altruists outcompete
those with lower numbers. The premise explains the existence of altruistic behavior,
which at the individual level is in many cases (and especially in battled for survival) inferior
to selfish behavior.
In the aVCM-SOSIEL, the above four profile types are differentiated based on: (a) pursued
goals and their relative importance levels and (b) initial knowledge heuristics and their
agent-specific anticipated influences. Below is a description of both.

7.2.3.3.2.1.1 Goals and their relative importance levels
One of the ways SOSIEL agents are differentiated is by the goal(s) they pursue, which,
once initially assigned, do not change for agents. In the aVCM-SOSIEL, there are two
possible goals, with agents pursuing only one during a period. The first goal (G1) is focused
on self-benefit and involves maximizing personal payoff, 𝜋𝑖 , where:
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Equation 7: The personal payoff equation.

𝑐𝑖 + ∑𝑁−1
𝑗=1 𝑐𝑗
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 (𝑤𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 ) + 𝑚
𝑁
The second goal (G2) is focused on common-benefit and involves maximizing common
payoff, 𝛼, where:
Equation 8: The common-benefit equation.

𝛼=𝑚

𝑐𝑖 + ∑𝑁−1
𝑗=1 𝑐𝑗
𝑁

In VCM experiments, both 𝜋𝑖 and 𝛼 are provided to participants at the end of each period.
As Table 8 displays, egoist agents are only assigned G1, more egoist than altruist and more
altruist than egoist agents are assigned both G1 and G2, and altruist agents are only
assigned G2 (Tab. 8).
Table 8: Agent profiles.
Agent Profile
egoist
more egoist than altruist
More altruist than egoist
altruist

Goal(s)
G1
G1, G2
G1, G2
G2

G1_IL
1
0.5-0.9
0.1-0.4
0

G2_IL
0
0.1-0.4
0.5-0.9
1

While more egoist than altruist and more altruist than egoist agents are both assigned
two goals, they differ based on the importance levels assigned to each goal, with the two
levels having to add up to one. In the case of more egoist than altruist agents, importance
levels for G1 (G1_IL) and G2 (G2_IL) are randomly assigned (using a Gaussian distribution
with µ=0.5 and σ=0.2) from [0.5, 0.9] and [0.1, 0.4], respectively. While, in the case of
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more altruist than egoist agents, importance levels for G1 and G2 are randomly assigned
(using a Gaussian distribution with µ=0.5 and σ=0.2) from [0.1, 0.4] and [0.5, 0.9],
respectively.
The assignment of different goals to agents is done with the aim of producing the
motivational heterogeneity commonly observed in VCM experiments (Sonnemans et al.
1999, Keser & Winden 2000, Fischbacher et al. 2001, Fischbacher & Gächter 2010,
Fischbacher et al. 2012).
Sober and Wilson (1999) noted that the behavior of individuals with the above-mentioned
profiles aligns when there is no conflict between self- and common-benefit. However, the
egoist and more egoist than altruist agents on one hand and the altruist and more altruist
than egoist agents on the other behave differently when self- and common-benefit
conflict. Sober and Wilson (1999) further noted that motivation is not clear when interests
coincide and can only be clarified when they conflict.

7.2.3.3.2.1.2 Initial knowledge heuristics
Another way in which SOSIEL agents are differentiated is by the decision options they are
initially assigned. Decisions by agents during a simulation that are used to create new
decision options, which further differentiate them, are based on their own experience in
a that simulation. In the aVCM-SOSIEL, there are two possible initial decision options,
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knowledge heuristic 1 (KH1) and knowledge heuristic 2 (KH2), both representing a
possible contribution amount during a period.
KH1 is based on the agent’s G2_IL and is therefore unique for each agent. For example, if
the G2_IL assigned to an agent is 0.7, then choosing KH1 would result in their contributing
7 out of 10 of their tokens to the common pool. In the context of the VCM, the equivalent
of this are participants basing their first contribution on the level of importance they
attribute to contributing. This makes sense, since in the first period VCM participants are
not yet exposed to the social characteristics of their specific VCM experiment. KH1 is
assigned to all agent profiles (E, META, MATE, A).
Choosing KH2 would result in the agent contributing all of their tokens to the common
pool and is assigned only to the agents of the more altruist than egoist profile. The logic
behind its assignment is based on Tversky and Shafir (1992) and Shafir and Tversky (1992),
where an explanation is proposed for why initial contributions in VCMs start higher and
then decline.
In their research, Shafir and Tversky (1992) found that participants behaved significantly
differently when they were aware of the decisions made by their counterparts than when
they were not. Specifically, they found that participants on average contributed
significantly more when they were uncertain of what others would contribute. This led
Shafir and Tversky (1992) to the conclusion that motivation-based preferences cannot be
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the only drivers of behavior and that reasons and considerations influencing decisionmaking are treated differently under uncertainty.
They pointed out that, in some instances, decision-makers may have a good reason for
pursuing each of the available decision options. If the likelihood of any of the options is
uncertain, however, the decision-maker may lack a clear reason for choosing one option
over another. This, in turn, may lead them to either trying to simplify the decision
situation or postpone making a decision within it until the uncertainty is resolved.
Experiments conducted in other decision situations described in Shafir and Tversky (1992)
and elsewhere (e.g., Evans 1984) provide supporting evidence for the above proposition.
It was observed, in these experiments, that when participants are explained the essential
properties of a decision situation that were initially unclear to them, they often change
their decision choices closer in line with UR behavior. This suggests that change in the
level of uncertainty about the decision situation at least partially drives the observed BR
behavior (Shafir & Tversky 1992).
Based on their findings, Shafir and Tversky (1992) argued that, in the VCM, uncertainty at
the beginning of the first period from not knowing what the others will do makes it
difficult for the participants to evaluate their decision options or see their preferences
clearly, leading at least some of the participants to simplify the decision situation by
ignoring some of the options and choosing the one that they find to be most socially
acceptable. Shafir and Tversky (1992) suggest that cooperating under uncertainty in the
220

first period may even be an attempt by some of the participants to induce the others to
cooperate.
At the end of the first period, finding out one’s payoff from the common pool (and
comparing it to one’s own contribution) significantly reduces the uncertainty and thereby
simplifies the decision process for the participants, making the selection of the option in
line with UR behavior that much easier to make. This remains to be the case for the rest
of the periods.
An interesting observation is that this explanation resembles Anatol Rapoport’s tit-for-tat
strategy (Axelrod 1981, Axelrod & Hamilton 1981), which has come out as the dominant
strategy in an n-player PD tournament that was organized by Robert Axelrod.
Returning to KH2, Shafir and Tversky’s (1992) research forms the basis for why KH2 is
included as an initial decision option. The explanation for why it is only assigned to agents
of the more altruist than egoist profile is based on the following reasoning: agents of the
egoist and more egoist than altruist profiles only take their own benefit into consideration
or take it into consideration first, respectively, and therefore are unlikely to choose the
socially acceptable option at a time of uncertainty. Agents of the altruist profile are
already contributing all of their tokens, by design. This leaves agents of the more altruist
than egoist profile as the only potential holders of the KH2 decision option.
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7.2.3.3.2.2 Agent distribution
The trends of the average participant contribution per period in VCM-I&W experiments
offer some insight into the distribution of the participant profiles who produced them.
For example, the fact that average participant contributions per period during and across
the experiments remain positive suggests that participants were not all egoists. Similarly,
the fact that the average participant contributions per period during and across the
experiments approach zero suggests that participants were not all altruists.
Beyond this, however, not much can be derived about the distribution of participant
profiles. As a result, it is not clear whether declines in contributions were driven by: (a)
conflicting motivations, (b) calculations using and/or comparisons of made-available
values, (c) confusion, or (d) any combination of the three. With that being the case,
determining the distributions of participants in the VCM experiments with the currentlyavailable level of information is impossible.
Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction, social systems allow for equifinality,
which means that the behavior produced in VCM experiments was most likely (if not
definitely) produced by a variety of distributions of participant profiles. This makes sense,
considering how unlikely it is to have the same distribution of participants each time in
an experiment.
Therefore, combining the above with the fact that similar behavior trends are
nevertheless repeatedly produced, it may be safe to assume that there is something
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about the experiment that leads different distributions of personality profiles to behave
in a similar way. With this in mind, aVCM-SOSIEL was tested with 24 out of the 410
possible distributions (App. A2), with the 24 distributions selected based on their
categorical nature.

7.3 Results: Application to SOSIEL and IEL agents
This section describes an application of the DBR method in attempting to invalidate the
ability of SOSIEL and IEL agents to represent BR decision-makers in the VCM-I&W. It
begins with a description of the identified behavior trends in the PD, VCM-I&W, aVCMIEL, and aVCM-SOSIEL, follows with a description of discovered mismatches and identified
heuristics, and concludes with a comparison of the behavior trends, mismatches, and
knowledge heuristics found in the PD, VCM-I&W, aVCM-IEL, and aVCM-SOSIEL. As
previously mentioned, the ability of DBR artificial agents to represent the behavior of BR
decision-makers can be invalidated based on their misrepresentation of the knowledge
of BR decision-makers, their cognition, or both.
As seen in Table 9, all of the decision situations were run for 10 periods. The PD included
2 players and 2 decision options, while the VCM and aVCMs included 10
participants/agents and 10 decision options. Lastly, in the VCM and aVCMs, the marginal
return from keeping a token during a period (𝑝) was 1, the marginal return from the
common pool during a period (𝑚) was 3, and the marginal return per capita from the
common pool during a period (𝑚⁄𝑁) was 0.3.
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Table 9: Initialization.
PD
VCM-I&W
aVCM-IEL
aVCM-SOSIEL

𝑇
10
10
10
10

𝑁
2
10
10
10

𝐷
2
10
10
10

𝑝
n/a
1
1
1

𝑚
n/a
3
3
3

𝑚 ⁄𝑁
n/a
.3
.3
.3

The results are organized in line with the four steps of the DBR method and include the
following four sections: (a) identifying patterns in behavior, (b) discovering mismatches
with properties, (c) identifying knowledge heuristics, and (d) comparing lists.

7.3.1 Identifying patterns in behavior
This subsection corresponds to the first step in the DBR method, which is to create a list
of all similarities and differences found between the BR and DBR behavior and the UR
behavior. The behavior pattern of interest is the change in the per period average
participant contribution over the ten periods. Other behavior patterns commonly
observed in VCM experiments (e.g., Ledyard 1995; Holt & Laury 2008, Chaudhuri 2011)
are not discussed here for the sake of focus.
In the PD, both players immediately identify the optimal decision option and defect in
each one of the ten periods. In the context of the VCM, this is equivalent to none of the
participants contributing to the common pool during any of the periods and therefore the
average participant contribution per period remaining zero.
In the VCM-I&W experiments, the average participant contribution per period (Fig. 30)
and the variety in the contribution amount start higher and more heterogeneous,
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respectively, both declining thereafter, but without reaching zero and total homogeneity.
The pattern of behavior in aVCM-IEL simulations is in line with VCM-I&Ws. The average
agent contribution per period in aVCM-SOSIEL simulations also starts higher, but barely
declines during the simulations and therefore also remains above zero.
Figure 30: Average participant contribution per period.

It is not clear exactly what the cause is of the pattern of the VCM-I&W average, beyond
that it represents a relatively high initial average participant contribution that more or
less steadily declines from period to period, but not to zero. The pattern of the aVCM-IEL
average is a result of the specific design of the utility function that is calibrated with VCMI&W results and that leads to all agents gradually reducing their contributions.
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Lastly, there are three reasons explaining the pattern of behavior in the aVCM-SOSIEL.
The first two are related to the way SOSIEL agents behave when parameterized with Sober
and Wilson’s (1999) profiles. The third is related to the inability of Sober and Wilson’s
(1999) profile framework and Shafir and Tversky’s (1992) explanation for behavior under
uncertainty to describe the behavior in VCM experiments on their own.
The first reason is rooted in the way that SOSIEL agents use their experience-based
expectations to decide how much to contribute. In the case of agents with more egoist
than altruist (or more altruist than egoist) profiles, if the average contribution turns out
to be lower (or higher) than their expected amount, then more egoist than altruist (or
more altruist than egoist) agents reduce (or increase) their own contribution amount. On
the other hand, if the average contribution turns out to be higher (or lower) than their
expected amount, then more egoist than altruist (or more altruist than egoist) agents
maintain their contribution amount.
The design logic and the resulting behavior sound reasonable, but lead to a significant
portion of more egoist than altruist and more altruist than egoist agents maintaining their
contribution amounts throughout most or even all of the periods. Running the
simulations with a small number of agents, with the aim of corresponding to the number
of participants in VCM experiments, amplifies this effect. It is not clear whether Sober and
Wilson (1999) took the relationship between expectations and decisions into
consideration when devising their profile framework.
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The second reason is rooted in the way that SOSIEL agents with more than one goal
choose which goal to focus on during a period. As described in Subsection 7.2.2.3.2.1.1,
SOSIEL agents are partially differentiated by the importance levels assigned to their goals.
These importance levels determine the likelihood with which a SOSIEL agent chooses a
goal during a period.
The design logic in this case and resulting behavior also sound reasonable, but lead to
some more egoist than altruist agents occasionally behaving like more altruist than egoist
agents and vice versa, which is a behavior unexplained by Sober and Wilson’s (1999)
profile framework. It is also not clear whether Sober and Wilson (1999) took the
relationship between having numerous goals and the process of goal selection into
consideration when devising their profile framework.
The third reason is rooted in the way that variety in agent behavior can be overlooked
when using average-based indicators, namely the average agent contribution per period.
In the aVCM-SOSIEL, agents with egoist and altruist profiles contribute none or all of their
tokens, respectively, while some agents with more egoist than altruist (or more altruist
than egoist) profiles gradually reduce (increase) their contributions, in effect offsetting
each other’s behavior.
Interestingly, the aVCM-SOSIEL results cannot be brought closer in line with aVCM-I&W’s
by biasing the distribution of agents towards ones with more egoist than altruist or egoist
profiles. This is because of the Shafir and Tversky (1992) based relationship between the
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number of more altruist than egoist profile agents (who initially try to stimulate
cooperation by contributing fully) and the higher initial value of the average agent
contribution. A reduction in the number of more altruist than egoist profile agents, as a
result of an increase in the number of more egoist than altruist or egoist profile agents,
reduces the initial amount of the average agent contribution and therefore maintains the
produced pattern.
In summary, the behavior of BR VCM-I&W participants differs from that of UR PD players
throughout the experiment. The aVCM-IEL artificial agents are capable of reproducing
these differences, although through the use of knowledge and cognition that is not
available to VCM participants. The aVCM-SOSIEL artificial agents, on the other hand, are
not capable of reproducing these differences, mainly due to the limitations of and
incompatibilities between the theory-based knowledge used to represent the knowledge
of VCM participants.

7.3.2 Discovering mismatches with properties
This subsection corresponds to the second step in the DBR method, which is to create a
list of matches and mismatches between the properties of the decision situation and the
corresponding properties of the BR decision-maker’s and DBR artificial agent’s knowledge
and/or cognition of that decision situation that could have produced the observed
behavior.
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There are two essential properties that cut across all the versions of the decision
situations being studied. The first property remains unchanged throughout all the periods
and relates to the inherent structure of all the decision situations being explored here. It
is the fact that reducing the number of tokens contributed during a specific period in the
VCM-I&W, aVCM-IEL, and VCM-SOSIEL increases one’s payoff for that specific period. This
is because the marginal return per capita from the common pool (𝑚⁄𝑁 = 0.3) is set lower
in the VCM-I&W, aVCM-IEL, and VCM-SOSIEL than the marginal return per token kept
(𝑝 = 1). In the context of the PD, it is because the payoff from cooperating, while the
other player defects, is set lower than the payoff from defecting, while the other defects.
In the context of the VCM-I&W, for a participant to use this property to understand the
decision situation they would need to calculate the marginal return per capita from the
common pool (𝑚⁄𝑁), which requires the application of algebra and can only be
completed from the second period onward after being presented with information about
the results of the first period.
The second property has the potential of changing from period to period and relates to
the circumstantial distribution of group members and the effects of their decisions on
each other. Particularly, it is that how much a participant decides to contribute during a
specific period significantly depends on their goals and expectations for the decision
situation in the current period; goals and expectations that were most likely shaped by
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the information they received about the contributions of others during the prior period
(Fischbacher & Gächter 2010).
This property requires insight into how other agents respond in the current decision
situation to the results of the prior period’s decision situation. Participants can analyze
the results of the prior period’s decision situation by comparing one’s own contribution
to the common pool (𝑐𝑖 ) with the payoff received from the common pool (𝛼). Both of
these values are provided to participants of VCM experiments at the end of each period.
However, figuring out whether others make this comparison and how it influences their
contribution choices is beyond the cognitive capacity of any VCM participant. The extent
to which the comparison is a good predictor of the behavior of others in the current
period depends on the extent to which the prior period’s behavior of others is
representative of their current period’s behavior.
For a participant to completely understand the common-pool resource problem they are
facing during any period, it is necessary and sufficient for them to have access to the
above-mentioned knowledge and to possess the necessary cognitive ability for processing
it. Any lack of necessary knowledge and/or cognition represents a mismatch between one
or more properties of the decision situation and one or more properties of the
participant’s knowledge and/or cognition. In cases when the two essential properties of
the decision situation align, one can be used as an indicator of the other. However,
experimental results, such as the ones referenced in this chapter, and empirical evidence
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have shown that in decision situations that are poorly understood, neither one is a
credible indicator of the other.
The following four subsections analyze the mismatches between decision situation
properties and the properties of the knowledge and cognition of PD players, VCM
participants, and aVCM-IEL and aVCM-SOSIEL agents.

7.3.2.1 PD
Since both of the players in the PD are UR, they both fully understand the abovementioned properties of the decision situation and possess the necessary cognitive ability
and relevant knowledge as early as the first period. Therefore, there are no mismatches
between the properties of the decision situation and the properties of the players’
knowledge and/or cognition.

7.3.2.2 VCM-I&W
In the case of the VCM-I&W, neither one of the properties can be known to any of the
participants at the beginning of an experiment because at that point they still do not have
enough information to make the necessary calculations and deductions for understanding
either of them. Therefore, it can be said with certainty that there are mismatches in the
first period between these two properties of the decision situation and the knowledge of
the participants.
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Starting with the second period, the first property can be deduced, by calculating the
marginal return per capita from the common pool. However, how many participants (if
any) actually make the calculation necessary for deducing the first property is not clear.
Therefore, starting with the second period, it cannot be determined with certainty
whether there is or isn’t a match between the first property and a participant’s knowledge
and/or cognition.
How well the second property can be estimated for the current period by comparing one’s
own contribution to one’s payoff from the common pool during the prior period depends
on the extent to which the prior period’s group behavior offers insight into the current
period’s. Therefore, starting with the second period, it also cannot be determined with
certainty whether there is or isn’t a match between the second property and a
participant’s knowledge and/or cognition.

7.3.2.3 aVCM-IEL
As was the case with the VCM-I&W, neither one of the properties is known to an aVCMIEL agent during the first period of the simulation and therefore there are mismatches in
the first period between these two properties of the decision situation and the knowledge
of the aVCM-IEL agents. Unlike the VCM-I&W participants, however, in the second and
later periods, aVCM-IEL agents continue to not have the necessary knowledge and/or
cognition to make the calculations needed for understanding the first property and,
therefore, the mismatch with the first property remains.
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The same can be said about the second property in the second and later periods. As
previously mentioned (Subsec. 7.2.2.3.1), the preference for common-benefit and
fairness-towards-self elements in the utility functions of aVCM-IEL agents include the per
period average payoff to all (𝜋̅) as a variable. The use of this variable, however, aside from
it representing information that is unavailable to VCM participants, provides much less
insight into understanding the second property than if they were to compare one’s
contribution to the payoff from the common pool.
It is not explained in Arifovic and Ledyard (2012) why aVCM-IEL agents use less useful
information that is not available to VCM participants, namely 𝜋̅, and do not use more
useful information that is available to VCM participants, namely the relationship between
𝑐𝑖 and 𝛼. In any case, aVCM-IEL agents continue to face mismatches between these two
essential decision situation properties and their knowledge and cognition throughout the
simulation.
The above-mentioned differences between the first layer of boundedness of the aVCMIEL agents’ rationality and the BR of the VCM participants are compensated by the
downwardly-biased design of the aVCM-IEL agents’ utility functions and the calibration of
the functions’ parameters with per period participant contribution averages from VCMI&W experiments. This can be seen as being part of the aVCM-IEL agents’ second layer of
boundedness, which compensates for the misalignment between the first layer of
boundedness and the knowledge and cognition of VCM-I&W participants.
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7.3.2.4 aVCM-SOSIEL
As was the case with VCM-I&W and aVCM-IEL, neither one of these properties is known
to an aVCM-SOSIEL agent during the first period of the simulation and therefore there are
mismatches in the first period between both of these essential decision situation
properties and the knowledge of the aVCM-SOSIEL agents.
In the second and later periods, as with aVCM-IEL agents, aVCM-SOSIEL agents continue
to lack the necessary knowledge and/or cognition to make the calculations needed to
understand the first property and, therefore, the mismatch with the first property
remains. As with aVCM-IEL agents, it is worth noting that this is unlike VCM participants,
some of whom could have had the knowledge and cognition to make the necessary
calculations.
However, the same cannot be said about the second property in the second and later
periods. aVCM-SOSIEL agents have and use their ability to estimate the second property
(by comparing their own contribution to their payoff from the common pool) and,
therefore, as with VCM participants, whether their estimate is accurate or not depends
on the extent to which the prior period’s group behavior is representative of the current
period’s group behavior. Therefore, as with VCM participants, starting with the second
period, it cannot be determined with certainty whether there is or isn’t a match between
the second property and a aVCM-SOSIEL agent’s knowledge and/or cognition.
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In summary, VCM-I&W participants are initially unaware of the two properties of the
VCM, but starting with the second period have the potential of calculating the first and
estimating the second. Similarly, both aVCM-SOSIEL and aVCM-IEL agents are unaware of
the two properties during the first period. However, starting with the second period, the
aVCM-SOSIEL agents have the potential of estimating the second property, while aVCMIEL agents do not. Therefore, aVCM-SOSIEL agents share more (mis)matches with VCM
participants than aVCM-IEL agents do.

7.3.3 Identifying knowledge heuristics
This subsection corresponds to the third step in the new DBR method, which is to create
a list of knowledge heuristics that could have been activated in response to the respective
(mis)matches identified in Step 2 (Subsec. 7.3.2) and that could have produced the
corresponding behavior(s) identified in Step 1 (Subsec. 7.3.1).

7.3.3.1 PD
In the case of the PD, there are no mismatches and the observed behavior is defection by
both players in every period. The UR analysis that underpins both players’ decisionmaking is based on a backward deduction and starts from the last period. Both players
know with certainty that defecting is the optimal decision option during the last period of
the game, when taking into consideration the fact that the other player may defect, and
therefore both plan to defect in the last period. Given the expected outcome for the last
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period, however, defecting also becomes the optimal decision option for the prior to last
period, which also leads to their planning to defect in the prior to last period. Following
this logic, defecting ends up being the optimal decision option for every period.

7.3.3.2 VCM-I&W
Analysis of behavior in Isaac and Walker (1988) is limited, but an extensive literature
review by Chaudhuri (2011) found that many participants in experiments with similar
results (e.g., Sonnemans et al. 1999, Keser & Winden 2000, Fischbacher et al. 2001,
Fischbacher & Gächter 2010, Fischbacher et al. 2012) are to some extent conditional
cooperators, basing their contribution amounts at least partially on their expectations of
the contribution from others. These expectations can be updated by comparing one’s
contribution to one’s payoff from the common pool.
For example, Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) found that declines in average participant
contribution per period are a result of declines in participant expectations, which are due
to decline because of earlier declines in the average participant contribution. Towards the
end of their experiments, Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) found all participants behaving
like egoists, even though only a small minority of them was motivated by self-benefit.
The presence of conditional cooperators explains in general why contributions decline
after earlier declines in average participant contribution and offers some significant
insight into the structure of knowledge heuristics used by VCM participants. What
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remains to be explained in order to fully describe participant knowledge heuristics are the
relationships among: (a) motivation(s); (b) contributions; (c) experience, both previous
and during the game; and (d) expectations that vary both for and among participants, and
through which participant interactions repeatedly produce the same group-level
behavior.

7.3.3.3 aVCM-IEL
In the aVCM-IEL, the caugnitive heuristics of IEL agents that are implemented each period
are clearly defined in Arifovic and Ledyard (2012). Agents start with the process of
experimentation by using a uniform distribution to randomly select a decision option from
their set of possible decision options (initially consisting of all possible options) and using
it to replace another randomly selected decision option from the same set of possible
decision options.
The IEL agents follow with the process of replication by using a uniform distribution to
randomly select pairs of decision options from their set of possible decision options,
evaluating how each would have done under the prior period’s conditions, and replacing
into their set of possible decision options a pair that consists of the one that would have
done better and its copy. It is not explained in Arifovic and Ledyard (2012) why it is
assumed that all VCM participants have access to the prior period’s conditions, a fact that
would involve their calculating the marginal return from the common pool.
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Lastly, IEL agents use a uniform distribution to randomly select a decision option from the
modified set of decision options, with the randomized nature of the selection process
partially being the reason for why the decline in contributions is gradual. It is not
explained in Arifovic and Ledyard (2012) why the process of selecting a decision option
needs to be random. In other words, why don’t IEL agents make their decisions more
decisively (as opposed to randomly), based on what they know, as some if not many
participants in VCM experiments may very well be doing.
It is also worth noting that the structure of the utility functions of aVCM-IEL agents are
biased towards reducing contributions. In fact, irrespective of the values of preferences
parameters, the initial contributions, or the behaviors of other agents, the contributions
of aVCM-IEL agents can only remain constant or decline. It is not explained in Arifovic and
Ledyard (2012) whether this is based on the assumption that the participants of VCM
experiments have an inherent bias towards self-benefit.
Furthermore, the contributions of aVCM-IEL agents decline from period to period, rather
than remain constant, due to the initial discrepancy between the initial contributions of
aVCM-IEL agents, which are randomly generated and assigned, and their preferred
contribution levels, which reflect the above-described structure of their utility functions
and the values of preference parameters (calibrated using VCM-I&W results). In fact,
contributions stop declining when the above-mentioned discrepancy disappears.
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7.3.3.4 aVCM-SOSIEL
The cognitive heuristics of aVCM-SOSIEL agents that drive their behavior each period are
described in Chapter 2. At the beginning of the simulation, agents start with the process
of action selection, during which they choose their contribution amount for the first
period. Agents with egoist, more egoist than altruist, and altruist profiles only have one
knowledge heuristic in their mental models to choose from, namely KH1, and therefore
choose to contribute in line with their G2_IL value. Agents with more altruist than egoist
profiles start with two knowledge heuristics in their mental models, namely KH1 and KH2,
and initially choose KH2 with the aim of behaving in a socially acceptable manner and/or
stimulating cooperation.
In the second period, agents with egoist and altruist profiles continue basing their
contributions on their G1_IL and G2_IL values and contribute to the common pool none
of their tokens or all of their tokens, respectively.
The behavior of agents with profiles more egoist than altruist (or more altruist than
egoist) depends on whether or not they expected the first period’s average participant
contribution to be higher (or lower). If the first period’s average participant contribution
was in line with their expectations, they continue contributing the same amount.
However, if the first period’s average participant contribution was below (or above) their
expectations, they generate a new knowledge heuristic with a lower (or higher)
contribution value.
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In summary, VCM-I&W participants likely use their expectations of how much others will
contribute in determining their own contribution amounts. Updating such expectations
can be done by comparing one’s contribution to one’s payoff from the common pool. This
comparison is also applied by aVCM-SOSIEL agents, but not by aVCM-IEL agents.

7.3.4 Comparing lists
This subsection corresponds to the fourth step in the DBR method, which is to compare
the lists of behaviors, (mis)matches, and heuristics.
The pattern of behavior produced in the aVCM-IEL, namely the average agent
contribution per period, fits extremely well with the pattern in the VCM-I&W (mainly
because the parameters in the utility functions of aVCM-IEL agents are calibrated with
VCM-I&W results). The same cannot be said for the pattern produced in the aVCMSOSIEL, which also includes a negative slope, but fails to replicate the significant decline
in the contribution average that is representative of VCM experiments.
However, the mismatches (Tab. 10) and heuristics of aVCM-SOSIEL agents correspond
much more closely with those of VCM-I&W participants than do those of aVCM-IEL
agents.
Table 10: Matches and mismatches.

Decision situation
PD
VCM-I&W
VCM-IEL

Period 1
Mismatch with Mismatch with
1st Property
2nd Property
no
no
yes
yes
yes
yes

Periods 2-10
Mismatch with Mismatch with
1st Property
2nd Property
no
no
depends
depends
yes
yes
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VCM-SOSIEL

yes

yes

yes

depends

7.4 Conclusion
As may be concluded from the analysis of VCM experiments (Sonnemans et al. 1999,
Keser & Winden 2000, Fischbacher et al. 2001, Fischbacher & Gächter 2010, Fischbacher
et al. 2012), behavior in these experiments is driven by relationships among: (a)
motivation(s); (b) contributions; (c) experience, both previous and during the game; and
(d) expectations that vary both for and among participants. Determining these
relationships is the key to understanding and, in turn, modeling the behavior of BR
decision-makers in VCM experiments, as well as in potentially many other decision
situations. Currently, no theory is capable of fully describing these relationships, even in
the VCM alone, from the point of participants choosing their initial contributions to the
point of their choosing their last.
aVCM-SOSIEL is a novel attempt at determining these relationships in the context of the
VCM. The analysis in the results section shows that aVCM-SOSIEL agents: (a) are capable
of representing much of the knowledge and cognition of VCM participants, mainly
because they use knowledge and cognition available to VCM participants; but (b) are not
capable of reproducing the average behavior of VCM participants, mainly because of the
limitations of Sober and Wilson’s (1999) profiles framework. Turning agents with more
altruist than egoist profiles into conditional cooperators may resolve the offsetting effect
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(Subsec. 7.3.1), but it would also be disruptive to the internal logic of Sober and Wilson’s
(1999) profile framework.
In regards to aVCM-IEL, it is also a novel attempt to develop a theory that explains the
behavior of VCM participants. The analysis in the results section shows that aVCM-IEL
agents: (a) are not capable of representing the knowledge and cognition of VCM
participants, mainly because they do not use information available to VCM participants
and, instead, use information unavailable to them; but (b) are capable
of reproducing the average behavior of VCM participants, mainly because the calibration
of the parameters in the utility functions of aVCM-IEL agents is based on VCM-I&W
results.
The inability of aVCM-SOSIEL agents to reproduce the average behavior in VCM-I&W
experiments and of the aVCM-IEL agents to represent the knowledge and cognition of
VCM participants invalidates for the time being their ability to represent the behavior of
BR participants in VCM experiments. Improving the ability of aVCM-SOSIEL agents to
represent VCM participants may be approached by experimenting with alternative
knowledge theories, while improving the ability of aVCM-IEL agents may be approached
by moving away from modeling techniques inspired by econometrics and genetic
replication and towards those inspired by psychology and sociology.
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7.5 Contribution
The main contribution described in this chapter is the DBR method for testing the ability
of artificial agents to represent human decision-making, which builds on the new
frameworks described in Chapter 6. The value of the DBR method, which is displayed in
this chapter through its application, is its ability to move beyond behavior averages and
allow for the application of analytical methods from psychology in the testing. By doing
this, the method helps to avoid false positive test results, which the aVCM-IEL exemplifies,
and provide insight into how to improve the ability of artificial agents to represent human
decision-making. The DBR method also serves as an alternative to the Turing Test, with
which it shares some characteristics in its overall structure, but differs by grounding the
test in a specific context and frameworks rooted in psychology.
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Chapter 8: Contributions, conclusions, and next steps
Chapter 8 ends with this dissertation’s contributions and conclusions, as well as a
discussion about the next steps in terms of: (a) implementing SHE in Bohdanska Dolyna,
(b) using evolutionary game theory to introduce rigor into the analysis of the decisionoutcome relationship, and (c) improving the SOSIEL framework.

8.1 Contributions
This dissertation is rooted in a wide range of fields that include, but are not limited to: (a)
cognitive architectures, (b) human cognition, (c) knowledge-based systems, (d) multiagent systems, and (e) social-ecological systems. The dissertation contributes to these
fields by producing three new frameworks, two new methods, and two new open-source
modeling tools.

8.1.1 The three new frameworks
This dissertation introduces the following three new frameworks: (a) the SOSIEL
framework, (b) the framework for analyzing the bounded-rationality of decision-makers,
and (c) the framework for analyzing the doubly-bounded rationality of artificial agents.
a. The SOSIEL framework advances the study of human decision-making by providing a
comprehensive and (as demonstrated by the SOSIEL platform) operationalizable
system of cognitive structures and processes relevant to decision-making. It also
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advances the fields of multi-agent modeling and knowledge-based systems by
serving as a blueprint for a new generation of cognitive, multi-agent, and
knowledge-based models that overcome the challenges and meet the additional
criteria discussed in Chapter 1.
b. The framework for analyzing the bounded rationality of decision-makers advances
the study of human decision-making by consolidating and organizing concepts
related to bounded rationality in a way that establishes a comprehensive
relationship between a decision situation and a decision.
c. The framework for analyzing the doubly-bounded rationality of artificial agents
advances our ability to model human decision-making by providing deeper insight
into the relationships among (a) a decision situation, (b) a decision-maker making a
decision within that decision situation, (c) a modeler modeling the decision-maker,
and (d) an artificial agent designed by the modeler to represent the decision-maker.
The insight from the last two frameworks advances our understanding of how and
where undesirable biases can enter the process of modeling decision-making and of
how and where improvements can be made with respect to an artificial agent’s
ability to represent human decision-making.

8.1.2 The two new methods
This dissertation introduces two following two new methods that advance our ability to
model human decision-making: (a) the SOSIEL method for acquiring and operationalizing
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decision-making knowledge and (b) the DBR method for testing the ability of artificial
agents to represent human decision-making.
a. The SOSIEL method for acquiring and operationalizing decision-making knowledge
advances our ability by providing guidance on how to acquire, process, and
represent decision-making knowledge for parameterizing and initializing models that
are built in line with the SOSIEL framework or, more generally, that are cognitive,
multi-agent, and knowledge-based. The method is unique in its ability to acquire
both the breadth in knowledge that is characteristic of heterogeneous populations
and the depth in knowledge that is characteristic of expert systems.
b. The DBR method advances our ability to test artificial agents in representing human
decision-making. The value of the method is its ability to move beyond the
limitations of analyzing behavior averages and allow for the application of individual
and group psychology in the testing. By doing this, the method helps to avoid false
positive test results, as well as provides insight into how to improve the ability of
artificial agents to represent human decision-making. The DBR method also serves
as an alternative to the Turing Test, with which it shares its overall structure, but
differs by grounding the test in specific decision situations and frameworks rooted in
psychology.
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8.1.3 The two new open-source modeling tools
This dissertation introduces the following two new open-source modeling tools: (a) the
SOSIEL platform and (b) the SOSIEL Human Extension (SHE) for LANDIS-II.
a. The SOSIEL platform makes headway in the field of multi-agent modeling by
operationalizing the SOSIEL framework and providing researchers with a tool for
modeling individual and social human decision-making that overcomes the
challenges and meets the additional criteria described in Chapter 1. The platform
also contributes to the field of modeling social-ecological systems by providing a
platform that can be coupled with platforms/models simulating ecological
processes. SHE is an example of such a coupling.
b. LANDIS-II’s SHE expands the field of modeling social-ecological systems by
providing researchers with the ability to model human behavior in a forestclimate context in a way that, as mentioned above, also overcomes the
challenges and meets the new criteria.

8.2 Conclusions
This dissertation demonstrates that the challenge of designing multi-agent models with
agents whose behavior is grounded in both empirical evidence and theory can be
overcome by empowering each agent with their own cognitive architecture that consists
of theoretically-grounded cognitive processes and agent-specific and empiricallygrounded knowledge. It does this by introducing the new SOSIEL framework, which
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provides a blueprint for and the theoretical foundations of a new generation of cognitive,
multi-agent, and knowledge-based models that overcome the challenge. The dissertation
provides support for the framework by introducing: (a) the new SOSIEL method for
acquiring and operationalizing agent-specific and empirically-grounded knowledge and
applying it in the context of SHE and Bohdanska Dolyna; (b) the new open-source SOSIEL
platform, which is an example of an operationalization of the SOSIEL framework; and (c)
LANDIS-II’s SHE, which is an example of a coupling of the SOSIEL platform with one that
simulates forest-climate change.
This dissertation also demonstrates that testing the ability of artificial agents to represent
human decision-making can be improved with a method of analysis that is rooted in
psychology. It does this by first introducing two new psychology-based frameworks for
analyzing the bounded rationality of human decision-makers and the doubly-bounded
rationality of artificial agents, which provide insight into the relationship between a
situation and a decision. It then introduces the DBR method, which builds on the
frameworks in testing the ability of artificial agents to represent human decision-making.
The dissertation demonstrates how through the application of psychology-based analysis
the DBR method can help avoid false positive test results and provide insight into how to
improve the ability of artificial agents to represent human decision-making.
Overcoming current challenges in designing cognitive, multi-agent, and knowledge-based
models holds the promise of improving our ability to develop, analyze, and implement
248

policy. For example, the SOSIEL platform allows us to explore interactions among relevant
factors influencing decision-making and outcomes that were not previously
comprehensively explored in the context of multi-agent modeling. However, at this point,
the process of overcoming obstacles still uncovers new and potentially more challenging
ones. For example, while providing deeper insight, the framework for analyzing the
doubly-bounded rationality also highlights the many ways in which human decisionmaking may be misrepresented in the process of modeling.
Perhaps this is a symptom of the relatively young state of the science of modeling human
(as opposed to unboundedly-rational) behavior, and the fact that it requires a much
deeper understanding of human psychology and sociology, which the respective fields do
not yet provide. In this regard, models of human behavior could also play a significant role
in advancing our understanding of human psychology and sociology by testing theories in
those fields.

8.3 Next steps
Next steps include moving forward with the application of LANDIS-II with SHE in the
Ukrainian Carpathians, improving the SOSIEL framework and platform, and expanding the
SOSIEL toolkit.
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8.3.1 Application of LANDIS-II with SHE in the Ukrainian Carpathians
One of the first next steps is to finish the application of LANDIS-II with SHE in Bohdanska
Dolyna. LANDIS-II has already been parameterized, initialized, and calibrated for the
context, by a team that is led by Ivan Kruhlov and that includes Oleh Chaskovsky, Robert
Scheller, and Dominik Thom. Parameterizing and initializing SHE still involves populating
the extension with knowledge, demographics, and social network structures of 1544 Luhy
residents.

8.3.2 Improve the SOSIEL framework and platform
There are ways in which the SOSIEL framework and platform can be improved. Below are
descriptions of planned further improvements, as they relate to the learning and decisionmaking processes and memory and social structures.

8.3.2.1 Improvements to the memory component
Below is planned development to the memory structures component of the cognitive
architecture:
1. The memory structures that are part of the cognitive architecture of SOSIEL agents
can be seen as representing short-term memory. However, many cognitive
architectures (e.g., Laird et al. 1986) utilize both short- and long-term memory, with
long-term memory providing noticeable benefits to both learning and making
decisions. Future work will involve introducing structures for storing long-term
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memory and supporting processes for extracting it from short-term knowledge,
modifying (with the aim of improving) it, and implementing it in guiding decisionmaking.

8.3.2.2 Improvements to the learning and decision-making components
Below is planned developments to the learning and decision-making processes
components of the cognitive architecture:
2. According to Johnson-Laird (2010), the larger the number of sub-decisions that need
to be made in relation to a decision (more than three), the harder it becomes for
humans to make the decision. This is a limitation on information processing power
that should be reflected during the process of satisficing. Future work will involve
introducing this limitation into the satisficing process.
3. The process of goal prioritization in the cognitive architecture of SOSIEL agents
prioritizes the importance levels of goals, with respect to how well an agent is doing
in achieving them. However, in line with Fleischhut & Gigerenzer (2013), importance
levels of goals should also be prioritized with respect to potential changes in the
agent’s beliefs. Future work will focus on introducing a new learning process that
changes inherent importance levels of goals based on changes in beliefs.
4. A SOSIEL agents process of learning and decision-making consists of a set of
complementary cognitive processes. However, each cognitive process or even the
entire learning and decision-making process is likely to be only one of a number of
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substitutable processes available for use, with which is used depending on the
context. For example, in the context of social learning, Biele and Rieskamp (2013)
suggested that averaging the advice of neighbors is a possible cognitive heuristic. In
the context of satisficing, Klein (1998) proposed take-the-first as a possible
approach, while Czerlinski and colleagues (1999) proposed take-the-last. As a further
example, Pingle and Day (1996) suggested that decision-making can take on a
number of modes, including: (a) trial and error, (b) imitation, (c) following an
authority, (d) unmotivated search, or (e) based on a hunch. As a result, different
SOSIEL agents may successfully use different cognitive heuristics in identical decision
situations (Hertwig et al. 2013). Rieskamp and Otto (2006) argue that humans do,
indeed, use different decision-making processes and provide an approach for how to
choose among alternative cognitive processes in different contexts. Future work will
focus on introducing alternative cognitive processes and meta-level processes that
use context to choose which to implement.

8.3.2.3 Improvements to the memory, learning, and decision-making components
Below is planned developments to the memory, learning, and decision-making
components of the cognitive architecture:
5. The knowledge captured by knowledge heuristics is procedural. However, in
addition to procedural knowledge, there is also declarative knowledge, which has
been successfully utilized in a prominent cognitive architecture, called ACT-R
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(Anderson & Lebiere 1998), and recently incorporated into another prominent
architecture, called SOAR (Laird 2008). In the context of the SOSIEL framework,
declarative knowledge would be facts about decision situations in which agents
need to make decisions. Such facts could allow for more powerful learning
processes. Future work will focus on developing an approach to capturing and
utilizing declarative knowledge in the cognitive architecture of SOSIEL agents.
6. In line with Langley and colleagues (2009), the cognitive architectures of SOSIEL
agents are identical among agents and remain fixed during a simulation, while the
knowledge varies. However, it is likely the case that cognitive architectures can vary
among individuals potentially as much if not more than the decision situations they
find themselves in. Furthermore, it is possible that architecture and knowledge coevolve, through aging and being exposed to intellectually encouraging and stiffening
events. For example, as with knowledge heuristics, existing cognitive heuristics may
also be modified or new ones may be learned or even created. Future work will
involve exploring ways of modifying the cognitive architecture of SOSIEL agents in a
way that allows for it to co-evolve with an agent’s experience.

8.3.2.4 Social structure
Below is planned developments to the social structure:
7. Social processes, such as structural balancing of social networks (Easley & Kleinberg
2010), influence social structure and, in turn, social outcomes. Future work will
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involve exploring ways of introducing the process of structural balancing into the
social structure of SOSIEL agents.

8.3.3 Expand the SOSIEL toolkit
I would also like to focus my research on expanding the SOSIEL platform’s set of tools,
used in analyzing its results. This, for example, includes demonstrating the usefulness of
evolutionary game theoretic concepts (e.g., evolutionarily stable strategies, Nash
equilibria) and formulation in decision-outcome and scenario analysis and introducing a
novel method for identifying regime shifts, which relies on dynamics in causal ranking.
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Appendix A: Interview guide for forest use
The purpose of this interview guide is to provide guidance for opening an interview, to
provide a set of initial and follow-up questions to motivate discussion about forest use
and management practices during an interview, and to provide guidance for closing an
interview.
Opening, the main goal of which is to motivate the respondent to communicate openly
and actively. During the opening, you should introduce yourself and remind the
respondent about the purpose of the study, which is to better understand the ways in
which they interact with the resource. The opening is an opportunity to establish a level
of trust, which is essential for the success of the interview and may be increased by getting
to know each other (Lewicki & Wiethoff 2000). You must also obtain consent following
the procedure specified by your research institution.
Middle, the main goal of which is to form and maintain a rapport with the respondent
that will allow for openness (Eden et al. 1992; Fontana & Frey 1994) and them sharing
relevant knowledge about resource use and/or management.
Closing, the main goal of which is to communicate both verbally and nonverbally that the
interview has come to an end and that you appreciate them spending time to participate
in our study. During closing, you should ask the respondent if they have any questions
and express sincere gratitude. Offer them contact information in case they have any
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questions or would like to add something to or change their answers. Also let them know
what to expect next. The ending phase should not be skipped.
Things to keep in mind while opening, conducting, and closing an interview:
1. Be genuinely polite. Keep in mind that the interviewee is doing us a favor by
participating in this interview.
2. Establish and maintain trust. Be transparent about the purpose of the interview and
each question.
3. Be sensitive to the interviewee’s body language. Keep in mind that an interviewee’s
interest and/or desire in participating in this interview or answering specific
questions may change. No need to push. Make sure the interviewee is comfortable
during the entire interview process or otherwise suggest rescheduling the interview.
4. Communicate clearly and in layman’s terms. Keep in mind that the interviewee may
not be familiar with technical terminology.
Below is a list of tasks an interviewer needs to complete as part of opening an interview.
1. Introduce yourself.
2. Remind interviewee about the purpose of the study, which is to better understand
different types of forest use and management decision situations and practices and
how the practices are learned, adjusted, and experimented with over time.
3. Obtain oral consent following procedure outlined in “Oral Consent Document.”
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Below is a list of questions an interviewer needs to ask during an interview.
1. Please describe some of the forest use and management decision situations that you
find yourself in that do not require any learning, adjustment, and/or
experimentation. In other words, decision situations for which you have an
established routine.
a. In relation to a specific decision situation:
i. Describe the decision situation. How can you tell that it is this decision
situation? What type of things do you notice that make you realize that you
are in this decision situation? Do your neighbors or anyone else help you
realize that you are in this decision situation? How often does this decision
situation occur?
ii. What do you do in this decision situation? Why, what is the goal? What are
the exact steps? Does your response include involving anyone else besides
yourself? Do you always do the same thing? If not, then how do you know
when to do what? What will happen if you do nothing?
iii. How do you know when you are done responding to this decision
situation?
iv. Is there anything else about this decision situation and your response that
would be worth mentioning?
b. Are there any other decision situations of this kind?
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4. Please describe some of the past forest use and management decision situations
that you found yourself in that required some learning, adjustment, and/or
experimentation. In other words, decision situations for which you either had a
routine that needed to be adjusted or for which you had somewhat of a routine that
needed to be improved.
a. In relation to a specific decision situation: (as above)
b. Are there any other decision situations of this kind?
5. Please describe some of the past forest use and management decision situations
that you found yourself in that were unfamiliar to you and in which you didn’t know
what to do and had to learn, adjust, and/or experiment.
a. In relation to a specific decision situation: (as above)
b. Are there any other decision situations of this kind?
6. Please describe some forest use and management decision situations that you
foresee happening in the future that.
a. In relation to a specific decision situation:
i. Describe the decision situation. How will you be able to tell that it is this
decision situation? What type of things do you expect to notice that will
make you realize that you are in this decision situation? How often do you
expect this decision situation to occur?
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ii. What will you do in this decision situation? Why, what will be your goal?
What will be your exact steps? Will your response include involving anyone
else besides yourself? What will happen if you do nothing?
iii. Is there anything else about this decision situation and your response that
would be worth mentioning?
b. Are there any other decision situations of this kind?
Below is a list of tasks an interviewer needs to complete as part of closing an interview.
1. Let them know that this brings the interview to an end.
2. Express sincere gratitude.
3. Ask the interviewee if they have any questions.
4. Offer them contact information in case they have any questions or would like to add
something to or change their answers.
5. Say goodbye.
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Appendix B: aVCM-SOSIEL simulations
Two simulation batches were conducted in the sensitivity analysis of aVCM-SOSIEL. The
first batch included 40 simulations of four distributions, with each consisting of only one
of the four agent profiles (Tab. App.B.1).
Table App.B.1: Results from first batch of sensitivity analysis.

Agent profile
First Last
egoist
0
0
more egoist than altruist 3.24 2.92
More altruist than egoist 8.76 8.76
altruist
1
1

The second batch included 240 simulations of 24 distributions (out of the possible 410
distributions), with each consisting of at least one and a varying quantity of each agent
profile. Table Appendix B.2 lists the simulated distributions and their 10-run average
agent contribution during the first and last period.
Table App.B.2: Results from second batch of sensitivity analysis.
Distribution
1234
1243
1324
1342
1423
1432
2134
2143
2314
2341
2413
2431

First
7.15
6.95
6.61
6.37
5.86
5.83
6.53
6.91
5.84
4.95
5.08
4.79

Last
7.08
6.96
6.43
5.98
5.63
5.61
6.52
6.83
5.59
4.54
4.91
4.48

Distribution
3124
3142
3214
3241
3412
3421
4123
4132
4213
4231
4312
4321

First
5.90
5.74
5.44
5.18
4.02
3.75
4.93
4.90
4.49
4.26
3.75
3.63

Last
5.71
5.45
5.36
4.90
3.85
3.63
4.86
4.65
4.37
3.92
3.53
3.36
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